Abstract: This paper examines how anti-harassment legal reforms that weaken non-disclosure agreements (NDAs) in cases of workplace sexual harassment affect startups' hiring and organizational decisions. Using a staggered difference-in-differences design and LinkedIn data on over 80,000 U.S. venture-capital-backed startups from 2014–2022, we find that NDA reforms, although intended for employee protection, reduce female hiring by about 7%, with effects concentrated among junior women, who are statistically more prone to sexual harassment, and in small or male-dominated startups. The results apply to both the intensive and extensive margins of hiring female workers. Treated entrepreneurial firms also witness more departures of male managers, promote more women, and receive less VC funding. These results suggest that while NDA-weakening laws increase firms’ perceived legal risk and reduce female hiring, they also trigger internal restructuring that promotes women's advancement into leadership and may, over time, foster more accountable and inclusive organizational cultures.
Discussant: Marina Gertsberg, University of Melbourne
Abstract: Using U.S. Census Bureau employee-employer matched data, we provide the first direct empirical evidence that firms' intangible investments raise their employees' portable human capital, designating these firms as ``human capital incubators.'' We introduce a model where workers' preferences for skill development shape labor supply, giving incubators a labor-market advantage and an additional motive to invest in intangibles. Consistent with the model, incubation correlates positively with firm profitability, market power, and inflows of young workers. For top-tercile incubators, the present value of incubation is worth about 13% of firm value: roughly 43% of this value is internalized by incubating firms as wage savings, while 57% accrues as a spillover to workers and downstream employers. The aggregate externality across the whole distribution is worth 7% of total income. In a counterfactual equilibrium where workers cannot differentially price firms' incubation capacity, diminished investment incentives lead to losses in aggregate income, intangible capital stock, and average worker skill.
Discussant: Abhinav Gupta, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill
Abstract: Why do equally skilled women earn less than their male counterparts? Using detailed panel data on over 3,000 Canadian financial advisors over 13 years, we document a 40–50% gender pay gap that cannot be explained by differences in performance, effort, or client satisfaction. Female advisors charge identical fees, deliver comparable investment returns, and retain clients at equal rates—yet earn substantially less because they manage smaller client books. This disparity originates at career entry: female advisors begin with 47% less assets under management despite equivalent qualifications and financial expertise. These initial gaps persist throughout their careers, with female and male advisors exhibiting parallel growth trajectories. Quasi-random client reassignments reveal that clients assigned to female advisors actually exhibit higher retention, suggesting the market inefficiently allocates talent. The persistence stems from path dependence rather than ongoing discrimination—initial disadvantages compound through network effects and limited access to secondary book markets. Our findings demonstrate how even temporary barriers at entry can create permanent inequality in trust-based professional services.
