

# The Glass Ceiling from Day Zero: Path Dependence in Financial Advisors' Careers.

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## Abstract

Why do equally skilled women earn less than their male counterparts? Using detailed panel data on over 3,000 Canadian financial advisors over 13 years, we document a 40–50% gender pay gap that cannot be explained by differences in performance, effort, or client satisfaction. Female advisors charge identical fees, deliver comparable investment returns, and retain clients at equal rates—yet earn substantially less because they manage smaller client books. This disparity originates at career entry: female advisors begin with 47% less assets under management despite equivalent qualifications and financial expertise. These initial gaps persist throughout their careers, with female and male advisors exhibiting parallel growth trajectories. Quasi-random client reassignments reveal that clients assigned to female advisors actually exhibit higher retention, suggesting the market inefficiently allocates talent. The persistence stems from path dependence rather than ongoing discrimination—initial disadvantages compound through network effects and limited access to secondary book markets. Our findings demonstrate how even temporary barriers at entry can create permanent inequality in trust-based professional services.

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# 1 Introduction

Understanding why gender gaps persist in high-skilled occupations remains a central challenge in labor economics. While extensive research documents disparities in hiring, promotion, and compensation across professions, identifying the specific mechanisms that create and sustain these gaps proves difficult in settings where performance evaluation is subjective and compensation structures are opaque.<sup>1</sup> We examine financial advisors—professionals who build independent books of business with transparent, performance-based pay—to isolate how gender disparities emerge and evolve when traditional explanations like subjective evaluation bias or firm-level discrimination are minimized. This setting allows us to track complete career trajectories while observing both the quantity and quality of output, providing unique evidence on whether persistent gaps reflect differences in productivity, initial opportunities, or the dynamics of human capital accumulation in relationship-driven professional services. Our findings speak to broader questions about inequality in markets where success depends on client relationships and network effects, including law, medicine, consulting, and other professional services where practitioners build portable practices over their careers.

Using data from over 3,000 Canadian financial advisors over 13 years, we document a striking gender gap in advisor compensation: female advisors earn 40–50% less than their male counterparts. This gap is almost entirely accounted for by differences in Assets Under Management (AUM) and client counts, rather than by differences in percentage fees or investment performance. Female advisors charge similar fees, deliver comparable returns, and retain clients at similar rates. Once we control for the size and composition of an

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<sup>1</sup>For hiring disparities, see for example, Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004); Neumark, Bank, and Van Nort (1996); Goldin and Rouse (2000); Moss-Racusin, Dovidio, Brescoll, Graham, and Handelsman (2012). For promotion and compensation gaps, see Bertrand and Hallock (2001); Blau and Kahn (2017); Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2010); Card, Cardoso, and Kline (2016); Babcock, Recalde, Vesterlund, and Weingart (2017). Evidence in specific professions includes: law (Azmat and Ferrer, 2017; Wood, Corcoran, and Courant, 1993), medicine (Sarsons, Gürgün-Kaya, Kuka, and Zeltzer, 2021; Ganguli, Sheridan, Gray, Chernew, Rosenthal, and Neprash, 2021), academia (Ginther, Schaffer, Schnell, Masimore, Liu, Haak, and Kington, 2011; Ceci, Ginther, Kahn, and Williams, 2014; Sarsons, Gürgün-Kaya, Kuka, and Zeltzer, 2021), and financial advisors (Egan, Matvos, and Seru, 2022; Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan, 2015).

advisor’s book, the compensation gap effectively disappears. These findings indicate that the earnings disparity does not reflect differences in skill, effort, or job performance and outcomes.

These findings are particularly compelling because our setting offers advantages rarely found in empirical studies of the labor market. First, there is transparency in both performance and pay: advisor compensation is formulaic, tied directly to AUM through standardized commissions, and investment performance is continuously observable. Second, unlike most professional labor markets—where evaluations are subjective and compensation structures opaque—this decentralized, client-driven environment eliminates institutional gatekeeping and enables a clean mapping between inputs and outcomes. That a substantial gender gap in pay emerges despite equivalent performance underscores the importance of understanding how differences in advisor books arise and evolve.

The gender gap in earnings can be traced to systematic differences in initial client books. Female advisors start with significantly smaller books—both fewer clients and lower AUM per client—even within the same firm and entry cohort. These initial gaps persist over time, despite female advisors growing at similar (or faster) rates, acquiring clients with comparable characteristics, and exiting the industry at the same rate as their male peers. Crucially, advisor characteristics at entry—such as age, net worth, and financial expertise—are balanced across genders. In a setting where both performance and compensation are transparent, these patterns point to initial client allocation as a central mechanism through which long-run disparities arise.

To probe this mechanism further, we examine involuntary advisor switches that randomly reassign clients from departing advisors to new ones. Clients assigned to female advisors are more likely to stay and less likely to withdraw assets, even after controlling for book characteristics and past performance. We find no evidence that clients are more sensitive to female advisor performance, nor that gender homophily drives retention patterns. These findings suggest that persistent disparities are not sustained by ongoing client preferences or

performance differentials. Instead, they reflect differences established at the outset. Complementing this evidence, we find that female advisors are significantly less likely to acquire books from exiting advisors—particularly from male sellers—despite achieving comparable client retention post-transfer.

Taken together, these results show how differences present at entry can give rise to durable disparities that persist throughout advisors’ careers. In a decentralized, client-driven market where performance is transparent and compensation is mechanically linked to outcomes, even modest frictions in initial client assignment—whether due to statistical discrimination, trust barriers, or network-based exclusion—can lead to inequality that is sustained over time, even in the absence of differential performance or attrition.

We contribute to several streams of literature. A substantial body of research has documented gender disparities in labor market outcomes, particularly in hiring, compensation, and promotion (e.g., Bertrand and Hallock, 2001; Blau and Kahn, 2017). A key strand of this literature focuses on the evolution of gender gaps over the life cycle, emphasizing the role of supply-side factors such as career interruptions, caregiving responsibilities, and preferences for temporal flexibility in shaping women’s earnings trajectories (e.g., Goldin, 2014). Other work are either cross-sectional—making it difficult to pinpoint *when* disparities arise—or are experimental in design, detecting bias in hypothetical or one-shot settings without observing long-run dynamics (Moss-Racusin, Dovidio, Brescoll, Graham, and Handelsman, 2012; Milkman, Akinola, and Chugh, 2015). In this paper, we make three distinct contributions to this literature.

First, we offer rare *observation data based evidence* of how gender inequality in market outcomes originates at the *point of entry*—before performance is observable—and then *persists over time despite equivalent growth trajectories and survival rates across genders*. In our setting of financial advisors, clients select advisors directly, advisors build their own client bases, and compensation is commission-based. This high-information, high-accountability context—where managers do not mediate outcomes and performance is measurable—allows

us to isolate the role of *client-side bias*. We show that female advisors begin with significantly smaller books of business than their male counterparts, despite no differences in returns, risk, or other observable characteristics. Once in the market, however, female advisors grow at the same rate, retain clients at the same rate, and are no more likely to exit. These findings are striking because they suggest that *bias operates through unequal access to initial opportunities*, not through differential treatment conditional on performance.

While an extensive literature documents discrimination at the point of hiring (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; Neumark, Bank, and Van Nort, 1996), these studies typically focus on access to jobs mediated by employers or gatekeepers. Our setting differs in that clients—not firms—are the decision-makers, and advisors build their own business through client acquisition. This allows us to isolate a form of demand-side bias in a decentralized market, and to trace its long-term impact on economic outcomes despite equal performance.

Second, we propose a simple theoretical framework in which *discrimination at entry* (Phelps, 1972; Arrow, 1973) generates a one-time disadvantage for female advisors, which is then *amplified by path dependence* in client growth dynamics. As advisors accumulate performance records and client referrals, new clients rely less on gendered priors and more on observable outcomes. This reconciles the persistence of early gaps with the absence of ongoing bias. Our model differs from classic theories of dynamic discrimination (Coate and Loury, 1993) in showing that *inequality can persist even in a fully meritocratic second stage*—simply because *the first stage embeds inequality into market structure via compounding growth and low reversibility*. This logic also helps explain why affirmative action or interventions aimed at improving initial access (rather than later-stage outcomes) are critical in trust-based, client-driven markets.

Finally, we contribute to the literature on discrimination in financial services by shifting the focus away from portfolio performance and firm-level hiring (Barber and Odean, 2001; ?) to the *client-advisor relationship as a key site of inequality production*. While past work has shown that consumers, students, and clients implicitly favor male professionals in

contexts like academia (Moss-Racusin, Dovidio, Brescoll, Graham, and Handelsman, 2012), consulting (Milkman, Akinola, and Chugh, 2015), and customer service (Hekman, Aquino, Owens, Mitchell, Schilpzand, and Leavitt, 2010), our setting is unique in tracking *how that bias translates into long-term career outcomes in a decentralized, high-stakes market*. Because advisor-client matches are self-initiated, and performance is transparent, our findings offer a rare field test of how early-stage discrimination—not institutional filtering—can shape economic trajectories.

## 2 Data

We use administrative records provided by two (independent) Canadian Mutual Fund Dealers. These firms advise just under C\$20 billion of assets, or roughly 5% of assets under management by MFDA-registered advisors. Financial institutions in the Mutual Fund Dealer Association (MFDA) represent a primary component of retail investment in Canada. Their advisors are licensed to distribute only mutual funds.<sup>2</sup> The dataset contains transactions and demographic information for clients and advisors from 1999 to 2012.<sup>3</sup> We can access the last available “Know Your Client” form. This form collects information on the client’s risk tolerance, investment horizon, financial knowledge, wealth, income, and occupation.

Our main sample of investors includes approximately 480,000 advised clients holding different types of investment accounts. Over one-quarter of investors own a brokerage account (“General” or “Open”), while 85% own retirement-related accounts (either “RRSP” or “RRIF”). Fewer investors own college saving accounts or “RESP” (9%) and tax-free accounts (4%). Summary statistics for the full sample are shown in Table 1.

We supplement our analysis with a subsample of our main sample, which we call the switcher sample. These are investors who were forced to switch advisors during our sample

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<sup>2</sup>As of December 2022, 85 MFDA members employed roughly 78,000 advisors and managed accounts worth C\$635B, or nearly 50% of Canadian retail investment assets.

<sup>3</sup>These two firms are the same as those examined in Linnainmaa, Melzer, and Previtero (2021).

period due to their current advisor leaving the dataset.<sup>4</sup> We identify such switches using several criteria. First, the leaving advisor must have at least ten clients during the six months prior to the exit. This ensures that we are capturing truly full-time working advisors. Second, the client and the advisor must have been working together for at least one year prior to the advisor’s exit. Third, the client must start working with a new advisor within less than a year of the old advisor’s exit. These filters ensure that we capture true switches due to an advisor’s exit.

This sample contains 14,774 investors, initially advised by 463 advisors and advised by 507 advisors after the switch. We consider these switches as quasi-exogenous, as the vast majority of switches in our sample represent transfers of entire client groups, or “books of business,” from one advisor to another at the same dealer. Ninety percent of displaced clients who remain at the firm select the same new advisor. Summary statistics for the investors and advisors in this sample are shown in Table 2.

### 3 The Gender Gap in Advisor Compensation

This section presents our baseline empirical findings where we document the magnitude and sources of the compensation gap.

Our analysis begins with OLS regressions estimating the relationship between advisor gender and compensation. We find a substantial gender gap: female advisors earn approximately 65% less than their male counterparts in total dollar compensation when controlling only for year-month fixed effects (column 1, Table 3). This gap narrows slightly to 56% with the inclusion of geographic fixed effects (column 2), which allows comparisons among advisors who live and work in similar locations. The magnitude of this disparity is striking—female advisors earn roughly 35 to 44 cents for every dollar earned by male advisors—and ranks among the largest gender pay gaps documented in professional services (Azmat and

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<sup>4</sup>Advisors leave the dataset likely due to either retirement or death, though we can’t observe the exact reason.

Ferrer, 2017; Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz, 2010; Wood, Corcoran, and Courant, 1993; Blau and Kahn, 2017). These findings are particularly surprising given that financial advisory compensation is often directly tied to performance and client value creation. Such a large gap raises two possibilities: either there are substantial gender differences in performance, or factors unrelated to productivity play a significant role in shaping compensation—even in a setting with transparent, formulaic pay structures.

### **3.1 Does performance explain this gap?**

To disentangle these possibilities, we examine whether differences in performance or productivity across male and female advisors contribute to this gap. Here our setting provides a crucial advantage over most studies of gender gaps in professional labor markets. Unlike traditional professions where performance evaluation is subjective and compensation structures are opaque, the financial advisory industry offers several unique features that allow for measurement of both inputs and outcomes.

First, advisor compensation is formulaic and transparent, tied directly to Assets Under Management through standardized commission structures. Second, investment performance is continuously observable and objectively measurable through client returns. Third, client outcomes such as retention rates and asset flows provide clear, quantifiable indicators of advisor effectiveness. Fourth, the decentralized, client-driven nature of the market eliminates institutional gatekeeping that might otherwise obscure the relationship between performance and pay. For example, compensation is not mediated by managerial discretion or subjective evaluations within hierarchical teams, where ratings may reflect managerial biases as well as employee performance. Taken together, these features make our setting an ideal laboratory for evaluating the role of performance in gender disparities, as they allow us to rule out many of the confounding factors that complicate interpretation in several other settings.

We control for advisor performance and skill using four distinct measures: client portfolio returns, advisor alpha, advisor tenure, and the risk profile of the advisor’s personal

investments. Client returns directly capture the investment performance experienced by clients—arguably the most salient outcome from their perspective. Advisor alpha, by contrast, measures abnormal returns on the advisor’s own portfolio, constructed using monthly return data over the sample period. To flexibly capture cross-sectional variation, we include advisor alpha-by-decile fixed effects. Controlling separately for client and advisor returns allows us to account for potential moral hazard—for example, if advisors take more risk in their personal portfolios than they do with client funds. Advisor tenure and risk taking capture characteristics—the experience of the advisor and their risk appetite—that can affect advisor performance.

Remarkably, including this comprehensive set of performance controls has minimal impact on the estimated gender gap. The coefficient on the female indicator decreases only modestly, from -0.646 to -0.557. The persistence of the gap, despite rich controls for observable performance and advisor characteristics, suggests that productivity differences are unlikely to explain the compensation disparity.

### **3.2 Client Characteristics and Market Segmentation**

Our results suggest that factors beyond productivity shape compensation, even in a setting with transparent, formulaic pay structures. As a next step, we test whether client-side heterogeneity might contribute to the observed gap. One possibility is that female advisors systematically serve different segments of the client market—such as lower-income households or more risk-averse individuals—that yield lower fees or require alternative service models. To evaluate this, we introduce a rich set of client-level controls in column (4), including client income, geographic location, age, gender composition, and the riskiness of their portfolio (as a proxy for risk tolerance).

After accounting for these characteristics, female advisors continue to earn substantially less than their male counterparts. The gender coefficient remains large and statistically significant at -0.677, nearly identical to the baseline estimate. These results suggest that

client market segmentation or differential matching to client types is unlikely to explain the observed compensation gap.

### **3.3 Supply-Side Factors and Advisor Characteristics**

A large literature attributes gender pay gaps, in part, to differences in labor supply—particularly around periods of family formation. Female workers often reduce labor supply for childbearing or caregiving responsibilities, and labor markets may penalize such gaps in employment (e.g., Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz (2010); Goldin (2014)). We evaluate the extent to which labor supply differences contribute to the compensation gap in our setting.

To proxy for family-related labor supply variation, we control for whether the advisor is single and whether they have children. In addition, we include the average length of the advisor–client relationship, which may capture past disruptions in service that shorten client tenure. We also control for the average number of investments per client, a measure that proxies for the time intensity or complexity of managing a given book. Column (5) of Table 3 shows that the gender gap remains large and statistically significant at -0.535 after including these controls. Column (6) adds geographic fixed effects to account for potential sorting into different neighborhoods based on advisor family structure or preferences. The estimated gap remains virtually unchanged at -0.515.

Together, these results suggest that labor supply differences—at least as captured by observable proxies—are unlikely to explain the large compensation gaps we document. Instead, female advisors appear to face systematic disadvantages despite having similar observable qualifications and client outcomes as their male counterparts.

### **3.4 The Role of Book Size**

A striking result emerges in column (7): once we control for Assets Under Management (AUM) per client, the coefficient on the female advisor indicator falls by more than half, to -0.252. This represents a reduction of over 60% relative to the raw gap, indicating that a

substantial portion of the compensation disparity is driven by differences in average account size. Further, when we additionally control for the number of clients, the gender coefficient becomes statistically insignificant and economically close to zero.

This finding is central to understanding how gender gaps operate in this market. Female advisors do not earn less because they charge lower fees, deliver inferior investment performance, or serve less lucrative client segments. Rather, they earn less because they manage smaller books—both in terms of client count and average AUM per client.

### **3.5 Complete Decomposition of the Gender Compensation Gap**

Our estimates thus far indicate a persistent gender gap in compensation that is unlikely to be explained by advisor performance, client characteristics, market segmentation, or supply-side factors. Instead, differences in AUM per client and the number of clients fully account for the disparity. However, in the preceding specifications, these control variables were added incrementally. To assess whether some combination of other observable factors might collectively explain the gap, column (9) of Table 3 includes all previously discussed controls—excluding AUM per client and client count—simultaneously. Relative to the baseline specification (column 1), the estimated gap narrows only modestly, from -0.646 to -0.518. In column (10), when we additionally control for AUM per client and the number of clients, the coefficient falls to near zero and becomes statistically insignificant, confirming that client book characteristics—not advisor performance, supply-side constraints, or client demographics—explain the gender gap in compensation.

## **4 Book Size Disparities**

This section examines gender differences in the size and composition of advisor books, their origins at market entry, and their persistence over time.

## 4.1 Decomposing Book Size Differences

To better understand the underlying drivers of these book-level disparities, we next examine differences in the scale and structure of advisors' books. This analysis allows us to isolate the extensive and intensive margins through which the gender gap in compensation arises. Table 4 presents a detailed decomposition of book size differences across four dimensions: percentage fees charged (columns 1–2), total client assets (columns 3–4), number of clients (columns 5–6), and AUM per client (columns 7–8).

We find no gender differences in the percentage fees charged to clients. The coefficients in columns 1–2 are -0.0165 and 0.00581, respectively—both economically negligible and statistically indistinguishable from zero. These results indicate that male and female advisors charge virtually identical rates for their services, ruling out fee differences as a contributor to the compensation gap.

The disadvantage for female advisors emerges in the composition of their books, along both the extensive and intensive margins. In terms of total client assets (columns 3–4), female advisors manage significantly less than male advisors, with coefficients of -0.638 in the raw specification and -0.519 after adding comprehensive controls. This disparity operates through two distinct channels: the number of clients (extensive margin) and the average AUM per client (intensive margin).

On the extensive margin, female advisors manage fewer clients, with coefficients ranging from -0.407 to -0.287 across specifications (columns 5–6). On the intensive margin, they manage smaller accounts on average, with coefficients between -0.228 and -0.190 (columns 7–8). Importantly, these differences remain large and statistically significant even after controlling for a wide range of advisor characteristics, performance metrics, and client demographics.

These results reveal that female advisors operate with systematically smaller books, both in the number of clients they serve and the assets managed per client. The fact that these gaps remain after controlling for performance, pricing, and client characteristics underscores the need to understand their origins.

