

“There is No Planet B”,
but for Banks “There are Countries B to Z”:
Domestic Climate Policy and Cross-Border Lending

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Abstract

We document that lenders react to domestic climate policy stringency by increasing cross-border lending. We use loan fixed effects to control for loan demand and an instrumental variable strategy to establish causality. Consistent with regulatory arbitrage, the positive effect decreases in borrowers' climate policy stringency and is absent if the borrower country has a higher stringency. Furthermore, climate policy stringency decreases loan supply to domestic borrowers with high carbon risk while increasing loan supply if such borrowers are abroad. Our results suggest that cross-border lending enables lenders to exploit the lack of global coordination in climate policies.

JEL classification: G21, H73, Q58.

Keywords: Cross-Border Lending, Climate Policy, Regulatory Arbitrage, Syndicated Loans.

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1 Introduction

Climate change is a global problem whose solution needs global coordination and cooperation.¹ Despite this need, there exists a significant heterogeneity in climate policy stringency across countries, which may lead to numerous consequences.² Cross-border lending, for example, can be affected by this heterogeneity since banks use cross-border lending extensively as a tool to react to the differences across countries. On the one hand, a stringent climate policy may increase firms' loan demand as the transition into a low-carbon economy requires investment, and banks may reduce their cross-border lending to satisfy the higher loan demand at home. On the other hand, the required investment may make lending to domestic firms less appealing as it may reduce firm profits and adversely affect banks' loan portfolios. Therefore, banks may increase their cross-border lending to reduce their exposure to stringent climate policy. While the former suggests a negative financial spillover, the latter suggests a race to the bottom behavior by banks, which can undermine the efforts to combat climate change.

In this paper, we consider both of these channels and empirically investigate how banks use cross-border lending to react to a change in climate policy stringency in their home country. To investigate cross-border lending, we use a sample of syndicated loans for the years between 2007 and 2017, where lenders are located in 42 different countries and borrowers are located in 40 different countries. We find that banks react to higher climate policy stringency in their home country by increasing their cross-border lending. Specifically, a one standard deviation higher climate policy stringency results in an average increase in the cross-border loan share of almost one percentage point (pp), corresponding to a nine percent increase relative to the mean loan share. To put these numbers in perspective, we

¹In the January 27th, 2021, "Executive Order on Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad" by U.S. President Biden, it is stressed that "domestic action must go hand in hand with United States international leadership, aimed at significantly enhancing global action ([link](#))."

²For instance, Germany has introduced financial aid to support research on technologies for decarbonizing heavy industry ([link](#)). In contrast, the Build Back Better Act could not get enough support to pass the U.S. Senate, partly due to the provisions it will introduce related to climate change ([link](#)).

can consider a hypothetical example of a cross-border syndicated loan where one lender is located in Germany, the other lender is in the U.S., and the borrower is in a third country, say, Poland. Our results indicate that Germany’s six index points stringent climate policy in 2015 leads the bank in Germany to have a 6 percent higher loan share in this loan compared to the bank in the U.S. We show that the increase in cross-border lending is not driven by loan demand by using loan fixed effects to control for loan demand. Moreover, we dispel concerns about omitted variables by instrumenting climate policy stringency with the Green Party shares in the domestic parliament.

Our measure of climate policy stringency is Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI).³ Being a popular index among both academicians and practitioners, CCPI comes with three main advantages (Burck et al., 2016). First, countries use different policies against climate change with different intensities, making a cross-country comparison a serious challenge. CCPI overcomes this challenge by utilizing climate policy experts to aggregate all different climate policies into one metric. Second, CCPI has extensive coverage across countries and time, enabling us to study a large portion of the universe of cross-border lending. Third, prepared by independent experts, CCPI eliminates the researcher’s subjective choices and improves the credibility of the analysis. We combine CCPI with syndicated loan data, which we use to assess cross-border bank lending. Syndicated loans are one of the main tools for cross-border lending (De Haas and Van Horen, 2013). In addition, syndicated loans make cross-border lending easier for smaller banks, as the lead arranger of a syndicated loan can take actions to reduce the information asymmetries (Sufi, 2007). Therefore, a combination of CCPI and syndicated loan data provides a relevant setting to investigate whether banks alter their cross-border lending to react to a change in climate policy stringency.

A naive regression model that estimates a positive coefficient for climate policy stringency on cross-border lending can suffer from two primary sources of endogeneity. The first one is

³CCPI is developed by Germanwatch with the aim to track efforts to combat climate change (Burck et al., 2016). We provide more details on CCPI in Section 2.

about loan demand. Observing an increase in CCPI of a country, a borrower may increase its loan demand to the lenders from that country. One reason can be that the borrower can use a relationship with a lender from a high CCPI country as a signaling device. Alternatively, the borrower may want to increase its knowledge in efforts against climate change, and a lending relationship with this lender can provide this knowledge. These arguments imply that the relationship between CCPI and cross-border lending can only be interpreted in terms of the loan supply if loan demand is properly controlled for. We use the granularity of the syndicated loan data and control for loan demand with loan fixed effects. Loan fixed effects provide a comprehensive approach to control for loan demand in a syndicated loan sample, thanks to the institutional setting of syndicated loans. In a syndicated loan, except for the lead arranger, lenders have limited interactions with the borrower. This lack of interaction suggests that comparing the lenders within the same loan highly likely holds loan demand constant. This, in turn, enables us to identify the credit supply effects of climate policy stringency.⁴

A second concern about the naive model is that there can be other country-level characteristics that are correlated both with CCPI and cross-border lending, which would induce omitted variable bias. For instance, an improvement in economic conditions can lead to an increase in both CCPI and cross-border lending. Or, a change in the demographics of the country can affect CCPI by altering the perception of climate change and cross-border lending by affecting loan demand. We show that controlling for factors that are found to be related to cross-border lending in the literature does not change the positive effect of climate policy stringency on cross-border lending. Despite this robustness, unobservable variables can still induce omitted variable bias, which entails an exogenous variation in climate policy stringency.

We obtain the needed exogenous variation by using the Green Party share in the parlia-

⁴We also show that exposure to lenders' CCPI does not have an impact on carbon emissions at the borrower level, which provides additional support for the loan supply channel.

ment as an instrument for climate policy stringency. The Green Party share is a credible instrument in our setting for two main reasons. First, thanks to the focus of these parties on environmental problems, the Green Party share is correlated with countries' climate policy stringency. Second, the Green Party share changes only after elections, indicating that the exclusion restriction may be satisfied if the predetermined nature of election cycles eliminates the association between the share and omitted variables. The most probable threat to the exclusion restriction would be the economic conditions: a change in economic conditions could influence both the Green Party shares and cross-border lending. We provide evidence for the validity of the exclusion restriction by documenting that Green Party shares neither predict nor are predicted by proxies for economic conditions. Furthermore, we relax the exact exclusion restriction with the method developed by [Conley et al. \(2012\)](#). This method demonstrates that the magnitude of the effect of Green Party share through other channels should be as large as the size of its effect through climate policy stringency to make the latter insignificant. We find this implausible, considering the lack of correlation between the Green Party share and economic conditions.

After establishing the positive effect of climate policy stringency on cross-border lending, we investigate the underlying mechanism. Our findings indicate that banks use cross-border lending as a tool for the race to the bottom. Race to the bottom refers to banks' actions to reduce the influence of changes in regulations on their loan portfolios ([Nouy, 2017](#)).⁵ In our context, a stringent climate policy may prompt a race to the bottom if it adversely affects banks' loan portfolios. Indeed, we show that as climate policies become more stringent, banks' loan portfolio performance worsens, measured by the nonperforming loans ratio and net profit ratio. Thus, this mechanism predicts that the adjustment in cross-border lending should curtail banks' exposure to climate policy stringency. In line with this prediction, we find that the positive effect of climate policy stringency on cross-border lending decreases as borrowers' climate policy gets stricter. This mechanism also suggests that banks should

⁵[Carruthers and Lamoreaux \(2016\)](#) survey the literature on race to the bottom behavior and regulatory arbitrage.

only increase their cross-border lending to reduce their exposure to climate policies if the borrower is subject to a less stringent climate policy. We find that this is the case. The positive effect of climate policy stringency is highly statistically significant if the borrower has lower climate policy stringency. However, the effect on cross-border lending is absent if the borrower's climate policy stringency is higher than that of the bank's home country.

Race to the bottom in the climate policy context has specific predictions for borrower-level carbon risk. In particular, it implies that higher climate policy stringency may hinder lending to domestic borrowers with high carbon risk, which may encourage lenders to increase their cross-border lending to borrowers with high carbon risk. We collect borrower-level carbon risk intensity information and include domestic lending in our data set to test these two hypotheses together. Consistent with the race to the bottom, climate policy stringency reduces domestic lending to borrowers with high carbon risk. At the same time, it increases cross-border lending to borrowers with high carbon risk. Furthermore, we support our findings for the underlying mechanism with three additional results. First, the effect is stronger for loans that are banks specialized in their domestic markets. Second, the effect is larger if the banks' reputation is less at stake. Third, the effect is smaller if the domestic country's bank supervisory authority is more powerful.

We start the last part of the paper by exploiting the heterogeneity among the banks and borrowers. Exercises on bank-level heterogeneity show that banks that are more expected to engage with cross-border lending as a reaction to climate policy stringency are indeed the ones who are more likely to do so. For instance, the magnitude of the effect is significantly larger for the banks that have higher cross-border loans in their books and for banks that face a higher nonperforming loans ratio. A higher cross-border loan ratio implies that the banks have more experience with cross-border lending, which means it is easier for this bank to use cross-border lending to react to changes in domestic climate policy stringency. Moreover, a higher NPL ratio creates a stronger incentive for the bank to engage with cross-border lending since a more stringent climate policy can reduce the returns of the loans when the bank needs

a higher return rate due to the high NPL ratio. Regarding geographical heterogeneity among borrowers, we focus on European lenders and find that European banks increase their cross-border lending more to borrowers in emerging market countries. At the same time, the effect is insignificant if the borrowers are located in Europe. Lastly, we consider different specifications in the appendix of the paper. We first use loan amounts instead of loan shares as the dependent variable in loan-level regressions. Second, we aggregate the loan level data up to the borrower country level and use the number of loans and loan amounts as dependent variables. Third, we use different climate policy stringency measures. We again estimate a positive and significant effect for climate policy stringency in these specifications.

Our paper mainly contributes to the literature on climate change and finance. First, our paper is related to the discussions about challenges that the financial markets entail regarding the transition to a green economy. One such challenge is created by the policies implemented to fight against climate change, known as the regulatory risk (Krueger et al., 2020; Seltzer et al., 2020; Ilhan et al., 2021; Stroebel and Wurgler, 2021).⁶ Due to this challenge, firms may prefer to reallocate their activities to the areas with less stringent climate policies (Bartram et al., 2021).⁷ Close to our work, Ben-David et al. (2021) document that multinational firms that are headquartered in countries with stringent climate policies are more likely to execute their polluting activities in countries with less stringent policies. We add to their work by showing that banks use cross-border lending as a tool to protect their loan portfolio's exposure to climate policies. Specifically, we show that banks increase lending to borrowers in countries with less stringent countries as a reaction to an increase in their home countries' climate policy stringency. This finding indicates that banks exploit the lack of homogeneity in climate policy stringency across countries through a cross-border lending channel, decreasing the effectiveness of such policies.

⁶In addition to regulatory risks, climate change creates physical risks through extreme weather events (Kruttli et al., 2021) and sea-level rise (Bernstein et al., 2019; Baldauf et al., 2020; Bakkensen and Barrage, 2017). Investors may demand higher returns considering these risks (Chava, 2014; Painter, 2020; Bolton and Kacperczyk, 2021; Hsu et al., 2022; Nguyen et al., 2022).

⁷Bartram et al. (2021) show that financially constrained firms shift their production to the outside of California after California's cap-and-trade program. See also Li and Zhou (2017); Dai et al. (2021)

Second, our paper is also related to literature about the role of banks in the fight against climate change. While banks provide less demanding funding sources to browner firms compared to the bonds and stocks market (De Haas and Popov, 2018; Beyene et al., 2021), they reflect the climate risk on loan terms (Atanasova and Schwartz, 2019; Correa et al., 2020; Bolton and Kacperczyk, 2021; Delis et al., 2021; Mueller and Sfrappini, 2021; Ivanov et al., 2021). In addition, banks lower their loan supply to browner firms after committing themselves to carbon neutrality (Kacperczyk and Peydro, 2021).⁸ We complement these findings by studying how banks adjust their domestic and cross-border lending according to their home country’s climate policy stringency. After an increase in their home country’s policy stringency, we document that banks decrease their domestic loan supply to browner firms while increasing cross-border lending to browner firms abroad.

