Andrea Eisfeldt, University of California-Los Angeles
Can Huang, University of Illinois-Urbana-Champaign
Richard Stanton, University of California-Berkeley
Abstract: The deposit business differs at large versus small banks. We provide a parsimo- nious model and extensive empirical evidence supporting the idea that much of the variation in deposit-pricing behavior between large and small banks reflects differences in “preferences and technologies.” Large banks offer superior liquidity services but lower deposit rates, and locate where customers value their services. In addition to receiving a lower level of deposit rates on average, customers of large banks exhibit lower demand elasticities with respect to deposit rate spreads. As a result, despite the fact that the locations of large-bank branches have demographics typically associated with greater financial sophistication, large-bank customers earn lower average deposit rates. Our explanation for deposit pricing behavior challenges the idea that deposit pricing is mainly driven by pricing power derived from the large observed degree of concentration in the banking industry.
Kristian Blickle, Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Cecilia Parlatore, New York University
Anthony Saunders, New York University
Abstract: Using supervisory data on the loan portfolios of large US banks, we document that these banks specialize by concentrating their lending disproportionately in a few industries. This specialization is consistent with banks having industry-specific knowledge, reflected in reduced risk of loan defaults, lower aggregate charge-offs, and higher propensity to lend to opaque firms in the preferred industry. Banks attract high-quality borrowers by offering generous loan terms in their specialized industry, especially to borrowers with alternative options. Banks focus on their preferred industry in times of instability and relatively lower tier 1 capital as well as after sudden surges in deposits.
Abstract: Existing macroeconomic models focused on bank balance sheet lending are deficient because they do not account for the modern industrial organization of financial intermediation. Utilizing publicly available micro-level lending data, we investigate two increasingly significant margins of adjustment in credit markets: banks’ ability to sell loans and shadow bank activity. These adjustment margins are substantial and vary across time and regions with different incomes. We examine these margins in a parsimonious dynamic quantitative model featuring banks with balance sheet adjustment through loan sales and shadow banks. Using the calibrated model, we illustrate that these margins significantly dampen the immediate contraction following bank capital shock. Recovery is also faster, because profitable loan sales (e.g., securitization) allow banks to build capital faster and because shadow banks pick up lending slack. Failure to account for adjustment margins leads to significant errors when studying policies which rely on financial intermediation pass-through in the level of aggregate lending, its direction, and composition. Our model highlights the tension between bank balance sheet models and data. The model, which forces total lending to depend strongly on bank balance sheet health, must reconcile the weak correlation between bank capital and aggregate lending. These issues can be reconciled with now available data from bank balance sheets, overall bank lending, and aggregate lending, in conjunction with a model of modern financial intermediation.
Discussant: Christian Opp, University of Rochester