## 4.2 Initial Gaps and Their Persistence

Do gender disparities in book size and composition originate at the start of an advisor’s career, or do they accumulate gradually over time? This distinction is crucial for understanding the mechanisms behind inequality: initial gaps may reflect barriers at entry—such as statistical discrimination or network-based exclusion—while gradual divergence would point to differential treatment or compounding disadvantages as careers progress. This section addresses both possibilities. We begin by examining book characteristics at entry, then assess whether these gaps persist over time.

Table 5 examines advisor book characteristics at entry, comparing advisors within the same dealer and entry cohort to control for firm-specific and time-varying factors. The results reveal substantial initial disparities. In the raw gap specification (Panel 1), female advisors begin with 47% lower total AUM (column 1), 17% lower AUM per client (column 2), and 28% fewer clients (column 3). These magnitudes are economically significant—female advisors enter the industry managing books worth nearly half as much as those of their male counterparts. They also begin with clients who are, on average, 0.56 years younger (column 8). Along other dimensions, however, there are few differences: female and male advisors have similar numbers of accounts per client (column 4) and comparable retention rates (column 5).

Controlling for advisor gross alpha performance (Panel 2) leaves these patterns largely unchanged: female advisors still enter with 60% lower total AUM and 38% fewer clients. Even after accounting for the gender composition of the initial client base (Panel 3), they continue to manage significantly smaller books at entry. These results suggest that client sorting on gender cannot account for the magnitude of the initial disparities.

To assess the persistence of gender gaps across advisor careers, we estimate the following specification:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \sum_{k=1}^{15} \beta_k \cdot \mathbf{1}[\text{Tenure}_{it} = k] + \gamma \cdot \text{Female}_i + \sum_{k=1}^{15} \delta_k \cdot \text{Female}_i \times \mathbf{1}[\text{Tenure}_{it} = k] + \theta_q + \lambda_t + \epsilon_{it} \quad (1)$$

where  $Y_{it}$  represents book characteristics for advisor  $i$  at time  $t$ , including log total assets under management, log AUM per client, log number of clients, average accounts per client, and client retention rates. The specification includes a full set of tenure dummies  $\mathbf{1}[\text{Tenure}_{it} = k]$  for  $k \in \{1, 2, \dots, 15\}$  years, capturing the baseline career trajectory. The coefficient  $\gamma$  on the female indicator captures the initial gender gap at entry, while the interaction terms  $\text{Female}_i \times \mathbf{1}[\text{Tenure}_{it} = k]$  test whether this gap evolves differentially by gender over careers.

We include advisor gross alpha decile fixed effects  $\theta_q$  to compare advisors of similar skill levels, ensuring that any observed gaps are not driven by performance differences. Time fixed effects  $\lambda_t$  control for market-wide temporal shocks. In our main specification, we include year fixed effects. As a robustness check, we replace these with dealer-by-entry-cohort fixed effects to control for firm-specific cohort effects and ensure results are not driven by compositional changes across firms or entry years. Standard errors are clustered at the advisor level.

The key parameters of interest are the interaction coefficients  $\delta_k$ , which capture the differential evolution of book characteristics for female advisors at each tenure year. If  $\delta_k \approx 0$  across all tenure years, this indicates parallel growth trajectories—female advisors neither catch up to nor fall further behind their male counterparts. Increasingly positive values of  $\delta_k$  would suggest convergence, while increasingly negative values would indicate divergence. The sum  $\gamma + \delta_k$  represents the total gender gap at tenure year  $k$ .

Figures 1–3 plot the marginal effects of advisor gender on key book outcomes across tenure years. Each figure is based on regressions similar to the specification described above, with three sets of controls: Panel (a) includes year fixed effects; Panel (b) adds dealer-by-entry-cohort fixed effects; and Panel (c) allows gender effects to vary by client gender through interaction terms.

Female advisors begin their careers managing approximately 40% less in total AUM than their male counterparts (Figure 1). This gap persists consistently throughout their careers, showing no signs of convergence even after 15 years of tenure. When examining within-cohort comparisons, the pattern remains stable, suggesting this is not driven by temporal trends or firm-specific factors. The interaction with client gender reveals that female advisors paired with female clients face the largest disadvantage, starting with approximately 45% lower AUM that persists throughout their careers.

The intensive margin reveals a similar pattern. Across all tenure years, female advisors consistently manage clients with 20–25% lower average account values (Figure 2). This gap widens slightly during mid-career years (around years 5 to 10) before stabilizing. The persistence of this disparity suggests that female advisors neither attract wealthier clients over time nor experience greater growth in the value of existing client accounts relative to their male counterparts.

On the extensive margin, female advisors consistently manage books with approximately 30% fewer clients across all stages of their careers (Figure 3). Although both male and female advisors grow their client bases over time, the trajectories are parallel, with no evidence of convergence. This persistent gap in client acquisition further amplifies the disadvantage in AUM.

Interestingly, female advisors achieve comparable—or slightly higher—client retention rates relative to their male counterparts across all tenure years (Figure 5). One-year retention rates hover around 95% for both genders, with female advisors showing marginally higher retention in some specifications. Consistent with this, client exit rates show no meaningful gender differences (Figure 6); monthly exit rates remain below 1% for both male and female advisors throughout their careers. The absence of differential attrition suggests that, once acquired, clients are equally satisfied with male and female advisors. Additionally, female advisors manage slightly more accounts per client—approximately 0.1 to 0.2 more on average—though this difference is economically small (Figure 4).

These patterns reveal a striking fact: the gender gaps observed at career entry remain stable over time. Despite equivalent client retention and no evidence of performance differences, female advisors neither close the initial gap in book size nor catch up in terms of client wealth. The parallel growth trajectories suggest that, once established, early disadvantages persist and are not mitigated by experience or reputation gains.

## 5 Why Gaps Emerge and Persist?

Having documented that female advisors begin with smaller books and experience parallel growth trajectories, we now examine the economic mechanisms underlying these patterns. This section explores two fundamental questions: what creates the initial disadvantage at career entry, and why do these gaps persist despite equivalent performance and client retention?

### 5.1 Sources of Initial Disparity

We begin by examining the sources of the initial disadvantage at career entry. Specifically, we evaluate three potential mechanisms that could generate the substantial gaps in book size: (1) gender-based sorting in client relationships, (2) differences in advisor characteristics that might justify differential allocation, and (3) statistical discrimination or trust barriers affecting initial client assignment.

#### 5.1.1 Gender Sorting in Client Relationships

One potential explanation for initial book size differences is gender-based sorting in advisor–client matching. If female advisors disproportionately attract female clients at entry—and if female clients tend to have lower average wealth or distinct investment profiles—this could contribute to smaller initial books.

Figure 7 examines how the gender composition of advisor client bases evolves over tenure.

Female advisors consistently serve a higher share of female clients than their male counterparts. At entry, their client base is approximately 58% female, compared to 48% for male advisors—a 10 percentage point gap that remains stable over time. This sorting pattern appears in both year fixed effects specifications (Panel a) and within dealer-entry cohorts (Panel b), suggesting it reflects systematic matching rather than firm-specific policies or time-varying shocks.

However, gender sorting alone cannot explain the magnitude of initial book size disparities. Even if female clients have somewhat lower average wealth, a 10 percentage point difference in client gender composition is insufficient to account for female advisors starting with 47% less AUM and 28% fewer clients. Moreover, Table 5 (Panel 3) shows that controlling for client gender composition reduces the AUM gap only marginally. These results suggest that while gender homophily is present in advisor–client matching, it explains at most a small fraction of the initial disadvantage faced by female advisors.

### 5.1.2 Advisor Characteristics

A second possibility is that female advisors differ in observable characteristics that influence initial client allocation. Table 6 examines gender differences in advisor attributes at entry, controlling for dealer-by-entry-cohort fixed effects to ensure comparisons are made within the same firm and entry period.

The results show striking similarities between male and female advisors at career entry. Female advisors are statistically indistinguishable from their male counterparts in age (coefficient of  $-0.741$  years), personal account values, net worth, financial knowledge, and family structure. Particularly noteworthy is the absence of differences in financial expertise: both self-reported knowledge and personal portfolio returns based on initial allocations show no gender gap. Female advisors’ own portfolios generate nearly identical returns to those of male advisors, suggesting equivalent financial acumen at the outset of their careers.

These null results are economically meaningful: they rule out the possibility that initial

book size disparities reflect legitimate differences in advisor quality, experience, or expertise. Female advisors enter the profession with equivalent credentials and demonstrable financial skills, yet receive markedly smaller client allocations at entry. This pattern points toward demand-side forces—rather than supply-side differences—as the primary driver of initial disparities.

## 5.2 Drivers of Persistence

Having established that substantial gaps exist at entry, we now turn to understanding why these disparities persist over the course of advisors’ careers, despite equivalent performance. Several mechanisms could account for this persistence: ongoing discrimination in performance evaluation, differential attrition, constraints on new client acquisition, persistent trust barriers, or structural frictions in secondary book markets. We examine each in turn and find that long-run disparities are driven primarily by path dependence in client acquisition and barriers to book transfers, rather than by performance-based discrimination or gender differences in exit.

### 5.2.1 Differential Performance Standards

One potential explanation for the persistence of gender gaps is that female advisors face higher performance thresholds: clients may be more likely to leave female advisors following poor performance or less responsive to strong performance. Figures 8 and 9 test for such differential treatment by examining how client retention and asset flows respond to portfolio returns, separately by advisor gender.

Figure 8 shows that client sensitivity to performance is similar across male and female advisors. Exit rates, net flows, and withdrawal probabilities respond nearly identically to return deciles, regardless of advisor gender. Across the entire distribution of returns, the response curves closely overlap, with no evidence that clients punish poor performance more harshly—or reward strong performance less generously—when the advisor is female. In-

teraction effects between advisor gender and performance are economically negligible and statistically insignificant across all specifications.

Figure 9 extends this analysis by testing whether gender homophily influences performance sensitivity—whether, for instance, female clients are more forgiving of female advisors’ poor returns or male clients more punitive. Again, we find no evidence of differential standards. The relationship between returns and client behavior is virtually identical regardless of whether advisor and client genders match. These null results are important: they rule out ongoing discrimination in performance evaluation as a driver of persistent gaps. Female advisors are held to the same standards as their male counterparts, suggesting that the durability of disparities must stem from other mechanisms.

### 5.2.2 Advisor Exit and Selection Effects

Another possibility is that differential selection through advisor exit sustains the observed gaps. If high-performing female advisors are more likely to leave the industry, or if low-performing male advisors disproportionately remain, compositional changes could maintain aggregate disparities even in the absence of ongoing bias. Figures 10–12 examine exit behavior and its relationship to advisor quality.

Trends in Figure 10 show modest gender differences in exit rates across tenure. Female advisors are slightly less likely to exit early in their careers but exhibit somewhat higher departure rates after year 10. These differences, however, are small—typically under 0.2 percentage points—and not statistically significant.

When exit patterns are stratified by advisor performance (Figure 11), no meaningful variation emerges. High- and low-performing advisors exit at similar rates regardless of gender, and the distribution of surviving advisors by gross alpha decile remains balanced throughout the tenure distribution. Similarly, analysis in Figure 12 shows that client return performance does not predict exit behavior: male and female advisors with comparable client outcomes are equally likely to remain active.

Taken together, these patterns indicate that differential attrition is unlikely to explain the persistence of gender gaps. The parallel growth trajectories documented in Section 4 reflect the actual experiences of continuing advisors, rather than compositional changes from selective exit.

### 5.2.3 New Client Acquisition Patterns

Persistent gaps may also arise from path dependence in client acquisition if female advisors face ongoing barriers to attracting new clients. Figures 13–16 examine patterns of new client acquisition across advisor careers.

Figure 13 shows that female advisors consistently recruit significantly fewer new clients each year throughout their careers. The gap appears immediately: in their second year, they attract approximately 30% fewer new clients than male peers—a disparity that remains stable over time. Even after a decade of experience and an established track record, female advisors continue to lag behind in new client acquisition. These patterns hold within dealer-entry cohort comparisons, ruling out firm-specific policies or time-varying shocks as primary explanations.

The intensive margin tells a similar story. Figure 14 shows that clients acquired by female advisors bring approximately 20% less AUM on average. This compounds the extensive margin disadvantage: female advisors not only attract fewer clients, but those clients also invest less. Figure 15 reinforces this pattern at the individual level, with consistently lower initial investments from new clients across all tenure years.

Interestingly, Figure 16 shows that female advisors' new clients are more likely to be female (approximately 55-60% versus 50% for male advisors), though this modest sorting cannot explain the magnitude of the acquisition gaps. Together, these patterns reveal a fundamental mechanism of persistence: the same barriers that create initial disparities continue to operate throughout careers, preventing female advisors from catching up through new client growth.

#### 5.2.4 Selection Barriers

The persistence of gender gaps could reflect two fundamentally different mechanisms. First, female advisors might face ongoing discrimination throughout their careers—constantly battling bias when trying to attract new clients, expand existing relationships, or acquire books. Alternatively, the persistence might be primarily mechanical: initial disadvantages become self-reinforcing through path dependence, even if discrimination itself doesn't continue. Distinguishing between these explanations is crucial for understanding both the nature of the inequality and potential policy remedies.

The involuntary switcher sample in our data provide unique opportunity to address this question. When advisors exit the firm, their entire book is sold to another advisor, and clients have no choice in this reassignment. This creates quasi-random variation in advisor-client matching that bypasses the normal selection process. If female advisors struggle because of ongoing quality differences or continuous discrimination in service provision, we would expect worse retention rates and other outcomes even in these involuntary assignments. If instead the problem is primarily about initial access—getting clients in the door—we might see different patterns once that barrier is mechanically removed.

Table 7 presents results from these quasi-random client reassignments. Clients assigned to female advisors following their previous advisor's departure are 3.98 percentage points more likely to stay with the firm and 0.53 percentage points less likely to exit in a given month. These retention advantages persist after controlling for advisor skill (gross alpha decile), book characteristics, and client demographics. The effects are economically meaningful: on an annualized basis, clients are roughly 5% less likely to leave female advisors compared to male advisors receiving similar involuntary transfers.

This finding reveals that the primary barrier operates at the point of initial client acquisition rather than in ongoing service provision. Once female advisors have clients—even clients who didn't choose them—they actually outperform male advisors in retention. This suggests the market failure is specifically in the matching mechanism: the process by which

clients initially select advisors prevents optimal matches from forming. Once these suboptimal initial allocations occur, they persist not because of ongoing discrimination but because switching costs and path dependence lock in the initial disadvantage.

The implications extend beyond individual careers. If female advisors systematically achieve better retention when given equal access to clients, then current allocation patterns are not just unfair but inefficient—high-quality advisors are systematically under-allocated clients based on gender rather than ability. The persistence of gaps despite this inefficiency suggests that market forces alone are insufficient to correct initial misallocations in trust-based service industries.

### **5.2.5 Book Transfer Markets and Structural Barriers**

A final mechanism we examine involves frictions in the secondary market for advisor books. Tables 8 and 9 reveal gender dynamics in book transfers that create structural barriers to convergence over time.

Table 8 reveals pronounced gender asymmetries in book-selling transactions. While 65% of transfers occur between male sellers and male buyers, only 5% involve both female sellers and female buyers. Female advisors account for just 12.5% of purchases from male sellers, despite male advisors comprising the vast majority of sellers. These patterns suggest that female advisors face substantial barriers in accessing the book transfer market—a key mechanism for accelerating book growth.

These barriers translate into meaningful differences in book acquisition outcomes. As shown in Table 9, when female advisors do purchase books, they acquire significantly smaller ones—containing 26–29% fewer clients than those purchased by male advisors. This gap persists even after controlling for buyer characteristics, geographic location, and advisor skill.

These structural barriers in secondary markets prevent female advisors from using book purchases to overcome initial disadvantages. While male advisors can accelerate growth

by acquiring established client bases, female advisors face both reduced access to purchase opportunities and smaller books when they do transact.

## 6 Conclusions

This paper documents and explains a large and persistent gender pay gap in financial advisory services. Female advisors earn 40–50% less than their male counterparts—a disparity that cannot be attributed to differences in performance, skill, effort, or client satisfaction. Instead, the gap arises entirely from differences in book size: female advisors manage fewer clients, and those clients hold less wealth on average. These disparities are present at career entry and persist with striking stability throughout the advisor lifecycle.

Our analysis reveals that gender gaps in this market are sustained through path dependence: early disadvantages in client acquisition give rise to persistent disparities via self-reinforcing mechanisms. Female advisors begin their careers with 47% less AUM and 28% fewer clients than observationally equivalent male peers. Despite delivering comparable investment performance and achieving equal or better client retention, these gaps remain stable over time. The parallel growth trajectories we observe indicate that whatever mechanisms create initial disparities continue to constrain female advisors throughout their careers.

Three key findings shed light on the nature of these constraints. First, female advisors are observationally equivalent to male peers at entry—similar in age, financial expertise, personal wealth, and risk preferences—ruling out skill-based explanations for initial disparities. Second, clients assigned to female advisors via quasi-random reallocation exhibit higher retention rates, indicating that performance differences do not account for limited client access. Third, female advisors face systematic barriers in both primary client acquisition and secondary book transfer markets, preventing catch-up growth through standard industry channels.

The persistence of gender gaps operates through path dependence rather than ongoing

performance-based discrimination. Early client allocations create self-reinforcing advantages: larger books generate more referrals, greater visibility, and enhanced access to acquisition opportunities. Female advisors face persistent barriers to new client growth that do not respond to demonstrated performance, and structural frictions in the book transfer market further limit their ability to close early gaps. The result is an equilibrium in which equally capable advisors follow markedly different career trajectories—driven not by merit, but by unequal starting positions.


Several limitations warrant emphasis. Our data come from one segment of the Canadian financial services industry, and generalizability to other contexts requires caution. We cannot definitively identify whether initial barriers reflect statistical discrimination, taste-based preferences, or other frictions, though our evidence points toward inaccurate statistical discrimination. Additionally, while we document substantial welfare costs from misallocation, we cannot quantify the full equilibrium effects of correcting these disparities.

Despite these limitations, our findings offer important lessons for understanding persistent inequality in professional labor markets. In settings where initial conditions have compounding returns—through network effects, referral systems, or relationship capital—temporary disadvantages can become permanent even in the absence of ongoing discrimination. This suggests that achieving gender equality in such markets requires interventions at the point of entry rather than relying on market forces to correct initial misallocations. The persistence of gaps despite transparent performance metrics and formulaic compensation in our setting underscores how difficult it is for reputation effects to overcome initial biases in trust-based services.

## References


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
**Figure 1: Marginal Effects of Female Advisor on Log Total AUM**

*Notes:* These figures show the marginal effects of being a female advisor on log total AUM. Panels a and c include year fixed effects. Panel b includes dealer by entry year cohort fixed effects. Regressions for panels a and b are shown in Tables B.2 and B.3.




**Figure 2:** Marginal Effects of Female Advisor on Log AUM per Client

*Notes:* These figures show the marginal effects of being a female advisor on log total AUM per client. Panels a and c include year fixed effects. Panel b includes dealer by entry year cohort fixed effects. Regressions for panels a and b are shown in Appendix Tables B.2 and B.3.




**Figure 3:** Marginal Effects of Female Advisor on Log Number of Clients

*Notes:* These figures show the marginal effects of being a female advisor on log number of clients. Panels a and c include year fixed effects. Panel b includes dealer by entry year cohort fixed effects. Regressions for panels a and b are shown in Appendix Tables B.2 and B.3.