Finally, we add to the strand of literature that examines cross-border lending incentives. Cross-border lending can be an important tool to transmit shocks among countries (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011; Giannetti and Laeven, 2012; Ongena et al., 2015; Claessens, 2017; Hale et al., 2020). So far, the literature has established that geographical and cultural proximity (Mian, 2006; Lin et al., 2012), bank acquisitions (Karolyi and Taboada, 2015), and regulatory arbitrage opportunities (Houston et al., 2012; Ongena et al., 2013; Demyanyk and Loutskina, 2016; Beck et al., 2022) are drivers of cross-border lending. Linking to existing work that examines the influence of international differences in corporate taxes on firm behavior (Bartelsman and Beetsma, 2003; Huizinga et al., 2008; Dischinger and Riedel, 2011), Laeven and Popov (2021) show that the incidence of carbon taxes can influence the reallocation of fossil lending across the borders. Our paper complements the existing literature by documenting that heterogeneity in climate policy stringency among countries can also induce cross-border lending due to the regulatory arbitrage opportunities it creates. To do so, we use loan fixed effects to control for loan demand, which enables us to estimate loan supply in a clean way.

⁸Degryse et al. (2021) show that environmentally conscious banks offer cheaper loans to green firms after the Paris Agreement.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and variables, Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy, Section 4 reports the results, and Section 5 concludes.

2 Data

Our analysis combines several data sources to assess climate policy stringency and estimate its effects on cross-border lending. This section describes the main variables and how we construct the sample. The appendix discusses the remaining variables and provides variable descriptions.

Climate policy stringency Our measure of climate policy stringency is the Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI), whose main aim is to enhance transparency in international climate politics and to allow countries to compare their climate protection progress (Burck et al., 2016). This annual index is developed by Germanwatch—a non-profit organization, and is published in collaboration with the NewClimate Institute and the Climate Action Network. CCPI consists of four main components: GHG Emissions Improvement (60%), Renewable Energy (10%), Energy Efficiency (10%), and Climate Policy (20%), where its range is between 0 and 100 and higher scores indicating better performance.⁹

We use CCPI as our climate policy stringency measure thanks to its several advantages. Countries have various policies regarding climate change, reflecting their different approaches. This nature of climate policies makes cross-country comparison a significant challenge. For instance, focusing only on one policy would mean overlooking other policies, leading to a severe mismeasurement problem. Also, different policies have different implications for the efforts regarding the fight against climate change, meaning that a cross-country comparison

⁹Germanwatch applied a methodological change in 2013. Germanwatch kindly provided us with a version with uniform weighting for each index component. Notice that the weighting scheme does not affect the points assigned to each index’s component and to each country as confirmed by robustness exercises run by Germanwatch. More details can be found on the official CCPI [web page](#).

would entail a careful aggregation of various climate policies. In addition, even if countries have the same policies, they may implement the same policies with different intensities. CCPI rigorously tackles all of these challenges. Namely, around 450 independent climate experts carefully evaluate all aspects of the countries' climate policies each year. These evaluations consider different intensities of the same policy and incorporate different policies into a single framework. Therefore, CCPI enables us to compare countries with a single variable. As CCPI includes both the climate policies and the outcome of these policies, such as realized GHG emissions, it captures both the policies and the outcome of these policies. Moreover, being a transparent index, using CCPI limits the researcher's discretionary power and subjective choices. Finally, CCPI has a broad coverage as it starts from 2005 and is available for 59 countries, which means that it covers 90% of global GHG emissions. Thanks to these advantages, CCPI is heavily used by researchers (e.g., [Atanasova and Schwartz \(2019\)](#); [Bolton and Kacperczyk \(forth.\)](#)), the financial industry (e.g., Blackrock, NN Investment), and policy institutions (e.g., World Bank, Financial Stability Board).¹⁰

[Figure 1](#) plots the average CCPI against its standard deviation for all countries included in our sample. European countries typically have more stringent climate policies than emerging economies, Anglo-Saxon, and Asian countries. As expected, Scandinavian countries stand out in their climate performance.¹¹ Panel A of [Figure 2](#) depicts the change in the climate policy stringency over time. This figure shows a general improvement in climate policy stringency, which varies, however, across the sample countries. Panel B of [Figure 2](#) plots instead the percentage change in the CCPI over time, showing a clear time-variation among countries' climate policy stringency.

Bank loans We analyze syndicated loans originated between 2007 and 2017 by commercial, savings, cooperative, and investment banks to non-financial firms (excluding SIC codes

¹⁰See Appendix Section [A](#) for details on the importance of the CCPI for practitioners and financial actors.

¹¹Details about the countries included in our sample and their average CCPI values are reported in Appendix [Figure A2](#).

between 6000 and 6999). Data comes from the LPC DealScan database and includes the loan amount, maturity, origination, borrowers, and lenders. Loans are converted to U.S. dollars. The dependent variable of our analysis is *Lender share*, which is the share of a lender in a cross-border syndicated loan. We define a loan as cross-border on a locational basis, thereby the lender and borrower are located in different countries (De Haas and Van Horen, 2013). We use only reported loan shares without imputing for the missing observations.¹² In Table 1, we report the summary statistics. Our final sample comprises 12,478 cross-border loan shares. The average value of loan shares is 7.72 percent, with a standard deviation of 7.98. Almost half of the syndicates are collateralized. A syndicated loan has 20 participants on average and an average maturity of 51 months.

Electoral outcomes We collect data on national-level election outcomes from countries' National Archives Election results. Specifically, we collect data on the total number of seats a given political party won during the election year. We use this data to calculate *Green Party share* after each election. Because elections do not take place annually, we used the latest election results for non-election years. We gather data only on European countries since the Green Party has a sizeable relevance only in European countries.¹³ Our instrumental variable Δ *Green Party share* is equal to the change in Green party share in two subsequent election years.

Bank balance sheets We collect bank balance sheet data from Bankscope and BankFocus.¹⁴ Due to a lack of common identifiers, we hand-match banks in DealScan with financial information in Bankscope and BankFocus by bank name and country at the consolidated

¹²This is available for 28 percent of the sample in the period 2007-2017. Imputing the missing loan shares does not change our baseline results (see Section 4.4). We also remove observations with incorrect values, such as total loan shares larger than 100 or loan shares equal to 0.

¹³We collect electoral data for the following countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.

¹⁴The provider Bureau van Dijk has changed the name of the database Bankscope to BankFocus starting from the year 2017. BankFocus contains data from the year 2011. We merge the two sources of bank-level data and respective bank identifiers to have the complete data set on bank-level characteristics starting from 2006. In cleaning and arranging our Bankscope-BankFocus data set, we follow Duprey and Lé (2016).

level.¹⁵ Prior to this match, we process bank names in DealScan to account for name changes, mergers, and acquisitions over the sample period. We link subsidiaries and branches to their parent financials (Hale et al., 2020). Indeed, as the amounts involved in a syndicated loan are too large for a subsidiary’s balance sheet, funds are usually provided by the bank’s headquarters (De Haas and Van Horen, 2013). We have 399 banks (of which 276 are parent banks) located in 32 countries in our data set. We match the bank-level data to climate policy stringency using the country of each bank.

Firms’ location We identify firms’ locations using Compustat/WRDS data. We match borrowers in the DealScan loan-level sample to Compustat North America and Global databases.¹⁶ Compustat database provides details both on the country where the company’s headquarter is located and the country where the company is legally registered. We use the former as a criterion to identify the borrower’s country.¹⁷ Our sample includes a total of 1,387 firms located in 40 countries.

3 Empirical strategy

Our objective is to estimate the causal effect of the home country’s climate policy stringency on cross-border lending. To achieve this objective, we need to address two main identification challenges. The first one is about loan demand. A change in a country’s climate policy stringency can alter the loan demand to its banks from abroad. This can occur if a firm deems country-level climate policy stringency as an indicator for the lending practices of banks from that country. The second challenge is that an omitted variable can affect both

¹⁵We consider the consolidated status of bank holding company integrating the statements of its controlled subsidiaries or branches. We employ a fuzzy match exercise, or probabilistic record linkage (Wasi and Flaaen, 2015).

¹⁶We use the DealScan-Compustat link table to match DealScan and Compustat borrower’s identifiers provided by Chava and Roberts (2008). The link table can be accessed through the following [link](#).

¹⁷A company may be registered in a different country from the one where it is actually conducting its business operations due to fiscal-related reasons.

the climate policy stringency and cross-border lending. For instance, a change in a country's macroeconomic conditions can influence both the climate policy stringency and cross-border lending. These two challenges suggest that our empirical strategy needs to properly control for loan demand and have an exogenous variation in climate policy stringency.

We tackle these two challenges in two steps. In the first step, we exploit the granularity of our data to control for loan demand. Controlling for loan demand is essential to causally identify the effect of climate policy stringency on cross-border lending. The reason is that a change in climate policy stringency can alter how banks screen and monitor their borrowers. For instance, banks may be more careful about their borrowers' environmental footprint due to a stricter climate policy. Therefore, firms that need to improve their environmental profile might shift their loan demand towards banks from countries with stricter policies to benefit from such banks' expertise. Alternatively, if firms anticipate that banks are willing to increase their cross-border lending as a reaction to a more stringent climate policy, they would increase their loan demand to such banks.

To control for loan demand, we use loan fixed effects. The use of granular fixed effects has become the standard way of controlling for loan demand. The main assumption of this practice is that a firm's loan demand is homogeneous across its banks ([Khwaja and Mian, 2008](#)). The loan fixed effects in a syndicated loan setting provide an exemplary implementation as this assumption is likely to be satisfied thanks to the institutional details of the syndicated loans. In a syndicated loan, typically, the lead arranger is the one that negotiates the loan amount and other terms with the firm. After the lead arranger and the firm agree on these terms, the lead arranger invites other lenders to participate in the syndicated loan, which means that the interaction between the firm and participants is limited ([Dennis and Mullineaux, 2000](#); [Sufi, 2007](#); [Ivashina, 2009](#)). Hence, these participants do not face the loan demand directly, and their shares are not likely to be affected by the loan demand. This suggests that comparing these shares in the same loan is possibly the cleanest way to keep the loan demand constant. To do a within loan comparison, we include

loan fixed effects in our preferred specification and estimate the following model:

$$\text{Lender Share}_{b,l,f,t} = \alpha_l + \beta \text{CCPI}_{c,t} + \gamma \mathbf{X}_{b,t-1} + \varepsilon_{b,l,f,t} \quad (1)$$

where $\text{Lender Share}_{b,l,f,t}$ is the cross-border loan share that bank b finances in loan l to firm f in year t . The variable of interest is $\text{CCPI}_{c,t}$, which measures the climate policy stringency of the country where the bank is located (hereafter lender-country) and is indexed by c . $\mathbf{X}_{b,t-1}$ includes lagged bank-level controls such as bank size (log of total assets), bank capital ratio (Tier 1 capital ratio), bank performance and financial health (ROAE, Net interest margin, log of customer deposits) and bank’s liquid assets position (liquidity ratio). α_l denotes the vector of loan fixed effects. We cluster the standard errors at the lender’s country-year level as it is the unit of treatment (Abadie et al., 2017).

In the second step, we address the challenge created by the variables that can be correlated with both climate policy stringency and cross-border lending. So far, the literature has documented that laws and institutions (Qian and Strahan, 2007; Houston et al., 2012; Ongena et al., 2013), cultural and geographical proximity (Mian, 2006; Giannetti and Yafeh, 2012), economic conditions and demographics (Giannetti and Laeven, 2012; Hale et al., 2020) affect cross-border lending. As these variables can be correlated with climate policy stringency, we collect related variables and include them in the regression models.