**Figure 4:** Marginal Effects of Female Advisor on Number of Accounts per Client

*Notes:* These figures show the marginal effects of being a female advisor on number of accounts per client. Panels a and c include year fixed effects. Panel b includes dealer by entry year cohort fixed effects. Regressions for panels a and b are shown in Appendix Tables B.2 and B.3.



**Figure 5:** Marginal Effects of Female Advisor on 1-year Client Retention Rate


*Notes:* These figures show the marginal effects of being a female advisor on of one-year client retention rates. Panels a and c include year fixed effects. Panel b includes dealer by entry year cohort fixed effects. Regressions for panels a and b are shown in Appendix Tables B.2 and B.3.




**Figure 6:** Marginal Effects of Female Advisor on Client Exit Rates

*Notes:* These figures show the marginal effects of being a female advisor on one year client exit rates. Panels a and c include year fixed effects. Panel b includes dealer by entry year cohort fixed effects. Regressions for panels a and b are shown in Appendix Tables B.2 and B.3.

(a) By Advisor Gender - Year FE




(b) By Advisor Gender - Dealer x Cohort FE




**Figure 7:** Marginal Effects of Female Advisor on Fraction of Female Clients

*Notes:* These figures show the marginal effects of being a female advisor on the fraction of the advisor's client that are female. Panels a and c include year fixed effects. Panel b includes dealer by entry year cohort fixed effects. Regressions for panels a and b are shown in Appendix Tables B.2 and B.3.




**Figure 8:** Performance Sensitivity to Advisor Gender

*Notes:* These figures show the marginal effects of being in a particular return decile interacted with the advisor being female. The outcome variables are: client exits rates (within one year), net flows (as a fraction of account market value) and an indicator equal to one if the client withdraws money on net within the next year. Net flows are inflows minus outflows over account values, such that a negative value means more money is being withdrawn. The client withdrawing money on net is equal to one if net flows are negative. d1-d10 represent deciles of the past quarter's return, adjusted by rank. These deciles are then interacted with a dummy equal to one if the advisor is female. Corresponding regressions are shown in in Table B.13.



**Figure 9:** Performance Sensitivity to Homophily - Advisors of Both Gender


*Notes:* These figures show the marginal effects of being in a particular return decile interacted with the advisor and the client being the same gender. The outcome variables are: client exits rates (within one year), net flows (as a fraction of account market value) and an indicator equal to one if the client withdraws money on net within the next year. Net flows are inflows minus outflows over account values, such that a negative value means more money is being withdrawn. The client withdrawing money on net is equal to one if net flows are negative. d1-d10 represent deciles of the past quarter's return, adjusted by rank. These deciles are then interacted with a dummy equal to one if the advisor and the client are the same gender. Corresponding regressions are shown in Table B.14.




**Figure 10:** Advisor Exit Rates by Gender and Tenure

*Notes:* These regressions show the exit rates of advisor by gender. The top panel shows the top exit rates. The bottom panel shows marginal effects follow a regression that controls for advisor gross alpha decile, the number of clients the advisor has, the advisor’s age and month fixed effects.


(a) Gross Alpha Decile by Gender - Advisors who never Exit




(b) Marginal Effects - Advisors who never Exit



(c) Gross Alpha Decile by Gender and Exit Status




(d) Marginal Effects - by Exit Status




**Figure 11:** Advisor Gross Alpha Quantile by Gender, Tenure and Exit Status

*Notes:* Panel a shows the average gross alpha decile for advisors who never exit the sample over the advisor's tenure. Panel b shows the marginal effects following regressions of advisor gross alpha decile on the advisor's gender interacted with the advisor's tenure, controlling for the number of clients the advisor has, the advisor's age and month fixed effects, again only for advisors who never exit. Panel c shows the gross alpha decile of advisor's over their tenure by gender, split by advisors who exit eventually and those who do not. Panel d shows marginal effects following regressions of advisor gross alpha decile on the the advisor's gender interacted with the advisor's tenure interacted with a dummy equal to 0 if the advisor never exits and one if they eventually exit. The regression also controls for the number of clients the advisor has, the advisor's age and month fixed effects. Advisor gross alpha is constant within advisor over time, so these figures represent composition changes of the advisors in each group.


(a) Average Client Returns by Gender - Advisors who never Exit




(b) Marginal Effects - Advisors who never Exit



(c) Average Client Returns by Gender and Exit Status




(d) Marginal Effects - by Exit Status



**Figure 12:** Advisor’s Average Client Return by Gender, Tenure and Exit Status


*Notes:* Panel a shows the average monthly client returns for advisors who never exit the sample over the advisor’s tenure. Panel b shows the marginal effects following regressions of one-month client returns on the advisor’s gender interacted with the advisor’s tenure, controlling for the number of clients the advisor has, the advisor’s age and month fixed effects, again only for advisors who never exit. Panel c shows the average one-month client returns over their tenure by gender, split by advisors who exit eventually and those who do not. Panel d shows marginal effects following regressions of average one-month client returns on the advisor’s gender interacted with the advisor’s tenure interacted with a dummy equal to 0 if the advisor never exits and one if they eventually exit. The regression also controls for the number of clients the advisor has, the advisor’s age and month fixed effects.



**Figure 13:** Marginal Effects of Female Advisor on New Clients Recruited

*Notes:* These figures show the marginal effects of being a female advisor on the number of new clients the advisor takes on each tenure-year. Panel a includes year fixed effects. Panel b includes dealer by entry year cohort fixed effects. Regressions are shown in columns (5) and (7) of Appendix Table B.4.

(a) By Advisor Gender - Year FE



(b) By Advisor Gender - Dealer x Cohort FE






Figure 14: Marginal Effects of Female Advisor on New Client AUM

Notes: These figures show the marginal effects of being a female advisor on the total AUM from new clients for each tenure-year. Panel a includes year fixed effects. Panel b includes dealer by entry year cohort fixed effects. Regressions are shown in columns (5) and (7) of Appendix Table B.5.

(a) By Advisor Gender - Year FE




(b) By Advisor Gender - Dealer x Cohort FE




**Figure 15:** Marginal Effects of Female Advisor on AUM per New Client

*Notes:* These figures show the marginal effects of being a female advisor on the total AUM per new client for each tenure-year. Panel a includes year fixed effects. Panel b includes dealer by entry year cohort fixed effects. Regressions are shown in columns (5) and (7) of Appendix Table B.6.

(a) By Advisor Gender - Year FE



(b) By Advisor Gender - Dealer x Cohort FE



**Figure 16:** Marginal Effects of Female Advisor on Fraction of New Female Clients

*Notes:* These figures show the marginal effects of being a female advisor on the fraction of new clients that are female for each tenure-year. Panel a includes year fixed effects. Panel b includes dealer by entry year cohort fixed effects. Regressions are shown in columns (5) and (7) of Appendix Table B.7.

**Table 1:** Demographic and Financial Characteristics of Main Investor Sample

	Mean	25 <sup>th</sup>	50 <sup>th</sup>	75 <sup>th</sup>
Frac. Female	0.52			
Frac. French Speaking	0.22			
Age	49.98	40.00	49.00	59.00
Age When First Account Opens	44.72	35.00	44.00	53.00
Account Age (years)	2.75	0.92	2.08	3.92
Client Advisor Relationship Length (Months)	59.59	26.00	52.00	87.00
Total Market Value of all Accounts (\$)	79879.16	11952.91	36331.21	92420.55
Equity Share in All Accounts	0.73	0.56	0.76	0.95
Total Fees Paid (%)	2.23	1.97	2.31	2.47
Total # of Distinct Plans	2.61	1.00	2.00	3.00
Total # of Distinct Investments	7.08	3.00	5.00	10.00
<b>Salary</b>				
\$30 to 50k	33.7%			
\$50 to 70k	35.3%			
\$70 to 100k	17.9%			
\$100 to 200k	12.7%			
\$200 to 300k	0.3%			
Over \$300k	0.3%			
<b>Financial Knowledge</b>		<b>Net Worth</b>		
Low	40.0%	Under \$35k	3.9%	
Moderate	53.8%	\$35 to 60k	6.8%	
High	6.1%	\$60 to 100k	9.9%	
		\$100 to 200k	18.0%	
		Over \$200k	61.4%	
<b>Observations</b>				
# of Unique Investors	479,769			
# of Investor-Years	3,414,962			

This table includes summary statistics for all investors aged 25-85. Statistics are averaged across investor-year-accounts, based on the first data point of each year per account. The first and final years in which an investor appears are excluded to smooth inflows and outflows.

**Table 2:** Demographic and Financial Characteristics of Switching Sample

<b>Panel A: Investors</b>				
	Mean	25th	50th	75th
Frac. Female	0.52			
Frac. French Speaking	0.13			
Age	50.31	41.00	50.00	59.00
Client Advisor Relationship Length Prior to Switch (Months)	65.36	29.00	55.00	93.00
Market Value of all Accounts (\$)	38376.23	5913.16	16920.98	44354.60
Total Fees Paid (%) Prior to Switch	2.28	2.00	2.34	2.48
Total Fees Paid (%) After Switch	2.19	1.81	2.28	2.55
Equity Share in All Accounts	0.68	0.50	0.73	0.99
<b>Salary</b>		<b>Net Worth</b>		
\$30 to 50k	32.3%	Under \$35k	3.3%	
\$50 to 70k	38.1%	\$35 to 60k	8.0%	
\$70 to 100k	18.2%	\$60 to 100k	12.5%	
\$100 to 200k	11.3%	\$100 to 200k	17.1%	
\$200 to 300k	0.1%	Over \$200k	59.0%	
Over \$300k	0.1%			
<b>Financial Knowledge</b>				
Low	37.8%			
Moderate	54.0%			
High	8.3%			
Observations	14,774			
<b>Panel B: Advisors</b>				
	Leaving Advisors		Advisors Switched To	
	Mean	SE	Mean	SE
% Female	0.23	(0.42)	0.19	(0.40)
Age	50.42	(12.32)	46.70	(10.09)
Advisor Tenure (Years)	6.05	(3.97)	6.29	(4.30)
% Clients Female	0.51	(0.17)	0.52	(0.13)
Clients' Age	48.58	(6.50)	48.52	(5.67)
Client Advisor Relationship Tenure (Years)	4.21	(2.91)	3.29	(2.67)
Total Client Assets (\$)	3040505.83	(6447341.53)	9349047.16	(11878648.33)
AUM Per Client	42216.50	(35766.64)	50785.27	(33670.12)
Total \$ Fees Paid by Clients	80005.15	(185176.90)	249842.42	(317382.23)
Clients' % Fee	2.66	(1.22)	2.62	(1.18)
Total \$ Fees Collected by Advisor	27471.46	(60555.28)	112047.71	(148036.49)
Advisor's % Fee Collected	0.91	(1.01)	1.43	(1.78)
# of Clients	58.12	(77.50)	163.94	(176.65)
# of Accounts per Client	1.85	(0.58)	1.95	(0.54)
# of Investments per Client	5.50	(2.69)	5.94	(2.85)
Clients' Returns	0.53	(2.83)	0.56	(2.65)
Risky Share of Clients' Portfolios	0.69	(0.16)	0.68	(0.16)
Advisor's Own Portfolio Return	0.20	(3.87)	0.60	(3.28)
Advisor's Own Risky Share	0.78	(0.26)	0.80	(0.21)
Observations	463		507	

This table includes summary statistics for the switching sample. Panel A shows summary statistics for the investors who switched advisors. Panel B shows summary statistics for the advisors who exited the sample and those who took over the clients from the exiting advisors. All statistics are from the final data point in which the exiting advisor appeared and the first in which the new advisor started taking clients from the exiting advisor.

**Table 3:** Gap in Dollar Fees

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Log Total \$ Fees Paid by Clients									
	Raw Gap		Controlling for Performance/Skill	Controlling for Client Characteristics	Controlling for Supply Side Factors		Controlling for Size of Book		All Controls	
Advisor is Female	-0.646*** (0.0983)	-0.557*** (0.0997)	-0.566*** (0.0922)	-0.677*** (0.0853)	-0.535*** (0.0858)	-0.515*** (0.0883)	-0.252*** (0.0759)	-0.00439 (0.00514)	-0.518*** (0.0823)	0.00304 (0.00510)
Clients' Returns			0.00467 (0.00740)						0.00221 (0.00533)	-0.000782 (0.000561)
Log Advisor Tenure			0.803*** (0.0375)						0.797*** (0.0685)	0.0182*** (0.00454)
Advisor's Equity Share			0.627*** (0.225)						0.378* (0.213)	0.0106 (0.0147)
Clients' Age				0.0754*** (0.00656)					0.0533*** (0.00670)	0.00157*** (0.000428)
% Clients Female				0.968*** (0.274)					0.563** (0.240)	-0.0272** (0.0123)
Risky Share of Clients' Portfolios				0.0623 (0.224)					-0.345* (0.208)	0.328*** (0.0185)
Advisor Has Children					0.856*** (0.0873)	0.589*** (0.0979)			0.466*** (0.0910)	0.00408 (0.00563)
Advisor is Single					0.319 (0.244)	0.323 (0.241)			0.204 (0.197)	-0.000568 (0.0105)
# of Investments per Client					0.223*** (0.0164)	0.224*** (0.0171)			0.180*** (0.0149)	0.000950 (0.000752)
Log Client Advisor Relationship Tenure					0.556*** (0.0302)	0.493*** (0.0310)			-0.275*** (0.0577)	-0.0301*** (0.00455)
Log AUM per Client							1.722*** (0.0382)	0.983*** (0.00391)		0.981*** (0.00413)
Log # of Clients								1.010*** (0.00191)		1.013*** (0.00208)
Month FE?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Advisor Alpha Quantile FE?	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Advisor Census Subdivision FE?	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Client Salary and NW?	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Observations	214168	214168	214168	214168	214168	214168	214168	214168	214168	214168
$R^2$	0.096	0.287	0.191	0.316	0.284	0.417	0.560	0.992	0.534	0.994

This table shows regression of dollar fees paid by clients on advisor gender and other advisor and client characteristics. Regressions are at the advisor-month level. Standard errors are clustered at the advisor level and in parentheses. \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

**Table 4:** Gap in % Fees and Size of Book

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Clients' % Fee	Log Total Client Assets (\$)	Log # of Clients	Log AUM per Client				
Advisor is Female	-0.0165 (0.0127)	0.00581 (0.0130)	-0.638*** (0.0977)	-0.519*** (0.0817)	-0.407*** (0.0777)	-0.287*** (0.0547)	-0.228*** (0.0400)	-0.190*** (0.0300)
Clients' Returns		-0.00443* (0.00241)		0.00535 (0.00577)		-0.00567* (0.00312)		0.0102*** (0.00266)
Log Advisor Tenure		0.102*** (0.0172)		0.773*** (0.0675)		1.131*** (0.0539)		0.144*** (0.0254)
Advisor Equity Share		0.0225 (0.0501)		0.362* (0.211)		0.380*** (0.137)		-0.0556 (0.0738)
Clients' Age		0.00280** (0.00109)		0.0525*** (0.00665)		-0.00410 (0.00434)		0.0492*** (0.00234)
% Clients Female		-0.0735** (0.0370)		0.573** (0.240)		0.295** (0.148)		0.0763 (0.0912)
Risky Share of Clients' Portfolios		0.749*** (0.0446)		-0.709*** (0.204)		-0.408*** (0.135)		-0.375*** (0.0772)
Advisor Has Children		0.0205 (0.0181)		0.461*** (0.0906)		0.225*** (0.0637)		0.0942*** (0.0319)
Advisor is Single		0.0178 (0.0296)		0.199 (0.198)		-0.0460 (0.137)		-0.00367 (0.0948)
# of Investments per Client		-0.00340* (0.00192)		0.182*** (0.0150)		0.0754*** (0.00898)		0.107*** (0.00734)
Log Client Advisor Relationship Tenure		-0.133*** (0.0178)		-0.247*** (0.0565)		-0.790*** (0.0489)		-0.0860*** (0.0210)
Log Initial # of Clients						0.402*** (0.0151)		
Bought Clients from Exiting Advisor						0.263*** (0.0441)		
Month FE?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Advisor Alpha Quantile FE?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Advisor Census Subdivision FE?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Client Salary and NW?	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y	N	Y
Observations	214325	214325	214449	214449	212264	212264	214449	214449
$R^2$	0.017	0.084	0.099	0.540	0.028	0.602	0.212	0.618

This table shows regression of percentage fees (measured in raw percentage points), log total client assets in dollars, log number of clients, and log assets per client on advisor gender and other advisor and client characteristics. Regressions are at the advisor-month level. Standard errors are clustered at the advisor level and in parentheses. \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

**Table 5: Book Characteristics at Entry, by Advisor Gender**

	(1) Log AUM	(2) Log AUM Per Client	(3) Log Number of Clients	(4) Average # of Plans per Client	(5) 1-Year Client Retention Rate	(6) 1-Year Client Exit Rate	(7) Fraction of Clients Female	(8) Client's Average Age
<b>Raw Gap Within Start Cohort and Dealer:</b>								
Advisor is Female	-0.471*** (0.131)	-0.174* (0.0684)	-0.284** (0.0895)	0.0310 (0.0328)	-0.0122 (0.0108)	-0.00294 (0.00379)	0.0376* (0.0172)	-0.556 (0.439)
Dealer by Advisor Start Cohort FE?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Calendar Month FE?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
<i>N</i>	1834	1834	1860	1860	1806	1860	1657	1860
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.227	0.124	0.277	0.071	0.042	0.035	0.035	0.061
<b>Controlling for Advisor Gross Alpha:</b>								
Advisor is Female	-0.595*** (0.160)	-0.189* (0.0794)	-0.380*** (0.114)	-0.0129 (0.0440)	-0.0142 (0.00886)	0.00417 (0.00369)	0.0276 (0.0205)	-0.0708 (0.526)
Dealer by Advisor Start Cohort FE?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Calendar Month FE?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Advisor Gross Alpha Decile?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
<i>N</i>	1202	1202	1213	1213	1212	1213	1106	1213
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.235	0.162	0.282	0.088	0.076	0.033	0.073	0.090
<b>Controlling for Client Gender Composition:</b>								
Advisor is Female	-0.467*** (0.136)	-0.152* (0.0681)	-0.310** (0.0947)	0.0391 (0.0361)	-0.0199 (0.0112)	-0.00301 (0.00414)		-0.0761 (0.447)
Fraction of Client Female	-0.0965 (0.256)	0.0795 (0.140)	-0.149 (0.169)	0.0628 (0.0503)	0.0278 (0.0199)	-0.00802 (0.00977)		0.742 (0.953)
Dealer by Advisor Start Cohort FE?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y
Calendar Month FE?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y
<i>N</i>	1642	1642	1657	1657	1611	1657		1657
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.210	0.115	0.274	0.072	0.049	0.040		0.068

This table shows cross-sectional regressions of advisor book characteristics at entry. Regressions are taken the first month the advisor enters the sample. Dealer by advisor entry year cohort fixed effects and calendar-month fixed effects are included in all specifications. The middle panel shows the regressions with an additional control for advisor gross alpha decile, which is a cross-sectional measure based on performance during their tenure as an advisor. The third panel includes a control for the fraction of the advisor's initial client base that is female. Standard errors, clustered at the advisor level, are in parentheses. \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table 6: Differences in Advisor Characteristics at Entry, by Gender**

	(1) Advisor Age	(2) Log Advisor Own Account Value	(3) Log Advisor Self-reported Net Worth	(4) Self-reported Financial Knowledge	(5) Family Count	(6) Advisor's Own Returns based on Initial Allocations
Female Advisor	-0.741 (0.611)	0.0515 (0.170)	-0.0296 (0.104)	-0.0245 (0.0239)	0.0218 (0.206)	1.993 (1.478)
<i>N</i>	1399	432	1558	1561	537	463
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.052	0.098	0.040	0.033	0.047	0.116