Even though we have a rich set of controls, there can still be omitted variables that may bias our results. We use an instrumental variable strategy to mitigate related concerns and have an exogenous variation in climate policy stringency. Namely, we use the change in Green Party share in the parliament as an instrument for the climate policy stringency and refer to them as the Green Party share. Political parties that mainly focus on environmental protection, the Green Party, were first established around the early 1970s.¹⁸ In tandem

¹⁸There can be several parties that focus on environmental protection. We combine all of such parties and mention them as the Green Party for the ease of exposition.

with increasing concerns regarding climate change in public, these parties have started to have more prominent roles in politics. As the main agenda of these parties is about the protection of the environment and actions against climate change, a change in their shares in the parliament should reflect the perception of environmental problems. For instance, an increase in Green Party share should predict stringent climate policies. Note that the relevance of Green Party share does not require the Green Party to be the ruling party or be a part of the ruling coalition. The reason is that the parties in charge can adjust their actions accordingly after observing the changes in Green Party's share. Moreover, to make sure that the relevance condition is satisfied, we let 1 year to pass after the election and we restrict our sample with European lenders, considering the Green Party's relevance in Europe.

In addition to the relevance condition, Green Party share should satisfy the exclusion restriction. In our context, exclusion restriction means that the changes in Green Party share should not affect the cross-border lending other than its effect through the climate policy stringency. This assumption would be violated, for instance, if Green Party share affect both the climate policy stringency and economic conditions as changes in economic conditions are likely to affect cross-border lending. The fact that the changes in Green Party share occur only after elections suggests that this assumption is satisfied in our setting. Typically, elections are held on a predetermined cycle, which means that the economic conditions and the election cycles are not likely to affect each other. This suggests that the timing of changes in Green Party share is not related to economic conditions. Thanks to this timing, these changes provide us the exogenous variation needed to identify the effect of climate policy stringency on cross-border lending. In Section 4, we provide supporting evidence that changes in Green Party share are orthogonal to the economic conditions—Green Party share neither predicts nor is predicted by economic conditions.

4 Results

In this section, we use syndicated loans for cross-border lending and the CCPI for climate policy stringency to study whether banks use cross-border lending to react to changes in climate policy stringency in their home country. In Section 4.1, we give the main results, in which we use granular fixed effects to control for loan demand and an instrumental variable strategy and a rich set of control variables to mitigate concerns related to omitted variable bias. In Section 4.2, we provide our findings regarding the underlying mechanism. In Section 4.3 we describe additional analysis exploiting the lender and regional heterogeneity of our sample. Finally, Section 4.4 concludes with a battery of robustness tests to determine the sensitivity of our results.

Before moving to the regression models, Figure 3 plots a strong and positive correlation between the CCPI and cross-border loan share on the bank balance sheets. Even though this plot suggests that banks may use cross-border lending to react to higher climate policy stringency, this positive correlation can be driven by other factors such as loan demand and variables correlated with both CCPI and loan supply. We use the regression models to document that this positive correlation is indeed driven by banks' reaction to the climate policy stringency in their home countries.

4.1 Main results

We start our regression analysis with the model in Equation 1, in which we regress lender share in syndicated loans on the CCPI of the bank's home country. As mentioned in Section 3, one of the concerns with this model is that loan demand can be correlated with the CCPI. For instance, observing an increase in CCPI of a country, the borrower may decide to increase its demand to the lenders from that country. The reason might be that having a lending relationship with a lender from a high CCPI country can generate a positive signal for the borrower. Alternatively, the borrower might want to increase its compliance with climate

policies, and a lending relationship with a lender from a high CCPI country can facilitate this process.

To mitigate the concerns related to loan demand, we use granular fixed effects to control for borrower characteristics and report the results in [Table 2](#). Column (1) starts with lender-level control variables, such as $\log(\text{total assets})$, capital ratio, and liquidity ratio. We include borrower fixed effects in Column (2). The size of the estimated coefficient indicates that the loan share of the lender increases by 10 percent when its home country’s CCPI increases by 24 units—the increase in CCPI that the United States experienced between 2007 and 2017. In Column(3), we include year fixed effects to control for time effects. In Column (4), we saturate the model with borrower \times year fixed effects, which means we compare loan shares of different lenders for the same borrower at the same year.

As explained in [Section 3](#), using granular fixed effects to control for loan demand requires an assumption that loan demand is constant across the lenders within the fixed effects level ([Khwaja and Mian, 2008](#)). Given that participants do not have a direct relationship with the firm except the lead arranger in a syndicated loan, the assumption is highly likely to hold for lenders in the same syndicated loan. This implies that comparing lenders in the same loan would enable us to control for loan demand more precisely and identify the changes in loan supply more accurately. Therefore, we include loan fixed effects and compare two lenders of the same loan in Column (5). The magnitude of the coefficient in this within-loan model is similar to the ones in the previous models, which mitigates the concerns about loan demand.

In addition to the loan demand, uncontrolled bank characteristics can bias the estimations. We already control for observable bank characteristics starting from Column (1). However, there could be unobservable bank characteristics that are correlated with CCPI. To control for such bank unobservables, we use one syndicated loan market feature: bank groups can participate in the syndicated loan market with several subsidiaries. Being a part of the same group, it is likely that these subsidiaries share similar business models. Thus,

comparing the loan supply of subsidiaries of the same bank group holds the effect of bank characteristics on loan supply constant. To do so, we include bank group fixed effects in Column (6). Furthermore, these subsidiaries may be located in different countries, which allows us to compare subsidiaries of the same group in the same year. We make this comparison in Column (7) by including bank group \times year fixed effects. We have positive and significant coefficients in both columns.¹⁹

After establishing that the positive correlation between cross-border lending and CCPI is not driven by loan demand or bank characteristics, we now turn to the concern related to variables correlated with both CCPI and loan supply. Being a weighted average of 14 different climate policy-related measures, CCPI can be correlated with other country-level variables. For instance, an improvement in the economic conditions can enable residents of a country to be more careful about the environment, leading to a higher CCPI score. Moreover, cultural differences among the countries can be a factor in the observed heterogeneity in CCPI.²⁰ In addition, demographic differences might explain heterogeneity in climate change awareness—a younger population can be more careful about the environment. Alternatively, the heterogeneity in CCPI can be partially driven by legal and institutional differences across the countries. These variables can threaten our estimations to the extent that they are correlated with loan supply.

We mitigate the concern about the omitted variables in two steps. First, we collect variables that are shown to be related to cross-border lending in the literature and include them in our models. More specifically, in Column (1) of [Table 3](#), we include log(GDP per capita), domestic credit to GDP ratio, and the unemployment rate to control for economic

¹⁹In [Table A1](#) of the Appendix, we investigate the relationship between exposure to lenders' CCPI and carbon emissions at the borrower level. If the positive relationship is driven by loan demand, we may find a change in carbon emissions, reflecting firms' desire to alter their carbon print. Instead, if the positive effect is driven by loan supply, there may not be a change in carbon emissions. In line with a loan supply channel, we do not find any significant effect of exposure to lenders' CCPI on the carbon emissions of the borrowers.

²⁰Results from Round 8 of the European Social Survey show that there are variations in climate preferences and beliefs among the countries. For instance, residents in Israel, Norway, and Eastern European countries are less likely to think that climate change is caused by human activity ([Poortinga et al., 2018](#)).

conditions in the lender’s home country. To ensure that the results are not driven by the cultural proximity between the lender and the borrower, we include a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the lender and borrower country have the same language and log of the distance between these countries in Column (2). We use population growth, share of old and young workforce in Column (3) for differences in demographics. Finally, we follow the literature and include indices for credit and property rights with the log of contract enforcing days to control for legal environment of the lender’s home country (Qian and Strahan, 2007; Houston et al., 2012). In all of these specifications, the positive coefficient of CCPI survives, and its magnitude is similar to the ones we have in Table 2.

Despite the rich set of control variables, the error term of the model in Equation 1 can still be correlated with CCPI, which necessitates an exogenous variation in CCPI. In the second step, we aim to obtain the needed exogenous variation by using the changes in the Green Party share in the parliament as an instrument for CCPI. As discussed in Section 3, there is little doubt that this instrument is relevant for CCPI owing to the main agenda of the Green Party. The results in Column (1) of Table 4 show that indeed the Green Party share is relevant for CCPI. Consistent with intuition, CCPI increases when there is an increase in the Green Party share. To see whether the positive relationship between CCPI and IV is strong enough, we report the efficient F-statistics developed by Olea and Pflueger (2013).²¹ Reassuringly, the effective F-statistics in our specifications are larger than the threshold level of 23.1 for 10 percent worst-case benchmark derived by Olea and Pflueger (2013), alleviating the concerns about weak instrument. We report the second-stage estimates with the efficient F-statistics from the first-stage in the remaining columns. In Column (2), we start with loan fixed effects and estimate a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the instrumented CCPI.²² This positive coefficient lends strong support to our interpretation

²¹The efficient F-statistics is robust to heteroscedasticity, serial correlation, and clustering (Olea and Pflueger, 2013).

²²Lee et al. (2021) report that the adjustment factor is 1.147 when the 1st-Stage F-statistics is 33.457. This adjustment factor indicates that the t-statistics of \widehat{CCPI}_{lender} ’s coefficient should be larger than 2.30 to be significant at 5 percent level. On Column (2), the t-statistics of \widehat{CCPI}_{lender} is 3.75, which means that

of the earlier results: banks increase their cross-border lending as a reaction to stringent home-country climate policy. In Columns (3) and (4), we consecutively include economic condition and bank group level controls. Doing so yields very similar estimates.

As argued in Section 3, the most likely way the exclusion restriction is to be violated is that the Green Party share is correlated with economic conditions. If this is the case, then CCPI instrumented by the Green Party share could still pick up the effect of economic conditions. On the other hand, the Green Party share may be uncorrelated to economic conditions due to election cycles being predetermined and unrelated with economic conditions. We investigate the correlation between the economic conditions and the Green Party share in Table 5, in which we use $\log(\text{GDP})_{pc}$, $\Delta \log(\text{GDP})$, Credit to GDP ratio, and Unemployment Rate as proxies for the economic conditions. First, in Panel A, we regress these four variables on the change in Green Party share one by one, considering the possibility that the Green Party share can influence the economic conditions.²³ Supporting the exclusion restriction, the estimated coefficient is insignificant in all of these models. In Panel B, we consider another possibility in which economic conditions influence the Green Party share. To assess this possibility, we regress the change in Green Party share on the lagged values of economic condition proxies separately in the first four columns and on all economic condition variables in the same model in Column (5). In line with the exclusion restriction, the economic condition variables have insignificant coefficients in all of these models. Overall, the results in Table 5 provide consistent evidence that the relationship between economic conditions and the Green Party share does not pose a threat to the identification.

Despite the lack of correlation between economic conditions and the Green Party share, it is still possible that the exclusion restriction does not hold exactly. Due to this possibility, we

the coefficient is significant at 5 percent.

²³We do not use the whole election cycle in this panel as we do in Table 4. Instead, we use the observations one year after the election. Note that this is a conservative sample decision since using the whole election cycle reduces the statistical power of the change in Green Party share. The reason is that the instrumental variable does not change within the election cycle. When we use the whole election cycle, the explanatory power of the change in Green Party share is even smaller, in line with this argument.

relax the exclusion restriction assumption with the method developed by [Conley et al. \(2012\)](#). The exclusion restriction in our setting means that the effect of the Green Party share on cross-border lending is assumed to be zero after controlling for its effect through the climate policy stringency. Formally, the exclusion restriction corresponds to assuming that $\gamma = 0$ in the following regression model: $Lender\ share = \beta CCPI + \gamma \Delta Green\ Party\ share + \epsilon$. The plausibly exogenous instrumental variable method by [Conley et al. \(2012\)](#) provides interval estimates for β when γ deviates from being exactly zero. Intuitively, these interval estimates show how large the direct effect of $\Delta Green\ Party\ share$ (γ) should be to make the effect of $CCPI$ (β) insignificant. We report the results of this method in [Figure 4](#) at 10 percent significance level for β , in which the x-axis shows different values of γ and the y-axis depicts the corresponding intervals for β . [Figure 4](#) illustrates that the direct effect of the Green Party should be as large as its effect through climate policy stringency to make β insignificant at 10 percent. Considering the lack of correlation between economic conditions and the Green Party share, we deem this implausible. Additional evidence comes from a comparison of [Columns \(2\)-\(4\)](#) in [Table 4](#). When we include economic conditions and bank-level control variables in the model, we see that the coefficient of instrumented CCPI stays remarkably stable, despite a relative increase in R^2 . In the spirit of measurement of omitted variable bias framework ([Altonji et al., 2005](#); [Oster, 2017](#)), this stability implies that the magnitude of the omitted variable bias is limited.