This table shows cross-sectional regressions of advisor characteristics at entry. Regressions are taken the first month the advisor enters the sample. Dealer by advisor entry year cohort fixed effects and calendar-month fixed effects are included in all specifications. Standard errors, clustered at the advisor level, are in parentheses. \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table 7:** Client Retention and Exit Following Involuntary Switches

	(1) Retained	(2) Client Exit
Female Advisor	0.0398* (0.0154)	-0.00531** (0.00204)
# of Clients in Purchased Book	0.000420* (0.000173)	-0.0000335 (0.0000210)
Previous Rep's # of Clients	-0.000132 (0.000142)	0.0000252 (0.0000228)
Advisor's Current # of Clients	-0.0000185 (0.0000767)	-0.0000120 (0.0000121)
Client Female	0.00313 (0.00771)	-0.000314 (0.000754)
Client Age	-0.000738* (0.000340)	0.0000512 (0.0000380)
<i>N</i>	69436	86943
# of Clients Included	4309	5077
# of Advisors Included	310	363
# of Female Advisors Included	53	66
Advisor Gross Alpha Fe?	Y	Y
Month FE?	Y	Y
$R^2$	0.012	0.007
adj. $R^2$	0.010	0.005

This table shows 1-year retention rates (column 1) and monthly client exit (column 2) regressed on a dummy equal to one if the advisor that the client switched to is a female. Only clients who switched advisors due to a former advisor leaving the dataset are included. One-year after the involuntary switch is included. Regressions are at the client-advisor-month level. Additional controls include the client's gender and age, the total number of clients the advisor has currently, the number of clients they received in the book-buying transaction and the number of clients that the former advisor had. Advisor gross alpha and month fixed effects are also included. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the advisor level. \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table 8:** Size of Book and Gender of Purchasing Advisor

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Log Number of Clients in Book Being Sold					
Buying Advisor is Female	-0.286** (0.120)	-0.275** (0.122)	-0.348*** (0.132)	-0.251** (0.125)	-0.262* (0.135)	-0.388** (0.177)
Log Book Size Pre-Book Purchase		0.0418 (0.0315)			0.136*** (0.0409)	0.132*** (0.0380)
% of Female Advisors in Selling Advisor's Census Subdivision				-0.399 (0.252)	-0.691*** (0.222)	-0.632*** (0.220)
Book is Sold to Multiple Advisor						0.601*** (0.114)
Buying Advisor is Female $\times$ Book is Sold to Multiple Advisor						0.250 (0.221)
Month FE?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Dealer FE?	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Advisor Alpha Quantile FE?	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
Observations	658	646	488	628	461	461
$R^2$	0.370	0.371	0.419	0.372	0.445	0.510

This table shows regressions of the size of the book being sold during advisor-to-advisor book-selling transactions on whether or not the purchasing advisor is female and various controls. Regressions are cross-sectional at the advisor-month level. Observations are during the month of the transaction. \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table 9: Involuntary Switches**

# of Advisors Selling Books	463	
% Female	22.68	
# of Advisors Buying Books	507	
% Female	19.33	
Sold to:	#	# of Clients
1 New Advisors	308	22.18
2 New Advisors	93	11.08
$\geq 3$ New Advisors	62	12.82
Of all book-selling transactions:	#	%
Male sold to Male	487	64.9
Female sold to Male	132	17.6
Male sold to Female	94	12.5
Female sold to Female	37	4.9
If sold by Male :	#	%
to Male	487	83.8
to Female	94	16.2
If sold by Female :		
to Male	132	78.1
to Female	37	21.9
T-test in difference of likelihood of selling to a female by gender: diff=.219-.162=.057		$p( T  >  t ) = .0853$ $p(T < t) = .0426$

This table shows summary statistics on involuntary switches in our sample of advised clients. Involuntary switches occur when an advisor leaves the data, but the majority of their clients remain and are assigned to a new advisor. Only advisors with non-missing gender information are included.

**Table 10: Summary Statistics by Advisor Gender**

	mean	p25	(1) p50	p75	sd
<b>All Advisors (N=4,412)</b>					
% Female	0.24	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.42
Age	46.91	39.00	47.00	55.00	10.74
Advisor Tenure (Years)	3.84	1.33	3.42	6.75	2.65
% Clients Female	0.50	0.41	0.51	0.60	0.23
Clients' Age	47.80	43.46	47.72	51.88	7.75
Client Advisor Relationship Tenure (Years)	2.52	0.88	2.27	3.96	1.84
Total Client Assets (\$)	4307201.54	140772.03	996300.12	4613287.00	8386295.40
AUM Per Client	46123.11	17539.33	35127.86	60234.53	49822.96
Total \$ Fees Paid by Clients	111523.07	4048.74	26904.16	116134.66	226201.64
Clients' % Fee	2.52	2.26	2.41	2.57	0.88
Total \$ Fees Collected by Advisor	46634.51	1382.24	10343.79	48005.81	100670.27
Advisor's % Fee Collected	1.21	0.56	0.72	1.00	1.72
# of Clients	76.51	6.00	29.00	99.00	117.68
# of Accounts per Client	1.83	1.35	1.75	2.14	0.70
# of Investments per Client	5.38	3.17	4.84	6.92	3.24
Clients' Returns	0.12	-0.86	0.04	1.69	2.63
Risky Share of Clients' Portfolios	0.70	0.60	0.72	0.83	0.19
Advisor's Own Portfolio Return	0.04	-1.20	-0.08	1.79	3.19
Advisor's Own Risky Share	0.80	0.70	0.87	1.00	0.22
<b>Male Advisors (N=2,864)</b>					
Age	47.00	39.00	47.00	55.00	10.87
Advisor Tenure (Years)	4.01	1.50	3.75	7.00	2.65
% Clients Female	0.48	0.40	0.49	0.57	0.22
Clients' Age	48.05	43.77	48.00	52.05	7.73
Client Advisor Relationship Tenure (Years)	2.63	0.97	2.44	4.13	1.84
Total Client Assets (\$)	4956083.85	174383.34	1276842.12	5516671.75	9279587.70
AUM Per Client	48657.17	19394.29	37265.09	64491.46	51562.42
Total \$ Fees Paid by Clients	127601.61	5124.24	34166.96	144113.77	248838.53
Clients' % Fee	2.52	2.26	2.41	2.57	0.93
Total \$ Fees Collected by Advisor	53360.67	1729.90	13087.36	58048.25	111908.89
Advisor's % Fee Collected	1.21	0.57	0.72	1.00	1.71
# of Clients	85.27	7.00	36.00	112.00	128.16
# of Accounts per Client	1.81	1.34	1.73	2.10	0.67
# of Investments per Client	5.42	3.17	4.92	6.93	3.23
Clients' Returns	0.11	-0.85	0.00	1.70	2.60
Risky Share of Clients' Portfolios	0.70	0.59	0.72	0.82	0.19
Advisor's Own Portfolio Return	0.03	-1.19	-0.13	1.73	3.12
Advisor's Own Risky Share	0.81	0.71	0.88	1.00	0.22
<b>Female Advisors (N=887)</b>					
Age	45.97	38.00	46.00	53.00	10.20
Advisor Tenure (Years)	3.46	1.08	2.92	5.92	2.62
% Clients Female	0.58	0.48	0.58	0.70	0.24
Clients' Age	47.43	43.00	47.47	51.59	8.00
Client Advisor Relationship Tenure (Years)	2.30	0.66	1.88	3.65	1.83
Total Client Assets (\$)	3081189.71	85066.65	570494.75	3187191.75	6108440.82
AUM Per Client	41122.28	14352.14	29510.47	54118.50	41546.23
Total \$ Fees Paid by Clients	80479.13	2567.81	15272.98	82344.69	159189.11
Clients' % Fee	2.52	2.27	2.40	2.56	0.86
Total \$ Fees Collected by Advisor	33264.94	785.36	5257.00	29439.27	71890.47
Advisor's % Fee Collected	1.15	0.54	0.70	0.96	1.64
# of Clients	61.06	4.00	20.00	74.00	97.08
# of Accounts per Client	1.86	1.35	1.79	2.19	0.78
# of Investments per Client	5.33	3.07	4.67	6.85	3.39
Clients' Returns	0.08	-0.86	0.10	1.66	2.66
Risky Share of Clients' Portfolios	0.70	0.60	0.73	0.83	0.20
Advisor's Own Portfolio Return	0.04	-1.20	-0.01	1.80	3.10
Advisor's Own Risky Share	0.78	0.66	0.84	0.96	0.23


This table shows the mean values for each variable amongst financial advisors, split by the gender of the advisor. Time period is 1999-2013. Observations are at the advisor year month level. Averages are taken across all advisors at the median month each advisor appears.

**Table 11:** Advisor Characteristics by Gender: T-tests for differences in means

	Male Mean	Female Mean	t-test of means p-value
Age	47.00	45.97	0.031
Advisor Tenure (Years)	4.01	3.46	0.000
% Clients Female	0.48	0.58	0.000
Clients' Age	48.05	47.43	0.038
Client Advisor Relationship Tenure (Years)	2.63	2.30	0.000
Total Client Assets (\$)	4,956,084	3,081,190	0.000
AUM Per Client	48657.17	41122.28	0.000
Total \$ Fees Paid by Clients	127601.61	80479.13	0.000
Clients' % Fee	2.52	2.52	0.953
Total \$ Fees Collected by Advisor	53360.67	33264.94	0.000
Advisor's % Fee Collected	1.21	1.15	0.312
# of Clients	85.27	61.06	0.000
# of Accounts per Client	1.81	1.86	0.042
# of Investments per Client	5.42	5.33	0.498
Clients' Returns	0.11	0.08	0.794
Risky Share of Clients' Portfolios	0.70	0.70	0.786
Advisor's Own Portfolio Return	0.03	0.04	0.928
Advisor's Own Risky Share	0.81	0.78	0.004


This table reports the mean values of advisor characteristics by gender and the p-value for the difference in means.

## A Appendix Figures



**Figure A.1:** Client AUM by Advisor Tenure


*Notes:* This figure shows the average total client AUM in dollars by advisor tenure, split by advisor gender. Panel a shows averages split by advisor gender. Panel b shows the averages split by advisor gross alpha quantile and gender, with a high alpha advisor being one whose gross alpha is in the 8th-10th decile and a low alpha advisor being one whose gross alpha is in the 1st-3rd decile. Gross alpha is constant over the advisor's tenure. Panel c shows the averages split by advisor and client gender. Observations are at the advisor year level, taken in December of each year. Only advisors with non-missing gender information are included.




**Figure A.2:** AUM per Client by Advisor Tenure

*Notes:* This figure shows the average AUM per client in dollars by advisor tenure, split by advisor gender. Panel a shows averages split by advisor gender. Panel b shows the averages split by advisor gross alpha quantile and gender, with a high alpha advisor being one whose gross alpha is in the 8th-10th decile and a low alpha advisor being one whose gross alpha is in the 1st-3rd decile. Gross alpha is constant over the advisor's tenure. Panel c shows the averages split by advisor and client gender. Observations are at the advisor year level, taken in December of each year. Only advisors with non-missing gender information are included.

(a) By Advisor Gender



(b) By Advisor Gender and Alpha



(c) By Advisor Gender and Client Gender






Figure A.3: Number of Clients by Advisor Tenure

Notes: This figure shows the average number of clients by advisor tenure, split by advisor gender. Panel a shows averages split by advisor gender. Panel b shows the averages split by advisor gross alpha quantile and gender, with a high alpha advisor being one whose gross alpha is in the 8th-10th decile and a low alpha advisor being one whose gross alpha is in the 1st-3rd decile. Gross alpha is constant over the advisor's tenure. Panel c shows the averages split by advisor and client gender. Observations are at the advisor year level, taken in December of each year. Only advisors with non-missing gender information are included.

(a) By Advisor Gender



(b) By Advisor Gender and Alpha



(c) By Advisor Gender and Client Gender






Figure A.4: Number of Accounts per Client by Advisor Tenure

Notes: This figure shows the average number of accounts per client by advisor tenure, split by advisor gender. Panel a shows averages split by advisor gender. Panel b shows the averages split by advisor gross alpha quantile and gender, with a high alpha advisor being one whose gross alpha is in the 8th-10th decile and a low alpha advisor being one whose gross alpha is in the 1st-3rd decile. Gross alpha is constant over the advisor's tenure. Panel c shows the averages split by advisor and client gender. Observations are at the advisor year level, taken in December of each year. Only advisors with non-missing gender information are included.




**Figure A.5: Client 1-year Retention Rate by Advisor Tenure**

*Notes:* This figure shows the average one-year retention rate of clients by advisor tenure, split by advisor gender. Panel a shows averages split by advisor gender. Panel b shows the averages split by advisor gross alpha quantile and gender, with a high alpha advisor being one whose gross alpha is in the 8th-10th decile and a low alpha advisor being one whose gross alpha is in the 1st-3rd decile. Gross alpha is constant over the advisor's tenure. Panel c shows the averages split by advisor and client gender. Observations are at the advisor year level, taken in December of each year. Only advisors with non-missing gender information are included.




**Figure A.6:** Client Exit Rate by Advisor Tenure

*Notes:* This figure shows the average one-year exit rate of clients by advisor tenure, split by advisor gender. Panel a shows averages split by advisor gender. Panel b shows the averages split by advisor gross alpha quantile and gender, with a high alpha advisor being one whose gross alpha is in the 8th-10th decile and a low alpha advisor being one whose gross alpha is in the 1st-3rd decile. Gross alpha is constant over the advisor's tenure. Panel c shows the averages split by advisor and client gender. Observations are at the advisor year level, taken in December of each year. Only advisors with non-missing gender information are included.




**Figure A.7:** Marginal Effects of Female Advisor on Log Total AUM - by Advisor Initial Age

*Notes:* These figures show the marginal effects of being a female advisor on the log total AUM for each tenure-year. All regressions include a control for advisor gross alpha decile and year fixed effects. Each regression is run separately based on the advisor's initial age when they enter the dataset. Initial age group 20-29 has 334 advisors, 67 females. Initial age group 30-39 has 640 advisors, 154 females. Initial age group 40-49 has 893 advisors, 238 females. Initial age group 50-59 has 637 advisors, 132 females.




**Figure A.8:** Marginal Effects of Female Advisor on Log AUM Per Client - by Advisor Initial Age

*Notes:* These figures show the marginal effects of being a female advisor on log AUM per client for each tenure-year. All regressions include a control for advisor gross alpha decile and year fixed effects. Each regression is run separately based on the advisor’s initial age when they enter the dataset. Initial age group 20-29 has 334 advisors, 67 females. Initial age group 30-39 has 640 advisors, 154 females. Initial age group 40-49 has 893 advisors, 238 females. Initial age group 50-59 has 637 advisors, 132 females.




**Figure A.9:** Marginal Effects of Female Advisor on Log Number of Clients - by Advisor Initial Age

*Notes:* These figures show the marginal effects of being a female advisor on the log total number of clients for each tenure-year. All regressions include a control for advisor gross alpha decile and year fixed effects. Each regression is run separately based on the advisor's initial age when they enter the dataset. Initial age group 20-29 has 334 advisors, 67 females. Initial age group 30-39 has 640 advisors, 154 females. Initial age group 40-49 has 893 advisors, 238 females. Initial age group 50-59 has 637 advisors, 132 females.




**Figure A.10:** Marginal Effects of Female Advisor on Number of Accounts per Client - by Advisor Initial Age

*Notes:* These figures show the marginal effects of being a female advisor on the average number of accounts per client for each tenure-year. All regressions include a control for advisor gross alpha decile and year fixed effects. Each regression is run separately based on the advisor’s initial age when they enter the dataset. Initial age group 20-29 has 334 advisors, 67 females. Initial age group 30-39 has 640 advisors, 154 females. Initial age group 40-49 has 893 advisors, 238 females. Initial age group 50-59 has 637 advisors, 132 females.




**Figure A.11:** Marginal Effects of Female Advisor on 1-year Client Retention Rates - by Advisor Initial Age

*Notes:* These figures show the marginal effects of being a female advisor on one-year client retention rates for each tenure-year. All regressions include a control for advisor gross alpha decile and year fixed effects. Each regression is run separately based on the advisor’s initial age when they enter the dataset. Initial age group 20-29 has 334 advisors, 67 females. Initial age group 30-39 has 640 advisors, 154 females. Initial age group 40-49 has 893 advisors, 238 females. Initial age group 50-59 has 637 advisors, 132 females.




**Figure A.12:** Marginal Effects of Female Advisor on Client Exit Rates - by Advisor Initial Age

*Notes:* These figures show the marginal effects of being a female advisor on one-year client exit rates for each tenure-year. All regressions include a control for advisor gross alpha decile and year fixed effects. Each regression is run separately based on the advisor’s initial age when they enter the dataset. Initial age group 20-29 has 334 advisors, 67 females. Initial age group 30-39 has 640 advisors, 154 females. Initial age group 40-49 has 893 advisors, 238 females. Initial age group 50-59 has 637 advisors, 132 females.




**Figure A.13:** Fraction of Advisors with New Clients

*Notes:* This figure shows the fraction of all advisors who take on a new clients in a given year of tenure, split by gender of the advisor.




**Figure A.14:** New Client Summary

*Notes:* These figures show the number of new clients, the market value of those new client accounts at entry, the market value at entry per new client and the percentage of new clients that are female, split by advisor tenure and gender. Plots start one year after the advisor enters the dataset. New client counts and market values at entry are summed over the calendar year at the advisor level. Only advisor who have some new clients in a given year are included.




**Figure A.15:** Performance Sensitivity to Switching Advisors

*Notes:* These figures show the marginal effects of being in a particular return decile interacted with the client having involuntarily switched advisors. The outcome variables are: client exits rates (within one year), net flows (as a fraction of account market value) and an indicator equal to one if the client withdraws money on net within the next year. Net flows are inflows minus outflows over account values, such that a negative value means more money is being withdrawn. The client withdrawing money on net is equal to one if net flows are negative. d1-d10 represent deciles of the past quarter's return, adjusted by rank. These deciles are then interacted with a dummy equal to one if the client has involunatrily switched to a new advisor. Corresponding regressions are shown in Table B.15.



**Figure A.16:** Performance Sensitivity to Homophily - Male Advisors

*Notes:* These figures show the marginal effects of being in a particular return decile interacted with the advisor and the client being of the same gender. Only male advisors are included. The outcome variables are: client exits rates (within one year), net flows (as a fraction of account market value) and an indicator equal to one if the client withdraws money on net within the next year. Net flows are inflows minus outflows over account values, such that a negative value means more money is being withdrawn. The client withdrawing money on net is equal to one if net flows are negative. d1-d10 represent deciles of the past quarter's return, adjusted by rank. These deciles are then interacted with a dummy equal to one if the advisor and the client are the same gender. Corresponding regressions are shown in Table B.19.



**Figure A.17:** Performance Sensitivity to Homophily - Female Advisors

*Notes:* These figures show the marginal effects of being in a particular return decile interacted with the advisor and the client being of the same gender. Only female advisors are included. The outcome variables are: client exits rates (within one year), net flows (as a fraction of account market value) and an indicator equal to one if the client withdraws money on net within the next year. Net flows are inflows minus outflows over account values, such that a negative value means more money is being withdrawn. The client withdrawing money on net is equal to one if net flows are negative. d1-d10 represent deciles of the past quarter's return, adjusted by rank. These deciles are then interacted with a dummy equal to one if the advisor and the client are the same gender. Corresponding regressions are shown in Table B.20.

## B Appendix Tables

**Table B.1:** Gap in Percentage Fees

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
	Raw Gap		Controlling for Performance/Skill	Controlling for Client Characteristics	Controlling for Supply Side Factors		Controlling for Size of Book		All Controls	
Advisor is Female	-0.0165 (0.0127)	-0.00223 (0.0140)	-0.0133 (0.0124)	-0.00820 (0.0119)	-0.0175 (0.0126)	-0.00386 (0.0139)	-0.0255** (0.0130)	-0.0229* (0.0130)	0.00579 (0.0130)	0.000234 (0.0130)
Clients' Returns			-0.00493* (0.00259)						-0.00443* (0.00241)	-0.00376 (0.00240)
Log Advisor Tenure			-0.0258*** (0.00692)						0.102*** (0.0172)	0.0987*** (0.0171)
Advisor's Equity Share			0.245*** (0.0463)						0.0224 (0.0501)	0.0107 (0.0493)
Clients' Age				0.00179* (0.00102)					0.00280** (0.00109)	0.00586*** (0.00116)
% Clients Female				-0.112*** (0.0372)					-0.0736** (0.0370)	-0.0782** (0.0362)
Risky Share of Clients' Portfolios				0.707*** (0.0410)					0.749*** (0.0446)	0.733*** (0.0429)
Advisor Has Children					0.0273 (0.0172)	0.0112 (0.0192)			0.0205 (0.0181)	0.0191 (0.0180)
Advisor is Single					0.0107 (0.0399)	0.0186 (0.0350)			0.0178 (0.0296)	0.0136 (0.0310)
# of Investments per Client					-0.00274 (0.00213)	-0.00167 (0.00215)			-0.00340* (0.00192)	0.00184 (0.00194)
Log Client Advisor Relationship Tenure					-0.0447*** (0.00719)	-0.0413*** (0.00781)			-0.133*** (0.0178)	-0.136*** (0.0176)
Log AUM per Client							-0.0395*** (0.00930)	-0.0475*** (0.00897)		-0.0635*** (0.0111)
Log # of Clients								0.0109** (0.00480)		0.0198*** (0.00504)
Month FE?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Advisor Alpha Quantile FE?	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Advisor Census Subdivision FE?	N	Y	N	N	N	Y	N	N	Y	Y
Client Salary and NW?	N	N	N	Y	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Observations	214324	214324	214324	214324	214324	214324	214324	214324	214324	214324
$R^2$	0.017	0.056	0.022	0.042	0.020	0.058	0.019	0.019	0.084	0.087

*Notes:* This table shows regression of percentage fees (measured in raw percentage points) paid by clients on advisor gender and other advisor and client characteristics. Regressions are at the advisor-month level. Standard errors are clustered at the advisor level and in parentheses. \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table B.2:** Impact of Advisor Tenure and Gender on Book Characteristics - With Year FE

	(1) Log AUM	(2) Log AUM Per Client	(3) Log Number of Clients	(4) Average # of Plans per Client	(5) 1-Year Client Retention Rate	(6) 1-Year Client Exit Rate	(7) Fraction of Clients Female
<b>Advisor Tenure (Years)</b>							
1 Year	0.760*** (0.0754)	0.108** (0.0386)	0.664*** (0.0514)	0.0325 (0.0185)	0.00112 (0.00680)	0.00675** (0.00250)	-0.0104 (0.00877)
2 Years	1.029*** (0.0962)	0.184*** (0.0454)	0.872*** (0.0689)	0.0735** (0.0243)	-0.00456 (0.00702)	0.000291 (0.00102)	-0.00668 (0.0109)
3 Years	1.268*** (0.104)	0.214*** (0.0480)	1.071*** (0.0744)	0.116*** (0.0268)	-0.0115 (0.00717)	0.00436* (0.00178)	-0.0107 (0.0113)
4 Years	1.433*** (0.110)	0.238*** (0.0506)	1.224*** (0.0800)	0.158*** (0.0292)	-0.0105 (0.00760)	0.00343* (0.00166)	-0.00959 (0.0119)
5 Years	1.589*** (0.114)	0.259*** (0.0513)	1.358*** (0.0848)	0.165*** (0.0314)	-0.0127 (0.00788)	0.00497** (0.00188)	-0.0116 (0.0121)
6 Years	1.739*** (0.122)	0.259*** (0.0551)	1.509*** (0.0907)	0.159*** (0.0340)	-0.0114 (0.00798)	0.00304 (0.00190)	-0.0108 (0.0128)
7 Years	1.885*** (0.125)	0.305*** (0.0566)	1.609*** (0.0942)	0.180*** (0.0363)	-0.0168 (0.00862)	0.00560* (0.00225)	-0.00623 (0.0131)
8 Years	1.984*** (0.131)	0.307*** (0.0597)	1.695*** (0.0998)	0.187*** (0.0384)	-0.0184* (0.00861)	0.00566* (0.00263)	-0.00184 (0.0137)
9 Years	2.150*** (0.142)	0.352*** (0.0632)	1.834*** (0.107)	0.216*** (0.0402)	-0.00683 (0.00984)	0.00244 (0.00261)	0.00285 (0.0142)
10 Years	2.223*** (0.152)	0.388*** (0.0663)	1.871*** (0.116)	0.221*** (0.0432)	-0.0119 (0.0104)	0.00182 (0.00318)	0.00303 (0.0148)
11 Years	2.314*** (0.155)	0.392*** (0.0683)	1.956*** (0.121)	0.234*** (0.0458)	-0.0186 (0.0106)	0.00878* (0.00433)	0.00583 (0.0149)
12 Years	2.377*** (0.169)	0.423*** (0.0726)	1.977*** (0.132)	0.235*** (0.0485)	-0.0210 (0.0113)	0.00556 (0.00387)	0.00456 (0.0157)
13 Years	2.422*** (0.177)	0.410*** (0.0761)	2.025*** (0.138)	0.244*** (0.0513)	-0.0246 (0.0130)	0.00973* (0.00454)	0.00233 (0.0163)
14 Years	2.476*** (0.191)	0.450*** (0.0809)	2.020*** (0.150)	0.248*** (0.0558)	-0.00649 (0.0172)	0.00322 (0.00171)	-0.00588 (0.0172)
15 Years	1.756*** (0.292)	0.350** (0.111)	1.439*** (0.238)	0.0576 (0.0699)	-0.0332 (0.0350)	0.0115 (0.0145)	-0.0257 (0.0246)
<b>Gender and Interactions</b>							
Female Advisor	-0.566*** (0.151)	-0.220** (0.0692)	-0.326** (0.110)	0.0199 (0.0416)	-0.0116 (0.00832)	0.00293 (0.00333)	0.0190 (0.0169)
Female × 1 Year	-0.106 (0.0944)	-0.0260 (0.0518)	-0.0860 (0.0629)	-0.0325 (0.0225)	0.00498 (0.00999)	-0.00438 (0.00405)	0.0176 (0.0120)
Female × 2 Years	-0.0846 (0.119)	-0.0446 (0.0601)	-0.0592 (0.0826)	-0.0392 (0.0319)	0.0149 (0.0100)	-0.00215 (0.00355)	0.00626 (0.0144)
Female × 3 Years	-0.0978 (0.129)	-0.0527 (0.0635)	-0.0562 (0.0901)	-0.0811* (0.0353)	-0.0134 (0.0128)	-0.00183 (0.00452)	0.0160 (0.0156)
Female × 4 Years	-0.189 (0.134)	-0.0609 (0.0637)	-0.170 (0.0958)	-0.103** (0.0391)	0.0124 (0.0119)	0.00677 (0.00714)	0.00914 (0.0159)
Female × 5 Years	-0.151 (0.141)	-0.0415 (0.0673)	-0.144 (0.1000)	-0.0718 (0.0392)	0.0231* (0.0112)	-0.00166 (0.00506)	0.0109 (0.0167)
Female × 6 Years	0.0146 (0.147)	0.0396 (0.0688)	-0.0690 (0.106)	-0.0562 (0.0404)	0.0154 (0.0119)	-0.0000412 (0.00573)	0.0169 (0.0173)
Female × 7 Years	0.0882 (0.150)	0.0393 (0.0702)	0.0195 (0.108)	-0.0352 (0.0418)	0.00743 (0.0117)	-0.00404 (0.00459)	0.0253 (0.0174)
Female × 8 Years	0.0882 (0.156)	0.0331 (0.0729)	0.0327 (0.114)	-0.0367 (0.0441)	0.0167 (0.0120)	-0.00638 (0.00459)	0.0161 (0.0174)
Female × 9 Years	0.0924 (0.154)	0.0452 (0.0729)	0.0147 (0.113)	-0.0280 (0.0456)	0.0168 (0.0136)	0.00251 (0.00701)	0.00585 (0.0179)
Female × 10 Years	0.111 (0.160)	0.0494 (0.0737)	0.0257 (0.119)	-0.0123 (0.0479)	0.0135 (0.0170)	-0.000205 (0.00641)	0.0102 (0.0186)
Female × 11 Years	-0.00628 (0.179)	-0.00191 (0.0822)	-0.0371 (0.130)	-0.0300 (0.0507)	0.00527 (0.0176)	-0.0120 (0.00632)	0.00806 (0.0190)
Female × 12 Years	0.0145 (0.186)	0.0293 (0.0820)	-0.0462 (0.138)	-0.0497 (0.0494)	0.0290 (0.0161)	0.000403 (0.00953)	0.0111 (0.0195)
Female × 13 Years	0.119 (0.179)	0.0841 (0.0811)	0.0354 (0.133)	-0.0180 (0.0519)	0.0283 (0.0171)	-0.00683 (0.00790)	0.0275 (0.0196)
Female × 14 Years	0.157 (0.202)	0.0542 (0.0849)	0.122 (0.150)	-0.0223 (0.0582)	-0.0436 (0.0503)	-0.00349 (0.00345)	0.0233 (0.0213)
Female × 15 Years	-0.128 (0.520)	0.0226 (0.253)	-0.171 (0.418)	-0.0108 (0.127)	-0.0288 (0.0596)	-0.00424 (0.0180)	-0.0126 (0.0366)
Advisor Gross Alpha Decile FE?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	19,302	19,302	19,358	19,358	17,543	19,358	19,036
R <sup>2</sup>	0.149	0.174	0.105	0.038	0.073	0.027	0.012

Notes: This table shows regression of an advisor's books characteristics by advisor gender and tenure. Year FE are included. Advisor gross alpha FE are included. Regressions are at the advisor-year level, with observations taken in December of each year. Standard errors are clustered at the advisor level and in parentheses. \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table B.3:** Impact of Advisor Tenure and Gender on Book Characteristics - With Advisor Start Year be Dealer FE

	(1) Log AUM	(2) Log AUM Per Client	(3) Log Number of Clients	(4) Average # of Plans per Client	(5) 1-Year Client Retention Rate	(6) 1-Year Client Exit Rate	(7) Fraction of Clients Female
<b>Advisor Tenure (Years)</b>							
1 Year	0.649*** (0.0442)	0.171*** (0.0230)	0.485*** (0.0294)	0.103*** (0.0111)	-0.00682 (0.00352)	0.00405* (0.00161)	-0.00561 (0.00309)
2 Years	1.040*** (0.0528)	0.372*** (0.0261)	0.697*** (0.0371)	0.174*** (0.0139)	-0.0137*** (0.00390)	0.000721 (0.000538)	-0.00458 (0.00596)
3 Years	1.259*** (0.0584)	0.404*** (0.0281)	0.877*** (0.0415)	0.235*** (0.0161)	-0.0245*** (0.00406)	0.00436*** (0.00119)	-0.00810 (0.00645)
4 Years	1.524*** (0.0617)	0.547*** (0.0295)	1.006*** (0.0434)	0.285*** (0.0171)	-0.0328*** (0.00430)	0.00570*** (0.00102)	-0.00813 (0.00689)
5 Years	1.740*** (0.0652)	0.638*** (0.0298)	1.132*** (0.0467)	0.295*** (0.0170)	-0.0434*** (0.00493)	0.00774*** (0.00140)	-0.00996 (0.00699)
6 Years	1.914*** (0.0683)	0.737*** (0.0320)	1.206*** (0.0482)	0.295*** (0.0175)	-0.0494*** (0.00475)	0.00842*** (0.00129)	-0.0134 (0.00708)
7 Years	2.082*** (0.0678)	0.865*** (0.0316)	1.245*** (0.0486)	0.306*** (0.0182)	-0.0633*** (0.00537)	0.0112*** (0.00191)	-0.0115 (0.00725)
8 Years	2.170*** (0.0687)	0.907*** (0.0316)	1.279*** (0.0502)	0.302*** (0.0187)	-0.0730*** (0.00519)	0.0126*** (0.00181)	-0.0114 (0.00748)
9 Years	2.062*** (0.0720)	0.781*** (0.0327)	1.305*** (0.0525)	0.309*** (0.0192)	-0.0866*** (0.00665)	0.0147*** (0.00198)	-0.00707 (0.00759)
10 Years	2.144*** (0.0764)	0.916*** (0.0334)	1.256*** (0.0559)	0.312*** (0.0196)	-0.101*** (0.00708)	0.0187*** (0.00273)	-0.00693 (0.00798)
11 Years	2.227*** (0.0818)	0.998*** (0.0359)	1.253*** (0.0592)	0.334*** (0.0206)	-0.101*** (0.00724)	0.0230*** (0.00350)	-0.0102 (0.00786)
12 Years	2.195*** (0.0884)	1.000*** (0.0370)	1.212*** (0.0656)	0.326*** (0.0217)	-0.115*** (0.00757)	0.0229*** (0.00288)	-0.00980 (0.00827)
13 Years	2.279*** (0.0884)	1.061*** (0.0373)	1.225*** (0.0658)	0.329*** (0.0231)	-0.144*** (0.00861)	0.0300*** (0.00424)	-0.0120 (0.00856)
14 Years	2.371*** (0.0980)	1.210*** (0.0404)	1.146*** (0.0737)	0.359*** (0.0257)	-0.101*** (0.0174)	0.00267*** (0.000793)	-0.0130 (0.00901)
15 Years	2.795*** (0.201)	1.295*** (0.0772)	1.524*** (0.154)	0.420*** (0.0481)	-0.137*** (0.0363)	0.0252 (0.0156)	-0.0212 (0.0199)
<b>Gender and Interactions</b>							
Female Advisor	-0.537*** (0.146)	-0.198** (0.0669)	-0.315** (0.107)	0.00891 (0.0413)	-0.0120 (0.00831)	0.00310 (0.00335)	0.0227 (0.0167)
Female × 1 Year	-0.0732 (0.0928)	-0.0212 (0.0513)	-0.0616 (0.0617)	-0.0275 (0.0220)	0.00675 (0.00996)	-0.00440 (0.00402)	0.0167 (0.0120)
Female × 2 Years	-0.0584 (0.115)	-0.0419 (0.0594)	-0.0391 (0.0799)	-0.0377 (0.0319)	0.0160 (0.0100)	-0.00186 (0.00356)	0.00505 (0.0144)
Female × 3 Years	-0.0728 (0.125)	-0.0506 (0.0627)	-0.0386 (0.0869)	-0.0818* (0.0352)	-0.0121 (0.0128)	-0.00179 (0.00455)	0.0149 (0.0154)
Female × 4 Years	-0.129 (0.128)	-0.0498 (0.0629)	-0.123 (0.0916)	-0.0933* (0.0385)	0.0151 (0.0118)	0.00664 (0.00718)	0.00868 (0.0158)
Female × 5 Years	-0.106 (0.136)	-0.0399 (0.0674)	-0.104 (0.0960)	-0.0626 (0.0387)	0.0252* (0.0112)	-0.00140 (0.00509)	0.00939 (0.0165)
Female × 6 Years	0.0616 (0.142)	0.0478 (0.0691)	-0.0190 (0.101)	-0.0502 (0.0397)	0.0176 (0.0119)	-0.000336 (0.00574)	0.0147 (0.0171)
Female × 7 Years	0.141 (0.144)	0.0466 (0.0701)	0.0657 (0.104)	-0.0292 (0.0414)	0.00988 (0.0117)	-0.00456 (0.00462)	0.0224 (0.0172)
Female × 8 Years	0.140 (0.149)	0.0341 (0.0725)	0.0798 (0.108)	-0.0320 (0.0434)	0.0179 (0.0120)	-0.00663 (0.00460)	0.0133 (0.0173)
Female × 9 Years	0.140 (0.146)	0.0543 (0.0712)	0.0486 (0.107)	-0.0252 (0.0450)	0.0186 (0.0137)	0.00238 (0.00703)	0.00342 (0.0178)
Female × 10 Years	0.163 (0.152)	0.0637 (0.0723)	0.0567 (0.114)	-0.00870 (0.0472)	0.0160 (0.0172)	-0.000725 (0.00644)	0.00706 (0.0185)
Female × 11 Years	0.0673 (0.171)	0.0142 (0.0802)	0.0112 (0.125)	-0.0233 (0.0504)	0.00760 (0.0177)	-0.0119 (0.00636)	0.00501 (0.0189)
Female × 12 Years	0.101 (0.177)	0.0511 (0.0791)	0.0123 (0.132)	-0.0430 (0.0491)	0.0297 (0.0161)	-0.0000342 (0.00956)	0.00964 (0.0194)
Female × 13 Years	0.199 (0.167)	0.0955 (0.0774)	0.101 (0.126)	-0.0164 (0.0519)	0.0291 (0.0173)	-0.00785 (0.00794)	0.0289 (0.0196)
Female × 14 Years	0.164 (0.192)	0.0497 (0.0810)	0.132 (0.144)	-0.0212 (0.0580)	-0.0397 (0.0563)	-0.00454 (0.00348)	0.0260 (0.0211)
Female × 15 Years	0.0561 (0.509)	0.0458 (0.236)	-0.00558 (0.391)	-0.0311 (0.114)	-0.0286 (0.0642)	-0.00381 (0.0190)	0.0248 (0.0344)
Advisor Gross Alpha Decile FE?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Dealer by Advisor Start Year FE?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	19,302	19,302	19,358	19,358	17,543	19,358	19,036
R <sup>2</sup>	0.268	0.243	0.216	0.077	0.083	0.022	0.040

Notes: This table shows regression of an advisor's books characteristics by advisor gender and tenure. Dealer by advisor start year FE are included. Advisor gross alpha FE are included. Regressions are at the advisor-year level, with observations taken in December of each year. Standard errors are clustered at the advisor level and in parentheses.