4.2 Mechanism

So far, our results show that a more stringent climate policy leads to an increase in cross-border lending. This section investigates the underlying mechanism and provides evidence that banks use cross-border lending to facilitate race-to-the-bottom behavior. The race to the bottom in the international banking context means that after facing stricter regulation in their home country, banks shift their activities from their home country to countries

with looser regulation, which enables them to evade the more stringent regulation at home (Acharya, 2003; Houston et al., 2012; Karolyi and Taboada, 2015). In our context, this mechanism has two main implications. First, stricter climate policies may make domestic lending less appealing due to the possible adverse effects of stricter policies on banks' loan portfolios. Second, banks engage with cross-border lending if doing so enables banks to circumvent these adverse effects.

We start our analysis by investigating the first implication: do stricter climate policies make domestic lending less appealing? Stricter climate policies aim to reduce the carbon print of the economy, which entails a reduction in carbon emissions. A reduction in emissions may require a change in the business model or in the production process. Also, existing inventories and machinery may lose value due to the needed changes (Litterman, 2021). These suggest that a stringent climate policy may worsen domestic firms' economic prospects, making domestic lending less appealing. One direct way to assess this channel is by looking at the relationship between climate policy stringency and the performance of banks' loan portfolios. To this end, we regress banks' nonperforming loans and net profit ratios on CCPI in Table 6. In this table, we use all banks in each country, both the ones that engage and do not engage with cross-border lending. We find that climate policy stringency is positively associated with nonperforming loans ratio and negatively associated with banks' profits, which creates motives for banks to perform a race to the bottom.²⁴ As explained before, the race to the bottom behavior suggests that banks engage with cross-border lending to mitigate these adverse effects. Therefore, the effect of climate policy stringency on loan portfolios can be different for cross-border lenders. To test this, we create a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a bank extends a cross-border loan in a year in our sample and interact

²⁴To explain these adverse effects, we relate firm profitability to climate policy stringency in the Appendix (Table A3). Confirming the negative impact on banks' loan portfolios, we again find that climate policy stringency is negatively correlated with firms' profits. Specifically, we use Return on Equity, Return on Capital, Net Profit Margin, and Operating Margin as firm profit indicators at the country level. We use the aggregate values obtained from Aswath Damodaran's website. The profit variables are calculated at the firm level for only public firms and then aggregated up to the country-year level. These aggregate values are, therefore less susceptible to outliers.

this dummy with CCPI. Indeed, we find that the interaction term has the opposite sign of the direct effect—it is negative for nonperforming loans and positive for bank profits. These results indicate that climate policies hurt banks’ loan portfolios, and cross-border lending enables banks to circumvent the adverse effects of climate policies.

Another support for race to the bottom as the underlying mechanism comes from the heterogeneity among the borrower countries’ climate policy stringency. If the increase in cross-border lending is driven by race to the bottom, cross-border lending should reduce banks’ exposure to climate policies. This argument yields two implications, which we explain and test subsequently. First, the increase in cross-border lending should be decreasing in the borrower’s climate policy stringency. As the borrower’s climate policy becomes more stringent, cross-border lending provides less evasion for the banks. We test this hypothesis on the first two columns of [Table 7](#), where we interact $CCPI_{lender}$ with $CCPI_{borrower}$. In line with race to the bottom, we estimate a negative coefficient for the interaction term, which suggests that a 10-unit increase in $CCPI_{borrower}$ reduces the increase in cross-border lending by approximately 40 percent. Second, the race to the bottom behavior mechanism predicts that the increase in cross-border lending should occur only if the lender country’s climate policy is more stringent than the borrower country’s. Otherwise, increasing cross-border lending would not decrease the lender’s exposure to stringent climate policies. The remaining columns in [Table 7](#) analyze this by splitting the sample into two in terms of the difference between $CCPI_{lender}$ and $CCPI_{borrower}$. We find that $CCPI_{lender}$ has a positive and statistically significant coefficient when $CCPI_{lender} > CCPI_{borrower}$. In contrast, it has an economically and statistically insignificant coefficient when $CCPI_{lender} < CCPI_{borrower}$. We combine the two findings of [Table 7](#) in [Figure 5](#), where we use $\Delta CCPI$, defined as $CCPI_{lender} - CCPI_{borrower}$, on the x-axis and Lender Share on the y-axis. Akin to regression discontinuity design, [Figure 5](#) illustrates that the effect of domestic climate policy stringency on cross-border lending materializes only if the lender’s country has a more stringent policy, and this effect increases in magnitude when $\Delta CCPI$ gets larger.

A corollary of the race to the bottom mechanism in our context is that banks should extend cross-border loans to borrowers who are similar to their domestic borrowers. The reason is that lending to similar borrowers reduces both screening and monitoring costs, making cross-border lending less difficult for banks. To test this, we turn to banks' domestic syndicated loans. We use these loans to calculate bank specialization. Namely, we calculate each industry's share in banks' domestic lending. Then, we assume that a bank is specialized in an industry if this industry has the largest share in its domestic loans. We use this specialization variable to create a dummy variable, *Specialized Loan*, that takes the value of 1 if the cross-border loan is in the banks' specialized industry. In the first 3 columns of [Table 8](#), we regress the Specialized Loan dummy on CCPI with different control variables. We find that banks lend more specialized cross-border loans as CCPI increases, suggesting that banks aim to conserve the industrial composition of their loan portfolios. Moreover, banks may increase their supply more when they lend specialized loans. Indeed, interacting Specialized Loan dummy with CCPI in the last 3 columns of [Table 8](#) reveals that banks almost double their loan shares if the loan is specialized.

So far, our results provide several independent but complementary pieces of evidence about how stricter climate policies at home trigger a race to the bottom behavior by banks. In what follows, we test the implications of the race to the bottom mechanism simultaneously. The regulatory arbitrage mechanism suggests that a more stringent climate policy can make lending to borrowers with high carbon risks less appealing. Therefore, this mechanism predicts a decline in lending to domestic borrowers with high carbon risk. At the same time, this mechanism predicts that banks may increase their cross-border lending to borrowers with high carbon risk since banks may prefer replacing their high-risk domestic borrowers with similar borrowers abroad. We combine cross-border lending with domestic lending to assess these two predictions together. In addition, we collect information about firm-level carbon intensity risk. The carbon intensity risk shows how much a firm is exposed

to unmanaged carbon risk based on emissions level.²⁵ These additional data allow us to create two dummy variables. The first dummy variable, Same Country, takes the value of 1 if the loan is domestic. The second dummy variable, High Carbon Intensity Risk, equals 1 if the borrower is defined as a high, severe, or medium carbon risk firm. We interact these two dummy variables with $CCPI_{lender}$ and report the results in Table 9. In line with regulatory arbitrage, High Carbon Intensity Risk \times $CCPI_{lender}$ has a positive coefficient, which means that climate policy stringency increases cross-border lending more if the borrower has a high carbon risk. In addition, we estimate a negative coefficient for Same Country \times High Carbon Intensity Risk \times $CCPI_{lender}$. This negative coefficient shows that credit supply to domestic firms decreases when $CCPI_{lender}$ increases if the domestic firm has a high carbon risk.

Next, we consider two indirect implications of the race to the bottom mechanism in a climate policy context. The first indirect implication is about bank reputation. Due to the public pressure for the need for climate policies, the race to the bottom may be poorly perceived and can hurt banks' publicity. Therefore, banks may prefer increasing their cross-border lending to countries where the flow of information is less likely to their home country. In Table 10, we use the distance between the lender and borrower countries and whether the lender and borrower countries share a border or have the same language as a proxy for information flow possibilities. In line with the possible negative effects of race to the bottom on banks' publicity, banks increase their cross-border lending more if the borrower country does not have the same language or share a border with the lender country. In addition, the increase in cross-border lending is driven by lender-borrower pairs that have larger distances above the sample's median value. The second indirect implication is about lender countries' bank supervision environment. Due to the possible political pressure, a race to the bottom behavior may attract the attention of the bank supervisory authorities with a possible penalty on banks. Therefore, banks may be more likely to pursue such behavior in a weaker supervision environment. We test this hypothesis in Table 11, where

²⁵Due to data availability of firm-level carbon risk, the number of observations declines in this sample.

we use two different bank supervision environment variables. In Panel A of [Table 11](#), we use *independence of the bank supervisory authority*. This variable shows the degree to which the supervisory authority is independent of the government and legally protected from the banking industry. In Panel B, we use *bank supervisory power*, which shows whether the supervisory authorities have the authority to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems ([Barth et al., 2013](#)). Higher values indicate higher power/authority for both of these variables. By splitting our sample into three, we see that the increase in cross-border lending is stronger if the lender country’s bank supervision has low independence or low power. These two heterogeneity tests also supports the race to the bottom mechanism as the main driver of our results.

To provide further insight into the underlying mechanism, we investigate which component of the CCPI is more important for the increase in cross-border lending. As explained in [Section 2](#), CCPI consists of four main categories: GHG Emissions Improvement, Renewable Energy, Energy Efficiency, and Climate Policy. Climate Policy captures governments’ policy actions against climate change, while the other three categories capture the results of these policies and actions. Therefore, an increase in the components’ value represents a more environment-friendly policy ([Burck et al., 2016](#)). If banks care about the risks that a stricter climate policy may bring for firms’ production processes, profitability, and ability to repay a loan, the Climate Policy component might be the main determinant for cross-border lending. [Table 12](#) report the results from this test. We first regress Lender Share on each of these four categories one by one in Columns (1) to (4) and find that all categories have positive and significant coefficients separately. In the last two columns, we run horse race models with all four categories included as explanatory variables. In these models, only the Climate Policy has a statistically significant coefficient.²⁶

²⁶Energy Efficiency, Renewable energy, and GHG emissions may suffer from collinearity as they proxy the outcome of a country’s climate politics.

4.3 Additional analysis

This section continues our analysis by exploring the heterogeneity in lender characteristics and regional patterns in bank credit allocation. We start with lender characteristics in [Table 13](#). In Columns (1) and (2) of [Table 13](#), we split our sample in terms of bank size. For larger banks, increasing cross-border lending as a reaction to more stringent climate policy is easier as for such banks, cross-border lending is easier to conduct, and the fixed costs attached to cross-border lending can be less important. In line with this intuition, we find that the increase in cross-border lending is stronger for larger banks. Similarly, for banks with more experience in cross-border lending, exploiting cross-border lending as a reaction to climate policy should be easier. This is indeed what our results show in Columns (3) and (4). The increase in cross-border lending is almost five times larger for the banks whose cross-border loan ratios are above our sample's median. The next two columns split the sample into two with respect to bank capital. Even though the effect is larger for less capitalized banks, the difference is not statistically significant. In the last two columns, we investigate the influence of banks' NPL ratio on the effect of climate policy stringency. A race to the bottom behavior has a special prediction for the NPL ratio, which is that the effect can be stronger for banks with a high NPL ratio. The reason is that these banks are more in need of profits. Thus the incentive for them to increase cross-border lending is stronger. In line with this argument, we find that the effect is significantly larger for banks with a high NPL ratio. Last, we investigate whether the effect depends on the role of the lender in the syndicated loan. Columns (9) and (10) of [Table 13](#) show that the effect is similar for lead arrangers and participants.

Next, we study the regional patterns in the effect of climate policy stringency. Studying the regional patterns can be particularly interesting as it would show the direction of climate policy-induced cross-border lending. Given the distribution of CCPI across the world, we focus on Europe and report the results in which we use only European lenders in [Table 14](#).

This table categorizes borrowers into five locations: the USA, emerging markets, Europe, Asia, and Anglo-Saxon countries. Among these five groups, the positive effect of climate policy stringency on cross-border lending is strongest for emerging markets. At the same time, the estimated effect is insignificant and small in size when the borrowers are located in the USA and Europe. This suggests that European lenders channel their credit supply towards emerging markets due to a more stringent climate policy at home.