\* $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table B.4:** Number of New Clients and Total Clients by Advisor Tenure and Gender

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Log Number of Clients							
	New	Total	New	Total	New	Total	New	Total
Female Rep=1	-0.131 (0.108)	-0.220* (0.0927)	-0.241 (0.139)	-0.291** (0.113)	-0.0321 (0.145)	-0.203 (0.569)	-0.0456 (0.139)	-0.603 (0.450)
Advisor Tenure (years)=1		0.646*** (0.0444)		0.663*** (0.0537)		-0.142 (0.315)		-0.167 (0.284)
Advisor Tenure (years)=2	0.511*** (0.0561)	0.781*** (0.0575)	0.526*** (0.0723)	0.845*** (0.0720)	0.829*** (0.0713)	0.162 (0.316)	0.664*** (0.0657)	0.0494 (0.286)
Advisor Tenure (years)=3	0.412*** (0.0580)	0.976*** (0.0616)	0.358*** (0.0741)	1.041*** (0.0777)	0.745*** (0.0725)	0.161 (0.318)	0.709*** (0.0681)	0.179 (0.289)
Advisor Tenure (years)=4	0.349*** (0.0588)	1.066*** (0.0668)	0.332*** (0.0754)	1.194*** (0.0832)	0.812*** (0.0772)	0.260 (0.319)	0.689*** (0.0728)	0.277 (0.291)
Advisor Tenure (years)=5	0.403*** (0.0603)	1.157*** (0.0709)	0.382*** (0.0774)	1.330*** (0.0881)	0.925*** (0.0833)	0.310 (0.323)	0.905*** (0.0778)	0.378 (0.294)
Advisor Tenure (years)=6	0.425*** (0.0613)	1.283*** (0.0756)	0.383*** (0.0775)	1.470*** (0.0940)	1.042*** (0.0896)	0.355 (0.328)	0.962*** (0.0836)	0.437 (0.299)
Advisor Tenure (years)=7	0.409*** (0.0630)	1.419*** (0.0794)	0.392*** (0.0793)	1.568*** (0.0973)	1.148*** (0.0970)	0.432 (0.330)	0.977*** (0.0900)	0.486 (0.302)
Advisor Tenure (years)=8	0.476*** (0.0666)	1.501*** (0.0843)	0.437*** (0.0834)	1.635*** (0.103)	1.304*** (0.105)	0.466 (0.331)	1.165*** (0.0976)	0.523 (0.304)
Advisor Tenure (years)=9	0.469*** (0.0679)	1.616*** (0.0911)	0.467*** (0.0850)	1.747*** (0.111)	1.404*** (0.113)	0.517 (0.338)	1.158*** (0.104)	0.554 (0.309)
Advisor Tenure (years)=10	0.414*** (0.0733)	1.709*** (0.0986)	0.400*** (0.0893)	1.802*** (0.120)	1.422*** (0.121)	0.514 (0.344)	1.070*** (0.112)	0.505 (0.315)
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=1		-0.0221 (0.0542)		-0.0624 (0.0644)		-0.100 (0.559)		0.309 (0.445)
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=2	-0.0573 (0.117)	-0.00987 (0.0725)	-0.00587 (0.148)	-0.0521 (0.0845)	-0.258 (0.154)	-0.173 (0.559)	-0.229 (0.146)	0.262 (0.444)
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=3	-0.0838 (0.116)	0.00215 (0.0802)	-0.0378 (0.145)	-0.0638 (0.0917)	-0.256 (0.150)	-0.163 (0.566)	-0.226 (0.144)	0.264 (0.450)
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=4	-0.0612 (0.119)	-0.0646 (0.0858)	-0.0318 (0.149)	-0.166 (0.0964)	-0.258 (0.154)	-0.235 (0.569)	-0.219 (0.148)	0.208 (0.452)
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=5	-0.0773 (0.119)	-0.0212 (0.0928)	-0.0899 (0.149)	-0.149 (0.101)	-0.314* (0.152)	-0.222 (0.572)	-0.266 (0.145)	0.229 (0.453)
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=6	-0.0687 (0.123)	0.00242 (0.104)	-0.0206 (0.155)	-0.0680 (0.107)	-0.224 (0.159)	-0.129 (0.572)	-0.193 (0.151)	0.317 (0.454)
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=7	0.0527 (0.127)	-0.0320 (0.107)	0.0994 (0.157)	-0.00506 (0.109)	-0.114 (0.160)	-0.0841 (0.571)	-0.0850 (0.151)	0.359 (0.453)
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=8	-0.0160 (0.128)	0.0369 (0.110)	0.0279 (0.156)	-0.0110 (0.115)	-0.220 (0.161)	-0.103 (0.574)	-0.193 (0.153)	0.347 (0.455)
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=9	-0.104 (0.130)	0.0413 (0.111)	-0.0775 (0.158)	-0.0159 (0.113)	-0.305 (0.161)	-0.128 (0.575)	-0.301 (0.154)	0.310 (0.457)
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=10	-0.0600 (0.134)	-0.000787 (0.119)	-0.0117 (0.163)	0.000837 (0.120)	-0.261 (0.166)	-0.0820 (0.577)	-0.221 (0.158)	0.363 (0.459)
Lagged Average Number of Plans per Client					0.00873 (0.0342)	0.431*** (0.0624)	0.00435 (0.0334)	0.405*** (0.0593)
Lagged Average Client-Advisor Relationship Length					-0.0133*** (0.00132)	0.00697*** (0.00176)	-0.0186*** (0.00127)	-0.000275 (0.00166)
Gross Alpha Decile FE?	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
Advisor Start Cohort by Dealer FE?	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Observations	15466	22549	11393	15705	11043	13928	11043	13928
# of Advisors	3039	3039	1811	1811	1769	1769	1769	1769

*Notes:* This table shows regressions of either the log number of new clients an advisor takes on or the log total number of clients an advisor has on advisor tenure, advisor gender, and the interaction of advisor tenure and gender. Regressions are at the advisor-year level, with observations taken in December each year. New clients is the sum of all new clients added over the previous year. Only advisors who take on some new clients in a given year are included. Standard errors (clustered at the advisor level) are in parentheses. \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

**Table B.5: Log New AUM and Log Total AUM by Advisor Tenure and Gender**

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Log AUM							
	New	Total	New	Total	New	Total	New	Total
Female Rep=1	-0.266 (0.201)	-0.404** (0.130)	-0.473* (0.238)	-0.518*** (0.155)	-0.222 (0.250)	-0.488 (0.713)	-0.223 (0.238)	-0.740 (0.579)
Advisor Tenure (years)=1		0.725*** (0.0645)		0.763*** (0.0793)		-0.447 (0.400)		-0.452 (0.377)
Advisor Tenure (years)=2	0.666*** (0.0990)	0.957*** (0.0807)	0.666*** (0.124)	0.996*** (0.101)	1.017*** (0.128)	-0.140 (0.398)	0.780*** (0.121)	-0.121 (0.378)
Advisor Tenure (years)=3	0.540*** (0.102)	1.181*** (0.0856)	0.437*** (0.128)	1.225*** (0.109)	0.918*** (0.132)	-0.169 (0.400)	0.920*** (0.125)	-0.00623 (0.381)
Advisor Tenure (years)=4	0.377*** (0.105)	1.260*** (0.0920)	0.372** (0.133)	1.392*** (0.115)	0.969*** (0.142)	-0.0920 (0.402)	0.898*** (0.132)	0.182 (0.383)
Advisor Tenure (years)=5	0.472*** (0.108)	1.355*** (0.0967)	0.444** (0.136)	1.554*** (0.119)	1.139*** (0.149)	-0.0573 (0.406)	1.269*** (0.137)	0.341 (0.387)
Advisor Tenure (years)=6	0.534*** (0.112)	1.494*** (0.104)	0.440** (0.137)	1.689*** (0.127)	1.311*** (0.157)	-0.0447 (0.410)	1.441*** (0.145)	0.468 (0.390)
Advisor Tenure (years)=7	0.583*** (0.112)	1.688*** (0.108)	0.558*** (0.138)	1.833*** (0.130)	1.561*** (0.165)	0.0568 (0.410)	1.574*** (0.150)	0.625 (0.393)
Advisor Tenure (years)=8	0.578*** (0.116)	1.762*** (0.113)	0.513*** (0.143)	1.900*** (0.135)	1.673*** (0.175)	0.0569 (0.413)	1.836*** (0.163)	0.674 (0.395)
Advisor Tenure (years)=9	0.662*** (0.118)	1.898*** (0.121)	0.607*** (0.147)	2.034*** (0.147)	1.874*** (0.189)	0.102 (0.420)	1.842*** (0.171)	0.554 (0.401)
Advisor Tenure (years)=10	0.621*** (0.128)	2.055*** (0.130)	0.571*** (0.159)	2.124*** (0.158)	1.945*** (0.205)	0.108 (0.428)	1.669*** (0.182)	0.617 (0.408)
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=1		-0.0375 (0.0827)		-0.0674 (0.0969)		-0.0438 (0.704)		0.240 (0.575)
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=2	-0.211 (0.216)	-0.0673 (0.107)	-0.132 (0.258)	-0.0813 (0.122)	-0.462 (0.270)	-0.137 (0.705)	-0.411 (0.259)	0.178 (0.575)
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=3	-0.217 (0.214)	-0.0579 (0.118)	-0.115 (0.248)	-0.111 (0.132)	-0.384 (0.257)	-0.142 (0.714)	-0.349 (0.247)	0.169 (0.583)
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=4	-0.170 (0.220)	-0.0823 (0.125)	-0.123 (0.257)	-0.188 (0.135)	-0.387 (0.269)	-0.158 (0.716)	-0.334 (0.261)	0.174 (0.583)
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=5	-0.162 (0.219)	-0.0362 (0.137)	-0.198 (0.256)	-0.157 (0.142)	-0.471 (0.263)	-0.166 (0.720)	-0.397 (0.253)	0.168 (0.586)
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=6	-0.0727 (0.220)	0.0663 (0.144)	0.0278 (0.260)	0.00236 (0.149)	-0.229 (0.271)	0.00732 (0.718)	-0.182 (0.262)	0.335 (0.585)
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=7	-0.0266 (0.234)	-0.0204 (0.148)	0.0219 (0.274)	0.0527 (0.150)	-0.255 (0.280)	0.0301 (0.716)	-0.227 (0.268)	0.352 (0.583)
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=8	-0.193 (0.238)	0.0701 (0.152)	-0.106 (0.275)	0.0306 (0.158)	-0.416 (0.279)	0.00535 (0.720)	-0.376 (0.269)	0.336 (0.585)
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=9	-0.284 (0.237)	0.111 (0.153)	-0.137 (0.271)	0.0402 (0.156)	-0.418 (0.277)	-0.0117 (0.721)	-0.409 (0.268)	0.315 (0.587)
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=10	-0.183 (0.249)	0.0620 (0.158)	-0.105 (0.290)	0.0652 (0.163)	-0.436 (0.296)	0.00412 (0.723)	-0.375 (0.284)	0.348 (0.590)
Lagged Average Number of Plans per Client					0.150** (0.0541)	0.803*** (0.0729)	0.167** (0.0516)	0.802*** (0.0676)
Lagged Average Client-Advisor Relationship Length					-0.0189*** (0.00202)	0.0107*** (0.00212)	-0.0252*** (0.00192)	0.00279 (0.00195)
Gross Alpha Decile FE?	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N
Advisor Start Cohort by Dealer FE?	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y
Observations	15394	22406	11361	15664	11011	13902	11011	13902
Advisors	3033	3031	1811	1810	1769	1768	1769	1768

*Notes:* This table shows regressions of either the new client AUM or the total client AUM on advisor tenure, advisor gender and the interaction of advisor tenure and gender. Regressions are at the advisor-year level, with observations taken in December of each year. New client AUM is the sum of the AUM from all new clients added over the previous year. Only advisors who take on some new clients in a given year are included. Standard errors (clustered at the advisor level) in parentheses. \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

**Table B.6:** Log AUM per New Client and Log AUM Per Client by Advisor Gender and Tenure

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)		(6)	(7)	(8)
	Log AUM Per Client									
	New	Total	New	Total	New	Total	New	Total	New	Total
Female Rep=1	-0.143 (0.146)	-0.164** (0.0617)	-0.258 (0.176)	-0.206** (0.0716)	-0.225 (0.193)	-0.276 (0.238)	-0.206 (0.189)	-0.132 (0.222)		
Advisor Tenure (years)=1		0.111*** (0.0326)		0.117** (0.0403)		-0.336* (0.161)		-0.309 (0.166)		
Advisor Tenure (years)=2	0.161* (0.0667)	0.206*** (0.0393)	0.141 (0.0821)	0.179*** (0.0476)	0.188* (0.0911)	-0.311 (0.161)	0.112 (0.0887)	-0.174 (0.167)		
Advisor Tenure (years)=3	0.130 (0.0669)	0.237*** (0.0407)	0.0761 (0.0825)	0.206*** (0.0502)	0.166 (0.0910)	-0.339* (0.162)	0.207* (0.0896)	-0.189 (0.168)		
Advisor Tenure (years)=4	0.0279 (0.0700)	0.237*** (0.0429)	0.0334 (0.0896)	0.229*** (0.0531)	0.145 (0.101)	-0.358* (0.163)	0.198* (0.0956)	-0.0981 (0.169)		
Advisor Tenure (years)=5	0.0738 (0.0722)	0.239*** (0.0447)	0.0601 (0.0902)	0.255*** (0.0538)	0.204 (0.105)	-0.372* (0.165)	0.355*** (0.0978)	-0.0391 (0.171)		
Advisor Tenure (years)=6	0.105 (0.0754)	0.255*** (0.0481)	0.0523 (0.0916)	0.250*** (0.0578)	0.255* (0.109)	-0.405* (0.167)	0.468*** (0.103)	0.0291 (0.174)		
Advisor Tenure (years)=7	0.178* (0.0750)	0.313*** (0.0495)	0.163 (0.0914)	0.296*** (0.0595)	0.399*** (0.112)	-0.381* (0.167)	0.577*** (0.105)	0.135 (0.175)		
Advisor Tenure (years)=8	0.0963 (0.0774)	0.303*** (0.0523)	0.0581 (0.0949)	0.286*** (0.0625)	0.336** (0.118)	-0.422* (0.170)	0.643*** (0.112)	0.139 (0.177)		
Advisor Tenure (years)=9	0.189* (0.0778)	0.348*** (0.0548)	0.128 (0.0966)	0.324*** (0.0662)	0.441*** (0.126)	-0.417* (0.171)	0.663*** (0.117)	-0.00900 (0.180)		
Advisor Tenure (years)=10	0.211* (0.0845)	0.412*** (0.0579)	0.167 (0.105)	0.359*** (0.0693)	0.503*** (0.138)	-0.408* (0.174)	0.580*** (0.124)	0.107 (0.182)		
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=1		-0.0136 (0.0461)		-0.0134 (0.0535)		0.0600 (0.238)		-0.0609 (0.223)		
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=2	-0.141 (0.154)	-0.0623 (0.0584)	-0.105 (0.184)	-0.0488 (0.0613)	-0.176 (0.200)	0.0278 (0.240)	-0.159 (0.197)	-0.0868 (0.223)		
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=3	-0.140 (0.154)	-0.0651 (0.0629)	-0.0694 (0.180)	-0.0618 (0.0646)	-0.113 (0.196)	0.0146 (0.242)	-0.111 (0.193)	-0.0981 (0.225)		
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=4	-0.0953 (0.158)	-0.0602 (0.0645)	-0.0588 (0.185)	-0.0647 (0.0648)	-0.0900 (0.200)	0.0460 (0.240)	-0.0829 (0.199)	-0.0614 (0.225)		
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=5	-0.0826 (0.155)	-0.0467 (0.0701)	-0.0906 (0.183)	-0.0444 (0.0685)	-0.131 (0.198)	0.0325 (0.242)	-0.112 (0.195)	-0.0805 (0.226)		
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=6	0.00277 (0.156)	0.0316 (0.0662)	0.0775 (0.186)	0.0343 (0.0704)	0.0314 (0.202)	0.114 (0.242)	0.0411 (0.200)	0.00388 (0.226)		
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=7	-0.0783 (0.167)	-0.0119 (0.0670)	-0.0582 (0.197)	0.0278 (0.0713)	-0.115 (0.209)	0.0969 (0.242)	-0.122 (0.206)	-0.0162 (0.226)		
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=8	-0.164 (0.169)	0.0163 (0.0692)	-0.0940 (0.199)	0.0181 (0.0744)	-0.147 (0.208)	0.0913 (0.242)	-0.139 (0.205)	-0.0231 (0.226)		
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=9	-0.163 (0.173)	0.0294 (0.0686)	-0.0253 (0.201)	0.0224 (0.0742)	-0.0700 (0.211)	0.0927 (0.242)	-0.0739 (0.208)	-0.0144 (0.226)		
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=10	-0.112 (0.180)	0.0200 (0.0698)	-0.0642 (0.213)	0.0270 (0.0752)	-0.138 (0.223)	0.0762 (0.242)	-0.124 (0.220)	-0.0209 (0.226)		
Lagged Average Number of Plans per Client					0.139*** (0.0336)	0.378*** (0.0284)	0.159*** (0.0321)	0.403*** (0.0268)		
Lagged Average Client-Advisor Relationship Length					-0.00539*** (0.00124)	0.00372*** (0.000897)	-0.00632*** (0.00124)	0.00308*** (0.000865)		
Gross Alpha Decile FE?	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N		
Advisor Start Cohort by Dealer FE?	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y		
Observations	15394	22406	11361	15664	11011	13902	11011	13902		
Advisors	3033	3031	1811	1810	1769	1768	1769	1768		

*Notes:* This table shows regressions of either log AUM per new client or total AUM per client on advisor tenure, advisor gender and the interaction of advisor tenure and gender. Regressions are at the advisor-year level, with observations taken in December of each year. New client AUM is the sum of the AUM from all new clients added over the previous year. Only advisors who take on some new clients in a given year are included. Standard errors (clustered at the advisor level) in parentheses. \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

**Table B.7:** Fraction of New and Total Female Clients by Advisor Gender and Tenure

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)		(5)		(6)	(7)	(8)
	Fraction of Clients Female									
	New	Total	New	Total	New	Total	New	Total	New	Total
Female Rep=1	0.0542 (0.0332)	0.0297* (0.0143)	0.0391 (0.0414)	0.0241 (0.0168)	0.0649 (0.0470)	0.0648 (0.0782)	0.0641 (0.0471)	0.0828 (0.0843)		
Advisor Tenure (years)=1		-0.0164* (0.00794)		-0.0126 (0.00887)		0.0349 (0.0302)		0.0328 (0.0303)		
Advisor Tenure (years)=2	0.00448 (0.0169)	-0.0114 (0.00974)	0.0221 (0.0203)	-0.00784 (0.0110)	0.0216 (0.0227)	0.0328 (0.0302)	0.0171 (0.0221)	0.0302 (0.0303)		
Advisor Tenure (years)=3	-0.00883 (0.0166)	-0.0111 (0.00982)	0.00532 (0.0199)	-0.01000 (0.0115)	0.00759 (0.0218)	0.0338 (0.0304)	0.00877 (0.0219)	0.0297 (0.0305)		
Advisor Tenure (years)=4	-0.00224 (0.0172)	-0.0122 (0.0104)	0.0145 (0.0209)	-0.00789 (0.0120)	0.0101 (0.0231)	0.0331 (0.0306)	0.00443 (0.0229)	0.0284 (0.0308)		
Advisor Tenure (years)=5	-0.0163 (0.0171)	-0.0221* (0.0106)	0.00502 (0.0208)	-0.00942 (0.0122)	0.00203 (0.0237)	0.0342 (0.0310)	-0.00854 (0.0234)	0.0270 (0.0312)		
Advisor Tenure (years)=6	-0.0321 (0.0174)	-0.0236* (0.0110)	-0.0114 (0.0209)	-0.00828 (0.0128)	-0.0222 (0.0239)	0.0297 (0.0315)	-0.0210 (0.0238)	0.0226 (0.0317)		
Advisor Tenure (years)=7	-0.0130 (0.0177)	-0.0114 (0.0114)	0.00439 (0.0210)	-0.00333 (0.0133)	-0.00806 (0.0244)	0.0390 (0.0319)	-0.0212 (0.0244)	0.0253 (0.0322)		
Advisor Tenure (years)=8	0.0135 (0.0182)	-0.00533 (0.0118)	0.0359 (0.0213)	0.00177 (0.0137)	0.0163 (0.0259)	0.0410 (0.0323)	-0.00113 (0.0258)	0.0251 (0.0328)		
Advisor Tenure (years)=9	0.0208 (0.0184)	-0.00456 (0.0123)	0.0362 (0.0219)	0.00502 (0.0143)	0.0195 (0.0269)	0.0467 (0.0331)	-0.0162 (0.0266)	0.0305 (0.0335)		
Advisor Tenure (years)=10	-0.0196 (0.0194)	-0.00513 (0.0129)	-0.00304 (0.0228)	0.00384 (0.0150)	-0.0228 (0.0284)	0.0463 (0.0339)	-0.0367 (0.0275)	0.0302 (0.0343)		
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=1		0.0170 (0.0109)		0.0180 (0.0122)		-0.0177 (0.0769)		-0.0337 (0.0826)		
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=2	-0.0167 (0.0367)	0.0137 (0.0135)	-0.0158 (0.0450)	0.00815 (0.0147)	-0.0265 (0.0512)	-0.0272 (0.0769)	-0.0230 (0.0513)	-0.0431 (0.0827)		
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=3	0.00512 (0.0367)	0.0114 (0.0145)	0.00516 (0.0455)	0.0113 (0.0157)	-0.0249 (0.0506)	-0.0293 (0.0783)	-0.0234 (0.0506)	-0.0467 (0.0841)		
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=4	-0.0407 (0.0377)	0.00963 (0.0150)	-0.0118 (0.0453)	0.00755 (0.0159)	-0.0319 (0.0507)	-0.0251 (0.0787)	-0.0291 (0.0509)	-0.0416 (0.0846)		
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=5	0.00196 (0.0373)	0.0152 (0.0152)	0.0244 (0.0457)	0.00850 (0.0165)	0.00219 (0.0508)	-0.0281 (0.0787)	0.00424 (0.0509)	-0.0437 (0.0846)		
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=6	-0.0288 (0.0376)	0.0213 (0.0159)	-0.0283 (0.0454)	0.0143 (0.0172)	-0.0559 (0.0509)	-0.0236 (0.0787)	-0.0534 (0.0513)	-0.0400 (0.0846)		
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=7	-0.00848 (0.0389)	0.0242 (0.0163)	0.00571 (0.0466)	0.0196 (0.0172)	-0.0221 (0.0518)	-0.0214 (0.0786)	-0.0213 (0.0519)	-0.0380 (0.0845)		
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=8	-0.0345 (0.0399)	0.00752 (0.0163)	-0.0235 (0.0481)	0.00768 (0.0174)	-0.0448 (0.0530)	-0.0309 (0.0787)	-0.0400 (0.0532)	-0.0469 (0.0846)		
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=9	-0.0114 (0.0411)	0.00208 (0.0164)	-0.00468 (0.0491)	0.000764 (0.0177)	-0.0302 (0.0539)	-0.0401 (0.0788)	-0.0263 (0.0541)	-0.0557 (0.0847)		
Female Rep=1 × Advisor Tenure (years)=10	-0.0248 (0.0421)	0.000610 (0.0176)	-0.0233 (0.0497)	0.00563 (0.0184)	-0.0399 (0.0549)	-0.0297 (0.0790)	-0.0356 (0.0549)	-0.0453 (0.0848)		
Lagged Average Number of Plans per Client					0.0190** (0.00605)	0.0174** (0.00566)	0.0221*** (0.00607)	0.0179** (0.00546)		
Lagged Average Client-Advisor Relationship Length					0.000387 (0.000239)	-0.0000403 (0.000191)	0.000553* (0.000243)	0.000000780 (0.000197)		
Gross Alpha Decile FE?	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Year FE?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	N	N	N
Advisor Start Cohort by Dealer FE?	N	N	N	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	14443	21617	10764	15343	10427	13641	10427	13641	10427	13641
Advisors	2940	2939	1786	1785	1741	1740	1741	1740	1741	1740

*Notes:* This table shows regressions of either the fraction of new clients that are female or the fraction of all clients that are female on advisor tenure, advisor gender and the interaction of advisor tenure and gender. Regressions are at the advisor-year level, with observations taken in December of each year. Fraction of new female clients is the average of all new clients added over the previous year. Only advisors who take on some new clients in a given year are included. Standard errors (clustered at the advisor level) in parentheses. \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

**Table B.8:** Number of Advisors by Tenure and Gender

(1)		
	Male	Female
Tenure Year		
0	1599	427
1	1589	421
2	1681	446
3	1611	408
4	1503	380
5	1412	370
6	1350	342
7	1215	300
8	1087	267
9	996	243
10	883	210
11	806	176
12	695	152
13	605	134
14	527	113
15	71	13
Total	2439	695

*Notes:* This table shows the number of observations in each tenure-year by gender cell. Sample is restricted to tenure years 0-15. Only advisors with non-missing gender information who take on new clients after the first year are included.

**Table B.9:** Likelihood of Female Advisors Buying Books of Exiting Advisors

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Female Advisor							
Female Advisor Purchases Book								
% Female Advisors at Dealer		0.753 (1.395)						
% of Female Advisors in Selling Advisor's Census Subdivision			0.159* (0.0894)		0.145 (0.115)	0.151 (0.115)	0.172 (0.114)	0.102 (0.123)
Log Size of Book Being Sold				-0.0656** (0.0254)	-0.0597** (0.0259)	-0.0594** (0.0263)	-0.0501* (0.0264)	-0.0449* (0.0264)
# of Accounts per Client for Buying Advisor						-0.00160 (0.00934)		
Log Book Size Pre-Book Purchase							-0.0384* (0.0202)	-0.0373* (0.0200)
Seller is Female								0.0803 (0.0591)
Month FE?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Dealer FE?	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Advisor Alpha Quantile FE?	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Observations	658	628	628	488	464	461	461	461
$R^2$	0.192	0.200	0.205	0.258	0.266	0.270	0.279	0.283

Standard errors in parentheses

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ 

*Notes:* This table shows regressions of the likelihood of a book being purchased by a female advisor on various event-level controls. Regressions are at the event-level, where the event is the book-selling transaction. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the advisor level. \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

**Table B.10:** Gender Composition of Book Sold and Gender of Purchasing Advisor

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	% Clients Female in Sold Book					
Female Advisor=1	0.0297 (0.0223)	0.0251 (0.0218)	0.0325 (0.0255)	0.0243 (0.0229)	0.0157 (0.0252)	-0.0689 (0.0438)
Log Book Size Pre-Book Purchase		-0.00928 (0.00601)			-0.0193** (0.00898)	-0.0200** (0.00886)
% of Female Advisors in Selling Advisor's Census Subdivision				0.117*** (0.0390)	0.140*** (0.0455)	0.149*** (0.0471)
Book is Sold to Multiple Advisor=1						-0.00177 (0.0225)
Female Advisor=1 × Book is Sold to Multiple Advisor=1						0.140** (0.0572)
Month FE?	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
Dealer FE?	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y
Advisor Alpha Quantile FE?	N	N	Y	N	Y	Y
Observations	654	642	484	627	459	459
$R^2$	0.245	0.257	0.294	0.257	0.321	0.341

*Notes:* This table shows regressions of the percentage of female clients in a sold book on the buying advisor being female and various event-level controls. Regressions are at the event-level, where the event is the book-selling transaction. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the advisor level. \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table B.11:** Buys and Sells of Book By Geography

	Total Matched	Total Non-missing	Fraction Matched
Province	375	399	94.0%
Census Division	189	399	47.4%
Census Subdivision	117	399	29.3%
Census Consolidated Subdivision	132	399	33.1%
Postal Code	4	399	1.0%

*Notes:* This table shows the percentage of book-selling transactions by an exiting advisor that occur to an advisor within the same geographic area. “Total matched” is the number of transactions in which the buying and selling advisor are in the same indicated geographic unit. “Total non-missing” is the total number of transactions in which the buying and selling advisor both have non-missing geographic info.

**Table B.12:** Advisor Gender Diversity by Geography

	Distinct Units	With Non-Missing Gender Info	
		Average (Median) # of Advisors per Unit	Average (Median) # Female Advisors per Unit per Month
Province	10	141.70 (55.00)	29.50 (10.50)
Census Division	210	8.20 (2.00)	1.77 (1.00)
Census Consolidated Subdivision	476	3.81 (1.00)	0.84 (0.00)
Census Subdivision	574	3.37 (1.00)	0.74 (0.00)
Postal Code	3221	1.05 (1.00)	0.26 (0.00)

*Notes:* This table shows the gender distribution of advisors at the level of different geographic units. The counts are taken as an average of each monthly observation. Only advisors with non-missing gender and location info are included, which includes 2,631/4,412 advisors.

**Table B.13:** Performance sensitivity of client exits and outflows to advisor gender

	(1) Client Exit	(2) Net Flows (Fraction)	(3) Client Withdraws Money (Net)
Advisor is Female	0.000265 (0.000228)	-0.000198** (0.0000862)	-0.000840 (0.000563)
<hr/>			
Return Decile			
d1	0.000302* (0.000177)	-0.00108*** (0.000130)	-0.000282 (0.000512)
d2	-0.0000369 (0.0000989)	-0.000240** (0.000103)	-0.000977* (0.000506)
d3	0.0000732 (0.0000896)	-0.000106 (0.0000861)	-0.000113 (0.000439)
d4	0.0000675 (0.0000864)	0.0000517 (0.0000820)	0.000340 (0.000360)
d5	-0.00000280 (0.0000709)	0.000126* (0.0000695)	0.0000193 (0.000323)
d7	0.0000669 (0.0000720)	-0.0000419 (0.0000692)	-0.000493 (0.000320)
d8	0.0000963 (0.0000886)	-0.000274*** (0.0000757)	-0.00126*** (0.000368)
d9	0.000156 (0.000153)	-0.000374*** (0.0000909)	-0.00297*** (0.000453)
d10	0.000307** (0.000145)	-0.000651*** (0.000123)	-0.00297*** (0.000510)
<hr/>			
Return Decile x Female Advisor			
d1rep_female	-0.000516** (0.000230)	0.000760*** (0.000152)	0.000869 (0.000653)
d2rep_female	-0.000160 (0.000294)	0.000119 (0.000130)	-0.000880 (0.000663)
d3rep_female	-0.000239 (0.000212)	0.000167 (0.000125)	-0.000447 (0.000739)
d4rep_female	-0.000229 (0.000193)	0.0000518 (0.000118)	-0.000805 (0.000657)
d5rep_female	-0.0000122 (0.000176)	0.0000484 (0.000120)	-0.000187 (0.000661)
d7rep_female	-0.000123 (0.000179)	0.000120 (0.000124)	0.000922 (0.000675)
d8rep_female	-0.000432** (0.000210)	0.000149 (0.000127)	-0.000362 (0.000673)
d9rep_female	-0.000164 (0.000207)	0.0000134 (0.000130)	0.000827 (0.000687)
d10rep_female	-0.000553** (0.000252)	0.000163 (0.000150)	0.000363 (0.000709)
Relative Age	0.00202*** (0.000277)	-0.0114*** (0.000353)	0.0797*** (0.000889)
Log Account Market Value	-0.000666*** (0.0000723)	-0.00217*** (0.0000633)	0.0168*** (0.000471)
<hr/>			
Year-month FE?	Y	Y	Y
Client demographics?	Y	Y	Y
Client gender?	N	N	N
Observations	13885564	13742975	13885564
$R^2$	0.003	0.029	0.046
<hr/>			
	(p)0.01		

*Notes:* This table shows regressions of client exits rates (within one year), net flows (as a fraction of account market value) and an indicator equal to one if the client withdraws money on net within the next year. Net flows are inflows minus outflows over account values, such that a negative value means more money is being withdrawn. The client withdrawing money on net is equal to one if netflows are negative. d1-d10 represent deciles of the past quarter's return, adjusted by rank. These deciles are then interacted with a dummy equal to one if the advisor is female. Client demographics include self-reported net worth category, salary category, and financial knowledge category. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the year-month level. \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table B.14:** Performance sensitivity of client exits and outflows to homophily - both genders

	(1) Client Exit	(2) Net Flows (Fraction)	(3) Client Withdraws Money (Net)
Advisor and Client are Same Gender	0.0000612 (0.0000616)	0.0000429 (0.0000649)	0.00271*** (0.000309)
<u>Return Decile</u>			
d1	0.000212 (0.000152)	-0.000848*** (0.000142)	-0.000308 (0.000502)
d2	-0.0000380 (0.0000999)	-0.000207* (0.000110)	-0.00116** (0.000483)
d3	0.000124 (0.0000820)	-0.0000932 (0.0000875)	-0.000449 (0.000430)
d4	0.0000511 (0.0000833)	0.0000289 (0.0000858)	0.000187 (0.000394)
d5	0.000134 (0.0000919)	0.0000900 (0.0000778)	-0.0000623 (0.000314)
d7	0.000102 (0.0000699)	-0.0000309 (0.0000706)	-0.000390 (0.000314)
d8	0.0000388 (0.0000765)	-0.000233*** (0.0000767)	-0.00138*** (0.000393)
d9	0.000135 (0.000130)	-0.000394*** (0.0000961)	-0.00266*** (0.000467)
d10	0.000201 (0.000128)	-0.000700*** (0.000131)	-0.00307*** (0.000484)
<u>Return Decile x Same Gender</u>			
d1samegen	-0.0000201 (0.000111)	-0.000172* (0.0000950)	-0.000444 (0.000423)
d2samegen	-0.0000771 (0.0000977)	-0.0000882 (0.0000902)	-0.0000576 (0.000460)
d3samegen	-0.000175* (0.0000972)	-0.0000228 (0.0000828)	0.000699 (0.000431)
d4samegen	-0.0000382 (0.0000845)	0.00000622 (0.0000871)	0.000259 (0.000485)
d5samegen	-0.000199* (0.000103)	0.000101 (0.0000939)	0.000140 (0.000439)
d7samegen	-0.000131 (0.0000932)	0.00000783 (0.0000785)	-0.0000622 (0.000393)
d8samegen	-0.0000319 (0.0000812)	-0.0000188 (0.0000873)	-0.000117 (0.000472)
d9samegen	-0.0000203 (0.0000917)	0.0000399 (0.0000883)	-0.000383 (0.000422)
d10samegen	0.0000237 (0.000110)	0.0000525 (0.0000947)	0.000103 (0.000397)
Relative Age	0.00201*** (0.000274)	-0.0115*** (0.000351)	0.0781*** (0.000866)
Log Account Market Value	-0.000661*** (0.0000718)	-0.00216*** (0.0000647)	0.0164*** (0.000472)
Year-month FE?	Y	Y	Y
Client demographics?	Y	Y	Y
Client gender?	N	N	N
Observations	15579597	15418682	15579597
$R^2$	0.003	0.029	0.045

*Notes:* This table shows regressions of client exits rates (within one year), net flows (as a fraction of account market value) and an indicator equal to one if the client withdraws money on net within the next year. Net flows are inflows minus outflows over account values, such that a negative value means more money is being withdrawn. The client withdrawing money on net is equal to one if netflows are negative. d1-d10 represent deciles of the past quarter's return, adjusted by rank. These deciles are then interacted with a dummy equal to one if the advisor and the client are the same gender. Client demographics include self-reported net worth category, salary category, and financial knowledge category. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the year-month level. \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table B.15:** Performance sensitivity of client exits and outflows to switching advisors

	(1) Client Exit	(2) Net Flows (Fraction)	(3) Client Withdraws Money (Net)
Switched Advisors	0.000158 (0.000485)	-0.00255*** (0.000265)	-0.0119*** (0.00139)
<u>Return Decile</u>			
d1	0.000201 (0.000156)	-0.000913*** (0.000130)	-0.000630 (0.000478)
d2	-0.0000699 (0.0000905)	-0.000246** (0.0000966)	-0.00122** (0.000473)
d3	0.0000540 (0.0000737)	-0.000107 (0.0000800)	-0.000204 (0.000398)
d4	0.0000382 (0.0000770)	0.0000316 (0.0000764)	0.000285 (0.000335)
d5	0.0000492 (0.0000692)	0.000128** (0.0000631)	0.0000132 (0.000274)
d7	0.0000599 (0.0000719)	-0.0000340 (0.0000630)	-0.000433 (0.000292)
d8	0.0000244 (0.0000753)	-0.000248*** (0.0000663)	-0.00147*** (0.000345)
d9	0.000121 (0.000139)	-0.000378*** (0.0000850)	-0.00288*** (0.000436)
d10	0.000206 (0.000140)	-0.000680*** (0.000117)	-0.00311*** (0.000483)
<u>Return Decile x Switched</u>			
d1ps	0.000215 (0.000610)	-0.0000137 (0.000502)	0.0133*** (0.00182)
d2ps	0.0000358 (0.000663)	0.000536 (0.000411)	0.00403** (0.00204)
d3ps	-0.000176 (0.000577)	0.000542 (0.000369)	0.00444** (0.00192)
d4ps	-0.000288 (0.000566)	0.0000788 (0.000378)	0.00125 (0.00176)
d5ps	0.000385 (0.000725)	0.000387 (0.000397)	-0.00196 (0.00194)
d7ps	-0.00124** (0.000533)	0.000726* (0.000425)	0.00228 (0.00179)
d8ps	0.000158 (0.000616)	0.000735** (0.000356)	0.00439** (0.00199)
d9ps	0.000656 (0.000764)	0.000153 (0.000390)	0.00849*** (0.00171)
d10ps	0.000453 (0.000858)	0.000137 (0.000435)	0.00968*** (0.00196)
Relative Age	0.00201*** (0.000274)	-0.0115*** (0.000352)	0.0782*** (0.000866)
Log Account Market Value	-0.000661*** (0.0000718)	-0.00217*** (0.0000645)	0.0164*** (0.000472)
Year-month FE?	Y	Y	Y
Client demographics?	Y	Y	Y
Client gender?	N	N	N
Observations	15579597	15418682	15579597
$R^2$	0.003	0.029	0.045

*Notes:* This table shows regressions of client exits rates (within one year), net flows (as a fraction of account market value) and an indicator equal to one if the client withdraws money on net within the next year. Net flows are inflows minus outflows over account values, such that a negative value means more money is being withdrawn. The client withdrawing money on net is equal to one if netflows are negative. d1-d10 represent deciles of the past quarter's return, adjusted by rank. These deciles are then interacted with a dummy equal to one if the client involuntarily switched advisors. Client demographics include self-reported net worth category, salary category, and financial knowledge category. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the year-month level. \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

**Table B.16:** Performance sensitivity of client exits and outflows to switching to a female advisor - clients of both genders