4.4 Robustness

This section continues our analysis by providing additional robustness checks. The first robustness check focuses on the sensitivity of our main results to alternative measures of climate policy stringency. One concern is that our results could be driven by the way CCPI is constructed. To alleviate this concern, we use two alternative climate policy stringency measures: The Climate Change Cooperation Index (C3-I) by [Bernauer and Böhmelt \(2013\)](#) and the Environmental Policy Index (EPI) developed by YCELP, CIESIN, and the World Economic Forum ([Hsu et al., 2016](#)). The C3-I evaluates countries' climate policy performance both in terms of political behavior and emissions. The EPI is a composite indicator that measures how close countries are to established environmental policy targets. These two indices have smaller coverage, both in cross-section and in time series. Therefore, the sample size decreases when we use these two indices.²⁷ However, as shown in [Table A4](#), we can replicate our main results when we use these two alternative measures, meaning that our results do not hinge on the way CCPI is constructed. In these specifications, we estimate a significant coefficient with a positive sign, and this finding does not change when we include bank and country-level controls.

In the next robustness check, we consider one practice in the literature regarding the missing values in the syndicated loan population. Many syndicated loan deals do not report

²⁷The sample covers the period 2007-2014 for specifications when we use the C3-I, and the period 2007-2016 for specifications when we use the EPI as a measure of climate policy stringency.

the lender share (loan amounts)—approximately, we can observe the loan shares for 28 percent of the loans. The literature deals with the missing observation problem by allocating the total amount of unreported total loan shares equally to the lenders whose shares are not reported (Doerr and Schaz, 2021; De Haas and Van Horen, 2013; Giannetti and Laeven, 2012). In Table A5, we use both reported and imputed loan shares and replicate our main model. We again estimate a positive and statistical effect for climate policy stringency.

Another concern with lender share as the dependent variable is that if the loan size gets smaller as climate policy becomes more stringent, the amount of lending of a lender to a borrower can be smaller, even though the loan share is higher. To mitigate this concern, we use $\log(\text{loan amount})$ as the dependent variable in Table A6 of the Appendix. Similar to our main table, we saturate the model with the loan fixed effects and bank group \times year fixed effects. We estimate a positive and significant coefficient in every model, which confirms the positive impact of climate policy stringency on cross-border lending.

In the last robustness check, we aggregate our loan level data up to bank-borrower country level, following De Haas and Van Horen (2013). Even though the granularity of the loan level data is valuable for identification, it can mask some patterns at the aggregate level. For instance, an increase in CCPI may decrease the number of cross-border loans, and this decrease can offset the increase in loan shares caused by CCPI. To see whether such a pattern emerges in our sample, we use two aggregated lending variables at bank-borrower country level: the number of syndicated loans a bank extends to a country, and the total amount of loans a bank extends to a country. We use $\log(\text{Number of loans})$ as the dependent variable in the first four columns of Table A7 and $\log(\text{Loan amount})$ in the remaining four columns. Importantly, we use ΔCCPI as main independent variable, which is the difference between $\text{CCPI}_{\text{lender}}$ and $\text{CCPI}_{\text{borrower}}$. We follow Khwaja and Mian (2008) and De Haas and Van Horen (2013) and control for loan demand with borrower country \times year fixed effects and include bank-level characteristics as control variables. Intuitively, we compare the lending of two lenders with different ΔCCPI to the same borrower country. In these alternative

specifications, we estimate positive and significant coefficients for the number of loans and loan amount, confirming our main result.

5 Conclusion

Due to disagreements about how and when to implement policies about climate change, there is a large heterogeneity in these policies across the countries. This lack of coordination can create escape rooms for the ones who may be adversely affected by these policies. In this paper, we focus on banks and try to understand whether they exploit the heterogeneity in climate policies with their loan supply decisions. In particular, we use the syndicated loan market as a laboratory to study the link between the cross-border loan supply and the climate policy stringency of the banks' home countries.

We find that banks react to a more stringent climate policy at home by increasing their cross-border lending. Specifically, banks increase their shares in cross-border syndicated loans by nine percent when the climate policy stringency of their home country increases by one standard deviation. To establish that the effect is not driven by loan demand, we use the granularity of syndicated loans and compare the banks within the same loan by employing loan fixed effects. To mitigate concerns about omitted variables, we instrument climate policy stringency with Green Party shares in the parliament. Thanks to the predetermined election cycles, we show that these shares are not correlated with economic conditions, which suggests that these shares provide us arguably exogenous variation in climate policies.

Why do we observe the increase in cross-border lending? Our findings are in line with a race to the bottom behavior, in which the increase in cross-border lending reduces banks' exposure to climate policies. For instance, the positive effect on cross-border lending decreases in the borrower country's policy stringency and is non-existent if the stringency is higher in the borrower country. In addition, domestic lending to brown borrowers decreases, but cross-border lending increases to such borrowers as climate policy becomes more stringent.

We demonstrate a negative correlation between climate policy stringency and banks' loan portfolio performance as a possible explanation for why banks have incentives to increase their cross-border lending.

Our paper documents one adverse effect of the lack of coordination in climate policies. Considering the nature of climate change, an action that reduces the pace of transition into a green economy can have far-reaching negative externality. By studying the previously overlooked use of cross-border lending, we aim to provide a broader picture of how international banking interacts with climate policies, which can be helpful for policymakers to improve international coordination and develop more effective policies.

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Figures and Tables

Figure 1: Variation in the climate policy stringency

This figure reports the average value against the standard deviation of the Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) for each country included in our sample. The CCPI score takes values in the interval [0;100], where higher values proxy a country with a more stringent climate policy. The panel consists of 39 countries over the period 2007-2017. Dots are colored according to the regional area where countries are located (Europe, Anglo-Saxon, Asia, and Emerging markets). The y -axis shows the standard deviation, while the x -axis shows the average value of the CCPI. For the list of the countries included in our sample, see [Figure A2](#). For the variation in each CCPI component, see [Figure A1](#).




Figure 2: **Evolution overtime and change in the climate policy stringency**

This figure shows the evolution and percentage change in the CCPI index over the period 2007-2017 for a sample of representative countries. The x-axis shows the sample period. In Panel A, the y-axis shows the CCPI values; in Panel B, the y-axis shows the percentage change in the CCPI. For the list of the countries included in our sample, see [Figure A2](#).




Figure 3: Correlation between home country climate policy and cross-border bank lending

This figure reports the correlation between the climate policy stringency measured by the Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) and the share of cross-border lending in total lending on bank balance sheets. Share of cross-border lending is calculated as the ratio between the total cross-border loan volume that each parent bank in the sample has financed in the syndicated loan market over the period 2007-2017 and total net loans. For variable definitions, see [Table A8](#).




Figure 4: **Green Party share and the exclusion restriction**

This figure shows the estimated coefficient of $CCPI_{lender}$ when the exclusion restriction assumption is relaxed. The dashed lines on the y-axis are 90 percent upper and lower bounds for the estimated coefficient of $CCPI_{lender}$ with the method developed by [Conley et al. \(2012\)](#). The x-axis shows the direct effect Green Party vote shares on cross-border lending after controlling for its effect through $CCPI_{lender}$ and country level variables. For variable definitions, see [Table A8](#).




Figure 5: Difference in CCPI and Lender Share

This figure shows that the positive effect of climate policy stringency does not exist if the borrower has a stringent climate policy, and the magnitude of the effect on loan supply increases as borrowers' climate policy becomes less stringent. The x-axis shows $\Delta CCPI$, which is defined as $CCPI_{lender} - CCPI_{borrower}$. The y-axis shows Lender Share. This figure uses residuals of a regression model, where Lender Share is regressed on loan fixed effects, bank group control variables (net interest margin, Tier 1 capital ratio, log(total assets), log(customer deposits), return on assets, and liquidity ratio). For variable definitions, see [Table A8](#).




Table 1: Summary statistics

This table presents information on the sample composition for the period 2007-2017. The sample consists of cross-border loan shares in the syndicated loan market. Balance sheet variables are at an annual frequency. The mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum values are shown. For variable definitions, see [Table A8](#).

	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Lender share	12,478	7.722	7.989	0.070	94.210
CCPI _{lender}	12,478	55.689	8.179	22.848	76.620
CCPI _{borrower}	12,478	49.961	8.887	22.848	76.620
<u>Bank-level controls</u>					
log(Total assets)	12,478	28.097	3.088	11.169	36.838
Tier 1 capital ratio	12,478	12.342	7.255	3.700	182.760
log(Customer deposits)	12,478	27.260	3.375	6.639	36.813
Liquidity ratio	12,478	49.097	35.340	0.720	395.494
ROAE	12,478	5.626	11.212	-223.690	46.09
Net interest margin	12,478	1.481	0.782	-0.130	9.17
<u>Country-level controls</u>					
log(GDP per capita)	11,942	10.497	0.709	6.906	11.685
GDP growth	11,942	1.949	2.605	-8.075	14.526
Domestic credit to GDP	11,705	121.545	37.846	25.456	206.671
Unemployment rate	11,942	7.562	3.457	0.489	27.071
Common Language	11,510	0.246	0.431	0	1
log(Distance)	11,510	7.908	1.025	4.798	9.384
Top 5 bank concentration	12,259	73.559	14.744	28.970	100
Population growth	11,943	0.547	0.532	-1.854	5.322
Young workforce	11,942	26.572	4.370	15.767	55.337
Old workforce	11,942	25.379	6.296	4.192	45.125
Capital regulatory index	9,004	6.851	1.778	2	10
Independence of supervisory authority	10,688	2.020	0.813	0	3
Property rights	11,838	77.153	18.426	20	97.1
Legal rights index	5,514	5.820	2.782	1	12
log(Contract enforcing days)	6,618	4.598	0.494	3.258	5.720
Financial liberalization index	11,838	67.711	14.805	20	90
<u>Loan characteristics</u>					
Number of lenders	12,478	19.897	11.435	2	94
Collateral	7,450	0.434	0.496	0	1
Maturity	12,406	51.532	29.789	3	342
log(Loan amount)	12,478	17.352	1.539	6.354	21.563
log(Loan volume)	4,211	19.488	2.180	13.153	25.155
log(Number of loans)	4,211	2.192	1.178	0.693	6.704
<u>Others</u>					
Climate policy _{lender}	12,478	12.053	4.231	0	20
Renewable energy _{lender}	12,478	2.617	1.704	0.023	8.094
Energy efficiency _{lender}	12,478	5.715	1.439	1.017	9.124
GHG emissions improvement _{lender}	12,478	35.304	5.257	9.570	45.564
Δ Green Party Vote Shr.	7,573	0.286	1.410	-4.5	6.667
High Carbon Intensity Risk	1,419	0.725	0.447	0	1
Bank Supervisory Power	11,264	10.106	1.909	6	16
C3-I _{lender}	2,785	54.690	1.779	48.455	58.345
EPI _{lender}	11,554	83.126	7.114	53.580	91.050

Table 2: **The effect of home country climate policy stringency on cross-border lending**

This table reports estimates from Equation 1. The dependent variable is Lender share and the main independent variable is $CCPI_{lender}$. The sample covers the period 2007-2017. All regressions include bank group level controls (net interest margin, Tier 1 capital ratio, $\log(\text{total assets})$, $\log(\text{customer deposits})$, and liquidity ratio). Control variables and fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of each column. Standard errors are clustered at the lender's country-year level and shown in parentheses. For variable definitions, see Table A8. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

	Lender Share						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
$CCPI_{lender}$	0.027 (0.019)	0.043*** (0.008)	0.044*** (0.008)	0.045*** (0.008)	0.042*** (0.008)	0.042*** (0.013)	0.081*** (0.016)
<u>Controls & Fixed Effects:</u>							
Bank Group Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Borrower FE		✓	✓				
Year FE			✓				
Borrower \times Year FE				✓			
Loan FE					✓	✓	✓
Bank Group FE						✓	
Bank Group \times Year FE							✓
Obs.	12,478	12,478	12,478	12,478	12,478	12,394	12,105
R ²	0.004	0.735	0.736	0.809	0.842	0.863	0.878
Mean(Lender Share)	7.722						

Table 3: Mitigating concerns about omitted variables

This table reports estimates from Equation 1 but adding additional controls. The dependent variable is Lender share and the main independent variable is $CCPI_{lender}$. The sample covers the period 2007-2017. Economic controls are log(GDP per capita), domestic credit to GDP, unemployment rate, GDP growth. Culture controls are log(Distance) and common language. Domestic bank competition control is Top 5 bank concentration. Demographics controls are log(total population), young workforce, old workforce, and population growth. Bank regulation controls are independence of supervisory authority and capital regulatory index (Barth et al., 2013). Institution controls are legal rights index, financial freedom, property rights, and log(Contract enforcing days). Control variables and fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of each column. All regressions include bank group level controls (net interest margin, Tier 1 capital ratio, log(customer assets), log(customer deposits), and liquidity ratio). Standard errors are clustered at the lender's country-year level and shown in parentheses. For variable definitions, see Table A8. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

	Lender Share					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$CCPI_{lender}$	0.039*** (0.008)	0.034*** (0.008)	0.032*** (0.008)	0.037*** (0.009)	0.045** (0.019)	0.058* (0.033)
<u>Controls & Fixed Effects:</u>						
Loan FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bank Group Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Economic Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Culture Controls		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Bank Competition Controls			✓	✓	✓	✓
Demography Controls				✓	✓	✓
Bank Regulation Controls					✓	✓
Institutions Controls						✓
Obs.	11,530	11,076	11,076	11,076	5,810	3,571
R ²	0.853	0.854	0.854	0.854	0.865	0.872
Mean(Lender Share)	7.722					

Table 4: **Green Party share as an instrument for climate policy stringency**

This table reports estimates from Equation 1 in which CCPI is instrumented by Δ Green Party Share. The dependent variable is Lender share. The sample covers the period 2007-2017 and includes only European lenders. Column (1) reports the first stage. Column (2) includes loan fixed effects. Column (3) includes country controls. Column (4) includes bank controls. 1st Stage Efficient F-statistics are calculated by the method developed by [Olea and Pflueger \(2013\)](#). Country control variables are GDP per capita, GDP growth, domestic credit to GDP ratio, and unemployment rate. Bank controls are Tier 1 capital ratio, log(total assets), log(customer deposits), and liquidity ratio. Control variables and fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of each column. Standard errors are clustered at the lender's country-year level and shown in parentheses. For variable definitions, see [Table A8](#). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

	CCPI _{lender}	Lender Share		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Δ Green Party Vote Shr.	1.620*** (0.277)			
\widehat{CCPI}_{lender}		0.120*** (0.032)	0.122*** (0.031)	0.121*** (0.037)
<u>Controls & Fixed Effects:</u>				
Country Controls			✓	✓
Bank Controls				✓
Loan FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Obs.	3,216	3,216	3,084	3,191
R ²	0.340	0.026	0.033	0.062
1 st Stage Eff. F-stat	34.252	34.252	35.612	29.508
Mean(Lender Share)	7.716			

Table 5: Green Party share and economic conditions

This table shows the correlation between the Green Party vote shares and macroeconomic variables. Panel A reports results of regression models in which GDP per capita, Log change in GDP, domestic credit to GDP ratio, and unemployment rate are regressed on Δ Green Party Share $_{t-1}$. Panel B reports results of regression models in which Δ Green Party Share is regressed on GDP per capita, log change in GDP, domestic credit to GDP ratio, and unemployment Rate. The sample covers the period 2007-2017. Control variables and fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of each column. Standard errors are clustered at the lender's country-year level and shown in parentheses. For variable definitions, see [Table A8](#). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Panel A					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
	$\log(\text{GDP})_{\text{pc}}$	$\Delta \log(\text{GDP})$	Credit to GDP	Unemp. Rate	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	
Δ Green Party Share $_{t-1}$	0.014 (0.024)	0.168 (0.294)	-1.507 (2.876)	0.147 (0.378)	
Obs.	1,602	1,602	1,600	1,602	
R ²	0.021	0.019	0.008	0.011	
Panel B					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Δ Green Party Share				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$\log(\text{GDP})_{\text{pc}, t-1}$	0.696 (1.026)				0.902 (0.731)
$\Delta \log(\text{GDP})_{t-1}$		-0.225 (0.145)			-0.255 (0.158)
Credit to GDP $_{t-1}$			0.002 (0.005)		0.006 (0.006)
Unemp. Rate $_{t-1}$				-0.021 (0.177)	0.011 (0.184)
Obs.	1,622	1,622	1,622	1,625	1,621
R ²	0.008	0.093	0.002	0.001	0.123

Table 6: Climate policy stringency and banks' loan portfolios

This table documents that domestic climate policy stringency is positively correlated with lenders' nonperforming loans ratio, and negatively correlated with lenders' profit ratio. *Cross-Border Lender* is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the lender engages cross-border lending in our sample. Data used in this table covers all banks that operate domestically and/or internationally. Columns (1)-(3) use nonperforming loans ratio as the dependent variable. Columns (4)-(6) use banks' net profit ratio as the dependent variable. Control variables and fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of each column. Control variables are GDP growth, unemployment rate, GDP per capita, exchange rate, and domestic credit to GDP ratio. Standard errors are clustered at the lender's country-year level and shown in parentheses. For variable definitions, see [Table A8](#). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

	Nonperforming Loans Ratio				Net Profit Ratio			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
CCPI _{lender, t-1}	0.032** (0.014)	0.031* (0.017)	0.037** (0.016)	0.013 (0.022)	-4.628*** (0.762)	-1.533*** (0.515)	-1.411*** (0.479)	-1.058** (0.461)
CCPI _{lender, t-1} × Cross-Border Lender				-0.060** (0.024)				2.990* (1.577)
<u>Controls & Fixed Effects:</u>								
Controls			✓	✓			✓	✓
Year FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓				✓			
Bank FE		✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Obs.	24,297	23,434	23,216	23,076	179,856	178,323	177,236	176,286
R ²	0.318	0.943	0.943	0.943	0.156	0.527	0.529	0.529
Mean(Dep. Var.)	4.893				24.786			

Table 7: Cross-border lending and borrower climate policy stringency

This table reports estimates from Equation 1. The dependent variable is Lender share and the main independent variable is $CCPI_{lender}$. The sample covers the period 2007-2017. Columns (1) and (2) include the interaction term $CCPI_{lender} \times CCPI_{borrower}$. Columns (2) to (6) shows results when we split the sample in CCPI index of the lender's country higher/lower than the one of the borrower's country. Control variables, fixed effects, and the difference in estimated coefficients between split samples are indicated at the bottom of each column. All regressions include bank group level controls (net interest margin, Tier 1 capital ratio, log(total assets), log(customer deposits), and liquidity ratio). Standard errors are clustered at the lender's country-year level and shown in parentheses. For variable definitions, see Table A8. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Lender Share	Interaction		$CCPI_{borrower} < CCPI_{lender}$			
	(1)	(2)	(3) Yes	(4) No	(5) Yes	(6) No
$CCPI_{lender}$	0.046*** (0.008)	0.043*** (0.008)	0.061*** (0.015)	0.008 (0.016)	0.060*** (0.016)	0.009 (0.017)
$CCPI_{lender} \times CCPI_{borrower}$	-0.002** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.001)				
<u>Controls & Fixed Effects:</u>						
Bank Group Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Borrower \times Year FE	✓		✓	✓		
Loan FE		✓			✓	✓
Obs.	12,478	12,478	7,980	3,860	7,763	3,519
R ²	0.809	0.842	0.812	0.819	0.851	0.841
Mean(Lender Share)	7.722					
Difference			0.052**		0.052**	

Table 8: Climate policy stringency and specialized loans

This table documents documents that lenders extend more specialized cross-border loans as the climate policy stringency at their home countries becomes more stringent, and the positive effect of climate policy stringency on cross-border lending is stronger for specialized loans. *Specialized Loan* is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if borrower is in the banks specialized industry. Lenders' specialized industry is the industry that receives the highest loan amount from the lender last year in the domestic syndicated loan market. Columns (4)-(6) of Table 8 use *Specialized Loan* as the dependent variable. Columns (1)-(3) of Table 8 interact $CCPI_{lender}$ with *Specialized Loan*. Control variables and fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of each column. Bank Group controls are log(total assets), net interest margin, Tier 1 capital ratio, log(customer deposits), and liquidity ratio and their interaction with *Specialized Loan*. Country Controls are GDP growth, unemployment rate, GDP per capita and domestic credit to GDP ratio. Standard errors are clustered at the lender's country-year level and shown in parentheses. For variable definitions, see Table A8. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

	Specialized Loan			Lender Share		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$CCPI_{lender}$	0.007*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.044*** (0.007)	0.030*** (0.008)	0.029*** (0.008)
$CCPI_{lender} \times \text{Specialized Loan}$				0.034** (0.015)	0.039** (0.018)	0.030* (0.017)
<u>Controls & Fixed Effects:</u>						
Bank Group Controls		✓	✓		✓	✓
Country Controls			✓			✓
Loan FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Obs.	12,478	12,478	11,530	12,478	12,478	11,530
R ²	0.460	0.462	0.465	0.841	0.843	0.853
Mean(Dep. Var.)	0.291			7.722		

Table 9: Does a stricter climate policy change the supply of credit domestically?

This table reports estimates from Equation 1. The dependent variable is Lender share and the main independent variable is $CCPI_{lender}$. The sample covers the period 2007-2017. All columns include the triple interaction term, $CCPI_{lender} \times \text{Same Country} \times \text{High Carbon Intensity Risk}$, where High Carbon Intensity Risk is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is assigned to a High, Severe, or Medium Carbon Risk category according to the final carbon risk score (high-level polluting firms) and 0 otherwise (Negligible or Low Carbon Risk Category); Same Country is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the lender and the borrower are located in the same country (domestic loan) and 0 otherwise. Control variables and fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of each column. All regressions include bank group level controls (net interest margin, Tier 1 capital ratio, log(total assets), log(customer deposits), and liquidity ratio). Standard errors are clustered at the lender's country-year level and shown in parentheses. For variable definitions, see Table A8. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Lender Share	Carbon-intensive firms				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Same Country \times High Carbon Intensity Risk \times $CCPI_{lender}$	-0.317** (0.125)	-0.353*** (0.110)	-0.344*** (0.111)	-0.234** (0.097)	-0.234** (0.096)
Same Country \times High Carbon Intensity Risk	19.355*** (7.041)	19.198*** (6.585)	18.794*** (6.619)	11.999** (5.664)	11.733** (5.672)
High Carbon Intensity Risk \times $CCPI_{lender}$	0.085 (0.085)	0.070 (0.068)	0.077 (0.065)	0.104** (0.044)	0.083* (0.043)
Same Country \times $CCPI_{lender}$	0.066 (0.101)	0.086 (0.125)	0.079 (0.126)	0.011 (0.099)	0.023 (0.107)
Same Country	-1.752 (5.998)	-2.171 (7.491)	-1.784 (7.539)	2.550 (5.939)	1.799 (6.354)
High Carbon Intensity Risk	-4.178 (5.066)	-0.698 (4.887)	-1.201 (4.680)		
$CCPI_{lender}$	-0.022 (0.067)	0.012 (0.069)	0.002 (0.067)	-0.023 (0.045)	-0.021 (0.044)
<u>Controls & Fixed Effects:</u>					
Bank Group Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Borrower FE		✓	✓		
Year FE			✓		
Borrower \times Year FE				✓	
Loan FE					✓
Obs.	2,540	2,540	2,540	2,540	2,540
R ²	0.073	0.540	0.543	0.612	0.701
Mean(Lender Share)	9.008				

Table 10: **Role of bank reputation**

This table documents that the increase in cross-border lending is larger when the bank reputation is less likely to be affected. The dependent variable is Lender share and the main independent variable is $CCPI_{lender}$. The sample covers the period 2007-2017. Columns (1) and (2) split the sample into two with respect to the languages of the lender and borrower countries. Columns (3) and (4) split the sample into two with respect to the distance between the lender and borrower countries. Columns (5) and (6) split the sample into two considering whether the lender and borrower countries share borders. Control variables and fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of each column. Bank group control variables are net interest margin, Tier 1 capital ratio, $\log(\text{total assets})$, $\log(\text{customer deposits})$, and liquidity ratio. Standard errors are clustered at the lender's country-year level and shown in parentheses. For variable definitions, see [Table A8](#). *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Lender Share	Language		Distance		Border	
	(1) Diff.	(2) Same	(3) High	(4) Low	(5) No	(6) Yes
$CCPI_{lender}$	0.031*** (0.008)	0.019 (0.014)	0.073*** (0.011)	0.001 (0.011)	0.052*** (0.009)	0.010 (0.047)
<u>Controls & Fixed Effects:</u>						
Bank Group Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Loan FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Obs.	8,156	1,904	6,152	4,952	10,928	972
R ²	0.867	0.842	0.818	0.880	0.838	0.938
Mean(Lender Share)	7.722					
Difference	-0.031*		0.048***		-0.055***	

Table 11: **How does domestic bank regulation influence climate policy-induced cross-border lending?**

This table reports estimates from Equation 1. The dependent variable is Lender share and the main independent variable is $CCPI_{lender}$. The sample covers the period 2007-2017. Panel A splits the sample into three in terms of the *Independence of the Bank Supervisory Authority*. Panel B splits the sample into three in terms of the *Bank Supervisory Power*. Control variables and fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of each column. All regressions include bank group level controls (net interest margin, Tier 1 capital ratio, log(total assets), log(customer deposits), and liquidity ratio). Standard errors are clustered at the lender's country-year level and shown in parentheses. For variable definitions, see Table A8. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Panel A			
<u>Lender Share</u>	<u>Ind. of Bank Supervisory Auth.</u>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Low	Medium	High
$CCPI_{lender}$	0.071*** (0.024)	0.028 (0.018)	-0.001 (0.022)
<u>Controls & Fixed Effects:</u>			
Bank Group Controls	✓	✓	✓
Loan FE	✓	✓	✓
Obs.	2,353	2,693	2,826
R ²	0.827	0.867	0.867
Mean(Lender Share)	7.722		
Panel B			
<u>Lender Share</u>	<u>Bank Supervisory Power</u>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Low	Medium	High
$CCPI_{lender}$	0.071*** (0.021)	0.043 (0.069)	0.027** (0.011)
<u>Controls & Fixed Effects:</u>			
Bank Group Controls	✓	✓	✓
Loan FE	✓	✓	✓
Obs.	2,963	2,181	3,420
R ²	0.874	0.841	0.849
Mean(Lender Share)	7.722		

Table 12: Which component of the CCPI matters most?

This table reports estimates from Equation 1 in which parts of CCPI are used as explanatory variables. The dependent variable is Lender share. The sample covers the period 2007-2017. Control variables and fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of each column. All regressions include bank group level controls (net interest margin, Tier 1 capital ratio, log(total assets), log(customer deposits), and liquidity ratio). Standard errors are clustered at the lender's country-year level and shown in parentheses. For variable definitions, see Table A8. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

	Lender Share					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Climate policy _{lender}	0.065*** (0.013)				0.069*** (0.012)	0.065*** (0.013)
Renewable energy _{lender}		0.111** (0.049)			0.020 (0.053)	0.037 (0.055)
Energy efficiency _{lender}			0.111*** (0.042)		0.039 (0.079)	0.027 (0.084)
GHG emissions improvement _{lender}				0.037*** (0.014)	0.035 (0.022)	0.032 (0.023)
<u>Controls & Fixed Effects:</u>						
Bank Group Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Borrower × Year FE					✓	
Loan FE	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Obs.	12,478	12,478	12,478	12,478	12,478	12,478
R ²	0.842	0.841	0.841	0.841	0.809	0.842
Mean(Lender Share)	7.722					

Table 13: **How does the effect differentiate with respect to lenders' characteristics?**

This table reports estimates from Equation 1. The dependent variable is Lender share and the main independent variable is $CCPI_{lender}$. The sample covers the period 2007-2017. Columns (1) and (2) split the sample into two with respect to bank size (above/below total assets sample median). Columns (3) and (4) split the sample into two with respect to the ratio of cross-border lending to total lending (above/below sample median). Columns (5) and (6) split the sample into two with respect to the Tier 1 capital ratio (above/below sample median). Columns (7) and (8) split the sample into two with respect to the non-performing loans ratio (NPL) (above/below sample median). Columns (9) and (10) split the sample into two with respect to the lead bank and participant banks following the definition by Ivashina (2009). Split points are the sample's median values. Control variables, fixed effects, and the difference in estimated coefficients between split samples are indicated at the bottom of each column. Standard errors are clustered at the lender's country-year level and shown in parentheses. For variable definitions, see Table A8. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Lender Share	Size		Cross-Border		Capital		NPL		Lead bank	
	(1) Low	(2) High	(3) Low	(4) High	(5) Low	(6) High	(7) Low	(8) High	(9) Yes	(10) No
$CCPI_{lender}$	0.018** (0.008)	0.061*** (0.010)	0.022** (0.009)	0.107*** (0.013)	0.053*** (0.013)	0.045*** (0.009)	0.031* (0.018)	0.097*** (0.031)	0.046*** (0.013)	0.046*** (0.007)
Fixed Effects:										
Loan FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Obs.	5,356	5,337	5,328	5,459	5,406	5,626	847	881	1,758	10,119
R ²	0.843	0.858	0.842	0.846	0.841	0.861	0.838	0.808	0.848	0.864
Mean(Lender Share)	7.722									
Difference	0.043***		0.085***		-0.008		0.065*		-0.001	

Table 14: **The effect of home country climate policy on cross-border lending: Are there regional patterns?**

This table reports estimates from Equation 1 in which we cluster countries belonging to the same geographical area. The dependent variable is Lender share and the main independent variable is $CCPI_{lender}$. The sample covers the period 2007-2017. European countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Portugal, and United Kingdom. Emerging market countries are Saudi Arabia, China, Chinese Taipei, India, Brazil, Russian Federation, Indonesia, South Africa, Malaysia, and Turkey. Asian countries are Japan, Singapore, Korea, Chinese Taipei, and China. Anglo-Saxon countries are United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. All lenders in this table are located in Europe. All regressions include bank group level controls (net interest margin, Tier 1 capital ratio, log(total assets), log(customer deposits), and liquidity ratio). Control variables, fixed effects, and the difference in estimated coefficients between split samples are indicated at the bottom of each column. Standard errors are clustered at the lender's country-year level and shown in parentheses. For variable definitions, see Table A8. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

Lender Share	Europe vs USA	Europe vs Emerging markets	Europe vs Europe	Europe vs Asia	Europe vs Anglo-Saxon
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
$CCPI_{lender}$	0.029 (0.026)	0.131*** (0.032)	0.008 (0.016)	0.110 (0.071)	0.040* (0.023)
<u>Controls & Fixed Effects:</u>					
Bank Group Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Loan FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Obs.	3,751	885	3,069	371	4,091
R ²	0.820	0.894	0.907	0.864	0.833
Mean(Lender Share)	7.722				

Appendix

A Data description

A.1 Climate policy stringency and the CCPI

The Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) has been internationally recognized for assessing a country's climate change performance index. Here are a few examples showing the index's impact:

- The Institutional Investor Group on Climate Change (IIGCC) has named the CCPI "recommended methodology" for climate-proofing sovereign bonds ([link](#)), and the CCPI presents countries' rankings at the COP to the UNFCCC ([link](#));
- The European Parliament has ranked the CCPI "first" within their ten composite indices for policy-making ([link](#));
- The G20's Financial Stability Board (FSB) has named the CCPI a proxy for transition risks as part of their research on the availability of data to assess climate-related risks to financial stability ([link](#));
- The World Bank has referenced the CCPI as one of the three most robust key performance indicators for sovereign sustainability globally ([link](#));
- BlackRock has undertaken major research of CCPI-adjusted smart-beta strategies making extensive use of the Germanwatch data, as part of their systemic research approach ([link](#));
- NN Investment Partners, a subsidiary of Goldman Sachs, has published a statement on creating net-zero investment portfolios within sovereign bonds, referencing their use of the CCPI database ([link](#)).

A.2 Country characteristics

Due to the possible effect of country-level characteristics on cross-border lending and climate policy stringency, we collect information about countries' economic conditions, culture, demography, law, and quality of institutions from several sources (Worldwide Governance Indicator, The Heritage Foundation, Fraser Institute among others). The common language and distance dummy variables come from [Rose \(2004\)](#). We also measure countries' competition in the domestic banking sector as the share of the five largest banks in total bank deposits. Finally, to examine whether the quality of banking system regulation affects cross-border lending activity, we rely on [Barth et al. \(2013\)](#) data set and their measures of countries' stringency of bank regulation -capital regulation, independence of supervisory authority and power of supervisory authority indices.²⁸

A.3 Carbon intensity measure

We gather borrower-level data on carbon intensity from Sustainalytics. Sustainalytics rates the sustainability of publicly-listed companies based on their social, environmental, and corporate performance. It offers a time-varying carbon risk rating based on carbon emissions for 4,000 companies from 2013 to 2017. The rating is an effort to assess the degree to which a company is exposed to unmanaged carbon risk, or the risks arising in the transition process to a low-carbon economy. We create the variable *High Carbon Intensity Risk* as a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is assigned to a Severe, High, or Medium Carbon Risk Category according to the final overall firm's carbon risk rating score.²⁹ We compile data for 1,419 firms of which 72.5 percent are defined as at high carbon intensity risk.

²⁸The data set provides information on bank regulation, supervision, and monitoring in more than 100 countries. As the indices are not available annually, we follow the literature and use the value of the variables from the third survey (data as of 2005) for 2005 to 2010, and the value of the variables from the last survey for the period 2011 ongoing.

²⁹The Carbon Risk Rating score ranges in the interval [0;100]. The score band and assigned categories are organized as follows: 0.00 - Negligible Risk; 0.01-9.99 - Low Risk; 10-29.99 - Medium Risk; 30-49.99 - High Risk; ≥ 50 - Severe Risk.

Additional Figures and Tables

Figure A1: Variation in CCPI components

This figure reports the average value against the standard deviation of each component of the CCPI index and for each country included in our sample. The *GHG emissions* component's value range in the interval [0;60]. The *Climate policy* component's value range in the interval [0;20]. The *Renewable energy* component's value range in the interval [0;10]. The *Energy efficiency* component's value range in the interval [0;10]. The panel consists of 39 countries over the period 2007-2017






Figure A2: Average home country climate policy

This graph reports the average Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) for each country included in our sample over the period 2007-2017.


(a) Europe



(b) Anglo-Saxon



(c) Emerging markets



(d) Asia




Table A1: **Climate policy stringency exposure from lenders and carbon emissions**

This table investigates the relationship between exposure to climate policy stringency via the lenders and the borrowers' carbon emissions. The dependent variable is the log of carbon emissions divided by total revenue. The main independent variable is CCPI exposure, which is a weighted average of lenders' CCPI where the weights are loan amounts. Column (1) uses the contemporaneous $\ln(\text{Carbon em.}/\text{Tot. revenue})$. Column (2) uses $\ln(\text{Carbon em.}/\text{Tot. revenue})$ one year later. Column (3) uses $\ln(\text{Carbon em.}/\text{Tot. revenue})$ two years later. Fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of each column. Standard errors are robust and shown in parentheses. For variable definitions, see [Table A8](#). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

	$\ln(\text{Carbon em.}/\text{Tot. revenue})$		
	(1) t=0	(2) t=1	(3) t=2
CCPI exposure	0.008 (0.016)	0.022 (0.015)	-0.024 (0.044)
<u>Fixed Effects:</u>			
Borrower FE	✓	✓	✓
Obs.	253	201	153
R ²	0.980	0.992	0.991
Mean(Dep. Var.)	4.738		

Table A2: **Bordering countries as an instrument for climate policy stringency**

This table reports estimates from Equation 1 in which CCPI is instrumented by the average of CCPI of the bordering countries. The dependent variable is Lender share. The sample covers the period 2007-2017. Column (1) reports the first stage, where Neighbor $CCPI_{lender}$ is the average of CCPI of bordering countries. Bordering countries are the ones that share a land border with the instrumented country. Column (2) includes loan fixed effects. Column (3) includes country controls. Column (4) includes bank controls. 1st Stage Efficient F-statistics are calculated by the method developed by [Olea and Pflueger \(2013\)](#). Country control variables are GDP per capita, GDP growth, domestic credit to GDP ratio, and unemployment rate. Bank controls are Tier 1 capital ratio, log(total assets), log(customer deposits), and liquidity ratio. Control variables and fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of each column. Standard errors are clustered at the lender's country-year level and shown in parentheses. For variable definitions, see [Table A8](#). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.101.

	CCPI _{lender}	Lender Share		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Neighbor CCPI _{lender}	0.808*** (0.078)			
\widehat{CCPI}_{lender}		0.048*** (0.012)	0.031+ (0.019)	0.035** (0.016)
<u>Controls & Fixed Effects:</u>				
Country Controls			✓	✓
Bank Controls				✓
Loan FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Obs.	11,070	11,070	10,729	10,729
R ²	0.280	0.010	0.016	0.026
1 st Stage Eff. F-stat	105.900	105.900	51.412	56.716
Mean(Lender Share)	7.716			

Table A3: **Climate policy stringency and corporate profits**

This table documents the negative correlation between climate policy stringency and corporate profits. The sample covers the period 2013-2017. Column (1) uses Return on Equity as dependent variable. Column (2) uses Return on Capital as dependent variable. Column (3) uses Net Profit Margin as dependent variable. Column (4) uses Operating margin as dependent variable. Control variables and fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of each column. Control variables are country-level population growth, ratio of the young workforce, GDP growth, unemployment rate, monetary policy rate, GDP per capita and domestic credit to GDP ratio. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. For variable definitions, see [Table A8](#). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

	ROE	ROC	Net Margin	Opr. Margin
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
CCPI	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.007** (0.003)	-0.004* (0.002)
<u>Controls & Fixed Effects:</u>				
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Country FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
Obs.	214	213	216	216
R ²	0.302	0.291	0.337	0.395
Mean(Dep. var.)	0.096	0.079	0.076	0.097

Table A4: **Alternative indices for home country climate policy stringency**

This table investigates the relationship between cross-border lending and home country climate policy stringency using alternative country-level indices to the CCPI. The dependent variable is Lender share. In columns (1)-(3) we use The Climate Change Cooperation Index (C3-I) by [Bernauer and Böhmelt \(2013\)](#). In columns (4)-(6) we use the Environmental Policy Index developed by YCELP, CIESIN, and the World Economic Forum ([Hsu et al., 2016](#)). Due to data coverage, the sample covers the period 2007-2014 for specifications in columns (1) to (3) and the period 2007-2016 for specifications in columns (4) to (6). Country control variables are GDP per capita, GDP growth, domestic credit to GDP ratio, and unemployment rate. Bank controls are Tier 1 capital ratio, log(total assets), log(customer deposits), and liquidity ratio. Control variables and fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of each column. Standard errors are clustered at the lender's country-year level and shown in parentheses. For variable definitions, see [Table A8](#). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, + p<0.101.

	Lender Share					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
C3-I _{lender}	0.141*	0.162*	0.128			
	(0.072)	(0.093)	(0.131)			
EPI _{lender}				0.075***	0.070***	0.064***
				(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.022)
<u>Controls & Fixed Effects:</u>						
Bank Group Controls		✓	✓		✓	✓
Country Controls			✓			✓
Loan FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Obs.	1,897	1,897	1,742	11,889	11,889	10,833
R ²	0.817	0.822	0.818	0.833	0.835	0.846
Mean(Lender Share)	7.081			7.918		

Table A5: **Imputing the missing loan share**

This table reports estimates from Equation 1 when we impute the missing loan shares. The dependent variable is Lender share and the main independent variable is $CCPI_{lender}$. The sample covers the period 2007-2017. All regressions include bank group level controls (net interest margin, Tier 1 capital ratio, $\log(\text{total assets})$, $\log(\text{customer deposits})$, and liquidity ratio). Control variables and fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of each column. Standard errors are clustered at the lender's country-year level and shown in parentheses. For variable definitions, see Table A8. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

	Lender Share					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$CCPI_{lender}$	0.037*** (0.014)	0.040*** (0.011)	0.028*** (0.007)	0.018*** (0.006)	0.023** (0.011)	0.033* (0.019)
<u>Controls & Fixed Effects:</u>						
Bank Group Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Borrower FE	✓	✓				
Year FE		✓				
Borrower \times Year FE			✓			
Loan FE				✓	✓	✓
Bank Group FE					✓	
Bank Group \times Year FE						✓
Obs.	40,650	40,650	40,650	40,650	40,573	40,207
R ²	0.585	0.587	0.841	0.911	0.913	0.918
Mean(Lender Share)	16.882					

Table A6: Home country climate policy and cross-border loan amounts

This table reports estimates from Equation 1. The dependent variable is $\log(\text{loan amount})$ and the main independent variable is $\text{CCPI}_{\text{lender}}$. The sample covers the period 2007-2017. All regressions include bank group level controls (net interest margin, Tier 1 capital ratio, $\log(\text{total assets})$, $\log(\text{customer deposits})$, and liquidity ratio). Control variables and fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of each column. Standard errors are clustered at the lender's country-year level and shown in parentheses. For variable definitions, see Table A8. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

	log(Loan amount)						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
$\text{CCPI}_{\text{lender}}$	0.029*** (0.007)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.012*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.004)
<u>Controls & Fixed Effects:</u>							
Bank Group Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
Borrower FE		✓	✓				
Year FE			✓				
Borrower × Year FE				✓			
Loan FE					✓	✓	✓
Bank Group FE						✓	
Bank Group × Year FE							✓
Obs.	12,478	12,478	12,478	12,478	12,478	12,394	12,105
R ²	0.069	0.728	0.732	0.804	0.902	0.925	0.930
Mean(log(Loan amount))	17.352						

Table A7: Climate policy stringency differentials and cross-border credit flows

This table shows estimation results from the bank-country pair’s analysis –bank-country level regressions– and effects on cross-border credit flows. We study the number (first four columns) and the volume (last four columns) of cross-border lending from bank i to destination country j –the country where borrower companies are located. The dependent variables are $\log(1+\text{loan amount})$ or $\log(1+\text{number of loans})$ and the main independent variable is ΔCCPI , which is equal to the difference between $\text{CCPI}_{\text{lender}}$ and $\text{CCPI}_{\text{borrower}}$. The sample covers the period 2007-2017. Columns (4) and (8) include bank group level controls (net interest margin, Tier 1 capital ratio, $\log(\text{total assets})$, $\log(\text{customer deposits})$, and liquidity ratio). Control variables and fixed effects are indicated at the bottom of each column. Standard errors are clustered at the country-pair level and shown in parentheses. For variable definitions, see [Table A8](#). *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$.

	log(Number of loans)				log(Loan amount)			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
ΔCCPI	0.025*** (0.005)	0.028*** (0.004)	0.036*** (0.005)	0.028*** (0.005)	0.029*** (0.008)	0.055*** (0.009)	0.073*** (0.010)	0.057*** (0.011)
<u>Controls & Fixed Effects:</u>								
Borrower country FE		✓				✓		
Borrower country \times Year FE			✓	✓			✓	✓
Bank Group Controls				✓				✓
Obs.	4,211	4,208	4,185	4,185	4,211	4,208	4,185	4,185
R ²	0.058	0.265	0.318	0.354	0.024	0.222	0.309	0.373
Mean(dep. var.)	2.198				19.495			

Table A8: **Variables description**

Variable name	Variable definition	Source
Lender share (%)	Cross-border loan share in % values financed by syndicated loan participants.	LPC's DealScan
CCPI	Country-level climate policy stringency proxied by the Climate Change Performance (CCPI). The score ranges from [0;100]	Germanwatch e.V.
Climate Policy	Country-level climate policy measuring government efforts in national and international climate policy. 20 percent of overall CCPI score. It ranges from [0;100].	Germanwatch e.V.
GHG Emissions	Country-level measure of GHG emissions. 60 percent of overall CCPI score. It ranges from [0;100].	Germanwatch e.V.
Renewable Energy	Country-level measure of usage of renewable energies. 10 percent of CCPI overall score. It ranges from [0;100]	Germanwatch e.V.
Energy Efficiency	Country-level measure of efficiency in energy usage. 10 percent of overall CCPI score. It ranges from [0;100].	Germanwatch e.V.
Total assets (log)	The natural logarithm of the value of total assets in USD millions.	Bankscope
Net Interest Margin (%)	Percentage of earnings in interest as compared to the outgoing expenditures paid to customers.	Bankscope
Customer deposits (log)	Total customer deposits in USD millions.	Bankscope
Nonperforming loans (NPL) (%)	Ratio of loans defined to be nonperforming over gross loans in USD millions.	Bankscope
Liquidity ratio (%)	Ratio of liquid assets over deposits and short-term funding.	Bankscope
GDP per capita (log)	Logarithm of gross domestic product divided by midyear population at the country-year level.	World Bank
GDP growth (%)	Annual GDP growth rate.	World Bank
Domestic credit to GDP (%)	Domestic credit to private sector as % of GDP at the country-year level.	World Bank
Unemployment rate (%)	Number people unemployed as a percentage of the labour force at the country-year level.	World Bank
Population growth rate (%)	Annual population growth rate calculated as the exponential rate of growth of midyear population from year t-1 to t. Population counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship.	World Bank
Old workforce (%)	Ratio of older dependents—people older than 64—to the working-age population—those ages 15-64.	World Bank
Young workforce (%)	Ratio of young dependents—people younger than 15—to the working-age population—those ages 15-64.	World Bank
Common Language	Dummy variable that is equal to one if the two countries share the same language or have a former colonial relation.	Rose (2004)

Table A8(cont.): **Variables description**

Variable name	Variable definition	Source
Distance (log)	Log of geographic distance borrower-lender's country.	Rose (2004)
Financial freedom index	An overall score (ranging between 0 and 100) capturing banking efficiency as well as a measure of independence from government control and interference in the financial sector at the country-year level. The higher the score, the lower the government interference.	The Heritage Foundation
Property rights	Score that ranges from 0 to 100. Countries with more secure property rights and legal institutions that are more supportive of the rule of law receive higher ratings.	Fraser Institute Website (2008)
Number of days to enforce contracts (log)	The enforcing contracts indicator measures the time and cost for resolving a commercial dispute through a local first-instance court and the quality of judicial processes index. It counts the number of days the lawsuit filing in court until payment.	World Bank Doing Business Database
Strength of legal rights index	Strength of legal rights index measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders, facilitating lending. The index ranges from 0 to 12, with higher scores indicating that these laws are better designed to expand access to credit.	World Bank Doing Business Database
Top five bank concentration (all banks)	The fraction of total assets held by the five largest banks in the country.	World Bank Global Financial Development Database
Capital regulatory index	The sum of overall capital regulatory stringency and initial capital stringency, which measures whether certain funds may be used to initially capitalize a bank and whether they are officially verified. A higher value indicates greater stringency.	Barth et al. (2013)
Independence of supervisory authority	The degree to which the supervisory authority is independent of the government and legally protected from the banking industry. The indicator is constructed based on the following three questions. (1) Are the supervisory bodies responsible to (a) the Prime Minister, (b) the Finance Minister or other senior government officials, or (c) a legislative body (yes = 1)? (2) Whether the supervisors can be sued if they take of the supervisory agency have a fixed term actions against a bank (No = 1)? (3) Does the chair value means a more independent supervisory contract and how long? (=1 if term ≥ 4). Higher values mean more independent supervisory authority.	Barth et al. (2013)
Official supervisory power	An index aggregating supervisory power. Specifically, it indicates whether the supervisory agency has the legal right to meet directly with external auditors to discuss their report without getting approval from the bank; intervene the ownership rights; suspend the board decision to distribute dividends, among others.	Barth et al. (2013)
Green Party share (%)	Share of seats that the Green Party obtained during a given election at the country-level. The variable is calculated as the number of party seats won over total seats.	National Archives Election Results
Same country	Dummy variable equal to 1 if the lender and the borrower are located in the same country; 0 otherwise This variable indicates a loan granted domestically.	LPC's DealScan

Table A8(cont.): **Variables description**

Variable name	Variable definition	Source
High Carbon Intensity Risk	Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company (borrower) is assigned to a High, Severe or Medium Carbon Risk Category; 0 otherwise (Negligible or Low Carbon Risk Category). Specifically, based on the distribution of the carbon risk scores, each company is assigned to one of the five Carbon Risk Categories.	Sustainalytics
Loan amount	Log change in the amount of cross-border lending by bank i to destination country j . The variable is constructed as $\log(1 + \text{the amount of cross border lending})$.	LPC's DealScan
Number of loans	Log change in the number of cross-border loans by bank i to destination country j . The variable is constructed as $\log(1 + \text{the number of cross-border lending})$.	LPC's DealScan
EPI	The EPI (The Environmental Policy Index) is a composite indicator that measures how countries address the national environmental challenges. The EPI categories track performance and progress on two broad policy objectives: Environmental health and Ecosystem vitality.	Hsu et al. (2016)
C3-I	The C3-I (The Climate Change Cooperation Index) measures countries' climate policy performance, both in terms of political behavior (output) and emissions (outcome).	Bernauer and Böhmelt (2013)