	(1) Client Exit	(2) Net Flows (Fraction)	(3) Client Withdraws Money (Net)
Switch Advisors	0.000446 (0.000476)	-0.00456*** (0.000338)	-0.0101*** (0.00139)
Switch to a Female Advisor	-0.00135*** (0.000135)	0.00938*** (0.000984)	-0.00880*** (0.000732)
Return Decile			
d1	0.000201 (0.000156)	-0.000914*** (0.000129)	-0.000629 (0.000478)
d2	-0.0000707 (0.0000906)	-0.000241** (0.0000963)	-0.00122** (0.000473)
d3	0.0000543 (0.0000737)	-0.000109 (0.0000795)	-0.000202 (0.000398)
d4	0.0000383 (0.0000770)	0.0000306 (0.0000762)	0.000286 (0.000335)
d5	0.0000491 (0.0000693)	0.000128** (0.0000629)	0.0000129 (0.000274)
d7	0.0000602 (0.0000720)	-0.0000360 (0.0000626)	-0.000431 (0.000292)
d8	0.0000244 (0.0000753)	-0.000248*** (0.0000662)	-0.00146*** (0.000345)
d9	0.000121 (0.000139)	-0.000378*** (0.0000848)	-0.00288*** (0.000436)
d10	0.000207 (0.000140)	-0.000687*** (0.000116)	-0.00311*** (0.000484)
Return Decile x Switch			
d1ps	-0.000193 (0.000636)	0.000346 (0.000492)	0.0133*** (0.00201)
d2ps	-0.000246 (0.000684)	0.00210*** (0.000457)	0.00455** (0.00218)
d3ps	-0.000226 (0.000663)	0.00216*** (0.000448)	0.00519** (0.00218)
d4ps	-0.000812 (0.000644)	0.00181*** (0.000473)	0.00165 (0.00190)
d5ps	0.000176 (0.000806)	0.00229*** (0.000475)	-0.00193 (0.00207)
d7ps	-0.00147*** (0.000536)	0.00266*** (0.000449)	0.00237 (0.00192)
d8ps	-0.000290 (0.000756)	0.00252*** (0.000438)	0.00475** (0.00219)
d9ps	0.000354 (0.000810)	0.00204*** (0.000426)	0.00748*** (0.00194)
d10ps	-0.000118 (0.000855)	0.00214*** (0.000491)	0.00942*** (0.00215)
Return Decile x Switch from Male to Female			
d1ps_mtf	0.00189 (0.00118)	-0.00151 (0.00174)	-0.000291 (0.00275)
d2ps_mtf	0.00130 (0.000888)	-0.00694*** (0.00151)	-0.00408 (0.00254)
d3ps_mtf	0.000200 (0.000879)	-0.00743*** (0.00131)	-0.00378 (0.00374)
d4ps_mtf	0.00247** (0.00116)	-0.00791*** (0.00124)	-0.00232 (0.00268)
d5ps_mtf	0.000935 (0.00105)	-0.00873*** (0.00119)	-0.000921 (0.00265)
d7ps_mtf	0.00107* (0.000633)	-0.00896*** (0.00146)	0.0000268 (0.00268)
d8ps_mtf	0.00214 (0.00138)	-0.00813*** (0.00122)	-0.00269 (0.00296)
d9ps_mtf	0.00140 (0.00147)	-0.00864*** (0.00152)	0.00417 (0.00313)
d10ps_mtf	0.00304* (0.00165)	-0.00916*** (0.00114)	-0.00127 (0.00364)
Relative Age	0.00201*** (0.000274)	-0.0115*** (0.000352)	0.0782*** (0.000866)
Log Account Market Value	-0.000662*** (0.0000719)	-0.00216*** (0.0000646)	0.0164*** (0.000471)
Year-month FE?	Y	Y	Y
Client demographics?	Y	Y	Y
Client gender?	N	N	N
Observations	15579597	15418682	15579597
R <sup>2</sup>	0.003	0.029	0.045

*Notes:* This table shows regressions of client exits rates (within one year), net flows (as a fraction of account market value) and an indicator equal to one if the client withdraws money on net within the next year. Net flows are inflows minus outflows over account values, such that a negative value means more money is being withdrawn. The client withdrawing money on net is equal to one if netflows are negative. d1-d10 represent deciles of the past quarter's return, adjusted by rank. These deciles are then interacted with a dummy equal to one if the client involuntarily switched advisors, and then trip0le interacted with a dummy equal to one if the client switched from a male to a female advisor. Client demographics include self-reported net worth category, salary category, and financial knowledge category. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the year-month level. \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

**Table B.17:** Performance sensitivity of client exits and outflows to switching to a female advisor - male clients

	(1) Client Exit	(2) Net Flows (Fraction)	(3) Client Withdraws Money (Net)
Switch Advisors	0.000246 (0.000503)	-0.00445*** (0.000419)	-0.00861*** (0.00195)
Switch to a Female Advisor	-0.00129*** (0.000130)	0.00854*** (0.000753)	-0.0111*** (0.000947)
<b>Return Decile</b>			
d1	0.000205 (0.000181)	-0.00116*** (0.000128)	-0.000408 (0.000551)
d2	-0.0000954 (0.0000972)	-0.000364*** (0.0000990)	-0.00120** (0.000560)
d3	0.0000381 (0.0000848)	-0.000172* (0.0000880)	-0.0000231 (0.000492)
d4	0.0000153 (0.0000859)	-0.0000136 (0.0000853)	0.000232 (0.000422)
d5	0.0000504 (0.0000790)	0.000167** (0.0000711)	0.000104 (0.000407)
d7	0.0000622 (0.0000957)	-0.0000272 (0.0000717)	-0.000587 (0.000413)
d8	0.0000282 (0.0000894)	-0.000272*** (0.0000771)	-0.00156*** (0.000451)
d9	0.000122 (0.000154)	-0.000471*** (0.0000903)	-0.00270*** (0.000524)
d10	0.000203 (0.000176)	-0.000768*** (0.000118)	-0.00304*** (0.000566)
<b>Return Decile x Switch Advisors</b>			
d1ps	0.000357 (0.000815)	0.000712 (0.000599)	0.00989*** (0.00287)
d2ps	0.000939 (0.000922)	0.00206*** (0.000671)	0.00234 (0.00298)
d3ps	-0.00111 (0.000849)	0.00233*** (0.000582)	0.00322 (0.00339)
d4ps	-0.00101 (0.000734)	0.00205*** (0.000607)	0.00167 (0.00301)
d5ps	0.000485 (0.00106)	0.00251*** (0.000592)	-0.00453 (0.00298)
d7ps	-0.00165** (0.000639)	0.00233*** (0.000715)	0.000737 (0.00305)
d8ps	0.000323 (0.000948)	0.00251*** (0.000569)	0.00434 (0.00318)
d9ps	0.00000949 (0.00102)	0.00193*** (0.000591)	0.00663** (0.00286)
d10ps	-0.0000197 (0.000956)	0.00253*** (0.000613)	0.00628** (0.00257)
<b>Return Decile x Switch from Male to Female Advisor</b>			
d1ps_mtf	0.00222 (0.00214)	-0.00107 (0.00160)	0.00793** (0.00398)
d2ps_mtf	-0.00134 (0.00116)	-0.00744*** (0.00126)	0.00178 (0.00408)
d3ps_mtf	0.00205 (0.00142)	-0.00779*** (0.00108)	0.00296 (0.00560)
d4ps_mtf	0.000560 (0.00102)	-0.00806*** (0.00115)	-0.00109 (0.00431)
d5ps_mtf	-0.000177 (0.00140)	-0.00847*** (0.00123)	0.000630 (0.00400)
d7ps_mtf	0.000388 (0.000460)	-0.00904*** (0.00118)	0.00530 (0.00383)
d8ps_mtf	-0.000185 (0.00133)	-0.00780*** (0.00118)	-0.00344 (0.00393)
d9ps_mtf	0.00131 (0.00207)	-0.00913*** (0.00138)	0.00842* (0.00498)
d10ps_mtf	0.00416 (0.00296)	-0.00927*** (0.00107)	0.00234 (0.00479)
Relative Age	0.00177*** (0.000241)	-0.0119*** (0.000349)	0.0758*** (0.000999)
Log Account Market Value	-0.000662*** (0.0000759)	-0.00227*** (0.0000631)	0.0166*** (0.000473)
Year-month FE?	Y	Y	Y
Client demographics?	Y	Y	Y
Client gender?	N	N	N
Observations	6991354	6918456	6991354
R <sup>2</sup>	0.003	0.030	0.046

*Notes:* This table shows regressions of client exits rates (within one year), net flows (as a fraction of account market value) and an indicator equal to one if the client withdraws money on net within the next year. Net flows are inflows minus outflows over account values, such that a negative value means more money is being withdrawn. The client withdrawing money on net is equal to one if netflows are negative. d1-d10 represent deciles of the past quarter's return, adjusted by rank. These deciles are then interacted with a dummy equal to one if the client involuntarily switched advisors, and then triple interacted with a dummy equal to one if the client switched from a male to a female advisor. Only male clients are included. Client demographics include self-reported net worth category, salary category, and financial knowledge category. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the year-month level. \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

**Table B.18:** Performance sensitivity of client exits and outflows to switching to a female advisor - female clients

	(1) Client Exit	(2) Net Flows (Fraction)	(3) Client Withdraws Money (Net)
Switch Advisors	0.000605 (0.000722)	-0.00492*** (0.000480)	-0.0119*** (0.00193)
Switch to a Female Advisor	-0.00146*** (0.000164)	0.0108*** (0.00134)	-0.00421*** (0.000904)
<b>Return Decile</b>			
d1	0.000156 (0.000155)	-0.000805*** (0.000153)	0.000127 (0.000558)
d2	-0.0000111 (0.000114)	-0.000209* (0.000107)	-0.000788 (0.000521)
d3	0.0000891 (0.0000972)	-0.000106 (0.0000930)	-0.000484 (0.000446)
d4	0.0000358 (0.0000927)	-0.0000309 (0.0000890)	0.000347 (0.000414)
d5	0.0000121 (0.0000997)	0.0000651 (0.0000805)	-0.000177 (0.000386)
d7	0.0000904 (0.0000858)	-0.000107 (0.0000855)	-0.000373 (0.000387)
d8	0.0000463 (0.0000999)	-0.000289*** (0.0000880)	-0.00111** (0.000437)
d9	0.000176 (0.000145)	-0.000361*** (0.000107)	-0.00257*** (0.000503)
d10	0.000229 (0.000143)	-0.000596*** (0.000144)	-0.00239*** (0.000528)
<b>Return Decile x Switch</b>			
d1ps	-0.000322 (0.00111)	-0.000175 (0.000845)	0.0145*** (0.00295)
d2ps	-0.000877 (0.000990)	0.00241*** (0.000584)	0.00595* (0.00310)
d3ps	0.000591 (0.00121)	0.00235*** (0.000740)	0.01000*** (0.00298)
d4ps	-0.000472 (0.00109)	0.00230*** (0.000688)	0.00305 (0.00308)
d5ps	-0.000672 (0.00105)	0.00239*** (0.000727)	0.00229 (0.00277)
d7ps	-0.00157* (0.000805)	0.00331*** (0.000599)	0.00609 (0.00311)
d8ps	-0.000967 (0.000916)	0.00275*** (0.000764)	0.00892*** (0.00311)
d9ps	-0.0000579 (0.00108)	0.00265*** (0.000642)	0.0109*** (0.00281)
d10ps	-0.0000392 (0.00113)	0.00182** (0.000755)	0.0161*** (0.00341)
<b>Return Decile x Switch from Male to Female Advisor</b>			
d1ps_mtf	0.000579 (0.00145)	-0.00242 (0.00215)	-0.00840*** (0.00314)
d2ps_mtf	0.00367** (0.00172)	-0.00757*** (0.00199)	-0.00847** (0.00383)
d3ps_mtf	-0.00126 (0.00122)	-0.00772*** (0.00176)	-0.0150*** (0.00468)
d4ps_mtf	0.00402** (0.00201)	-0.00927*** (0.00172)	-0.00362 (0.00437)
d5ps_mtf	0.00307* (0.00164)	-0.0102*** (0.00161)	-0.00278 (0.00425)
d7ps_mtf	0.00154 (0.00106)	-0.00973*** (0.00210)	-0.00710 (0.00454)
d8ps_mtf	0.00444* (0.00234)	-0.00862*** (0.00161)	-0.00767 (0.00518)
d9ps_mtf	0.00141 (0.00178)	-0.00937*** (0.00205)	-0.00135 (0.00466)
d10ps_mtf	0.00297 (0.00208)	-0.0100*** (0.00175)	-0.00642 (0.00546)
Relative Age	0.00219*** (0.000304)	-0.0110*** (0.000367)	0.0786*** (0.000831)
Log Account Market Value	-0.000689*** (0.0000690)	-0.00234*** (0.0000700)	0.0165*** (0.000463)
Year-month FE?	Y	Y	Y
Client demographics?	Y	Y	Y
Client gender?	N	N	N
Observations	6275965	6210436	6275965
$R^2$	0.002	0.030	0.042

*Notes:* This table shows regressions of client exits rates (within one year), net flows (as a fraction of account market value) and an indicator equal to one if the client withdraws money on net within the next year. Net flows are inflows minus outflows over account values, such that a negative value means more money is being withdrawn. The client withdrawing money on net is equal to one if netflows are negative. d1-d10 represent deciles of the past quarter's return, adjusted by rank. These deciles are then interacted with a dummy equal to one if the client involuntarily switched advisors, and then triple interacted with a dummy equal to one if the client switched from a male to a female advisor. Only female clients are included. Client demographics include self-reported net worth category, salary category, and financial knowledge category. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the year-month level. \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

**Table B.19:** Performance sensitivity of client exits and outflows to homophily - male advisors only

	(1) Client Exit	(2) Net Flows (Fraction)	(3) Client Withdraws Money (Net)
Advisor and Client are Both Male	-0.0000164 (0.0000689)	-0.0000397 (0.0000695)	0.00288*** (0.000374)
<b>Return Decile</b>			
d1	0.000301* (0.000171)	-0.000963*** (0.000151)	0.000150 (0.000554)
d2	0.00000706 (0.000109)	-0.000149 (0.000115)	-0.000757 (0.000526)
d3	0.000134 (0.0000985)	-0.0000531 (0.0000983)	-0.000377 (0.000473)
d4	0.0000899 (0.0000965)	0.0000794 (0.0000919)	0.000257 (0.000444)
d5	0.0000171 (0.0000945)	0.0000823 (0.0000854)	-0.0000762 (0.000391)
d7	0.000111 (0.0000761)	-0.0000556 (0.0000847)	-0.000340 (0.000386)
d8	0.000104 (0.0000992)	-0.000274*** (0.0000911)	-0.00102** (0.000452)
d9	0.000177 (0.000146)	-0.000340*** (0.000107)	-0.00285*** (0.000516)
d10	0.000304** (0.000132)	-0.000596*** (0.000150)	-0.00278*** (0.000551)
<b>Return Decile x Same Gender</b>			
d1samegen	-0.0000296 (0.000111)	-0.000166 (0.000108)	-0.000821* (0.000481)
d2samegen	-0.0000943 (0.000103)	-0.000169* (0.0000891)	-0.000442 (0.000520)
d3samegen	-0.000138 (0.000104)	-0.000105 (0.0000953)	0.000595 (0.000495)
d4samegen	-0.0000530 (0.0000894)	-0.0000586 (0.0000902)	0.000182 (0.000539)
d5samegen	-0.0000434 (0.000106)	0.0000934 (0.0000977)	0.000216 (0.000537)
d7samegen	-0.0000964 (0.0000938)	0.0000312 (0.0000888)	-0.000336 (0.000502)
d8samegen	-0.0000173 (0.0000968)	0.00000746 (0.0000952)	-0.000520 (0.000539)
d9samegen	-0.0000489 (0.0000936)	-0.0000524 (0.0000963)	-0.000253 (0.000525)
d10samegen	-0.0000105 (0.000133)	-0.0000581 (0.000117)	-0.000358 (0.000481)
Relative Age	0.00199*** (0.000279)	-0.0114*** (0.000357)	0.0804*** (0.000867)
Log Account Market Value	-0.000687*** (0.0000736)	-0.00212*** (0.0000626)	0.0168*** (0.000484)
Year-month FE?	Y	Y	Y
Client demographics?	Y	Y	Y
Client gender?	N	N	N
Observations	11606307	11486748	11606307
$R^2$	0.003	0.028	0.046

*Notes:* This table shows regressions of client exits rates (within one year), net flows (as a fraction of account market value) and an indicator equal to one if the client withdraws money on net within the next year. Net flows are inflows minus outflows over account values, such that a negative value means more money is being withdrawn. The client withdrawing money on net equals one if netflows are negative. d1-d10 represent deciles of the past quarter's return, adjusted by rank. These deciles are then interacted with a dummy equal to one if the advisor and the client are the same gender. Only male advisors are included. Client demographics include self-reported net worth category, salary category, and financial knowledge category. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the year-month level. \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

**Table B.20:** Performance sensitivity of client exits and outflows to homophily - female advisors only

	(1) Client Exit	(2) Net Flows (Fraction)	(3) Client Withdraws Money (Net)
Advisor and Client are Both Female	0.000252 (0.000167)	0.000837*** (0.000152)	-0.00146* (0.000816)
<u>Return Decile</u>			
d1	-0.0000666 (0.000220)	-0.000616*** (0.000194)	-0.000255 (0.000799)
d2	-0.0000897 (0.000268)	-0.000207 (0.000152)	-0.00298*** (0.000798)
d3	-0.0000155 (0.000176)	-0.0000213 (0.000141)	-0.00160* (0.000813)
d4	-0.000166 (0.000193)	0.0000911 (0.000155)	-0.00129 (0.000846)
d5	0.000208 (0.000209)	0.0000999 (0.000144)	-0.000131 (0.000767)
d7	0.000102 (0.000210)	0.000156 (0.000143)	0.000171 (0.000784)
d8	-0.000273 (0.000190)	-0.000109 (0.000141)	-0.00214*** (0.000809)
d9	-0.0000428 (0.000225)	-0.000616*** (0.000149)	-0.00233** (0.000910)
d10	-0.000258 (0.000267)	-0.000633*** (0.000186)	-0.00451*** (0.000875)
<u>Return Decile x Same Gender</u>			
d1samegen	-0.000246 (0.000256)	0.000260 (0.000242)	0.000957 (0.00104)
d2samegen	-0.000110 (0.000252)	0.0000364 (0.000199)	0.00218** (0.00102)
d3samegen	-0.000238 (0.000201)	0.000116 (0.000215)	0.00217** (0.00110)
d4samegen	0.0000711 (0.000279)	0.0000149 (0.000220)	0.00173 (0.00124)
d5samegen	-0.000453* (0.000254)	0.000164 (0.000205)	-0.0000790 (0.00113)
d7samegen	-0.000333 (0.000263)	-0.000174 (0.000213)	0.000531 (0.00114)
d8samegen	-0.000110 (0.000231)	-0.0000804 (0.000198)	0.00102 (0.00119)
d9samegen	0.000120 (0.000278)	0.000456** (0.000194)	0.000113 (0.00113)
d10samegen	0.000103 (0.000365)	0.0000324 (0.000220)	0.00377*** (0.00103)
Relative Age	0.00218*** (0.000351)	-0.0115*** (0.000343)	0.0753*** (0.00115)
Log Account Market Value	-0.000579*** (0.0000833)	-0.00245*** (0.0000732)	0.0164*** (0.000428)
Year-month FE?	Y	Y	Y
Client demographics?	Y	Y	Y
Client gender?	N	N	N
Observations	2279257	2256227	2279257
$R^2$	0.004	0.031	0.044

*Notes:* This table shows regressions of client exits rates (within one year), net flows (as a fraction of account market value) and an indicator equal to one if the client withdraws money on net within the next year. Net flows are inflows minus outflows over account values, such that a negative value means more money is being withdrawn. The client withdrawing money on net is equal to one if netflows are negative. d1-d10 represent deciles of the past quarter's return, adjusted by rank. These deciles are then interacted with a dummy equal to one if the advisor and the client are the same gender. Only female advisors are included. Client demographics include self-reported net worth category, salary category, and financial knowledge category. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the year-month level. \* $p < 0.10$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .